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Abstract
This thesis investigates whether government policy had a causal impact on UK output and
productivity growth between 1970 and 2009. Two policy-driven growth hypotheses are con-
sidered: rst that productivity growth is systematically determined by the tax and regulatory
environment in which rms start up and operate, and second that productivity is determined
by direct subsidies to business R&D. Each growth hypothesis is embedded within an open econ-
omy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model calibrated to the UK experience;
the agents optimality conditions imply a reduced form linear relationship between policy and
short-run productivity growth. Each model is tested by an Indirect Inference Wald Test, a
simulation-based test which formally compares the data generated from the model with the
observed data, using an unrestricted auxiliary model; the method has good power against gen-
eral misspecication. Identication is assured for the DSGE model by the rational expectations
restrictions; therefore the direction of causation in the model is unambiguously from policy to
productivity. Both models are also estimated by Indirect Inference. Estimation results show
that the tax and regulatory policy environment did have a causal e¤ect on productivity and
output in the 1970-2009 period, when policy is proxied by an index combining top marginal
income tax rates and a labour market regulation indicator. The results are robust to changes
in this proxy. Likewise, the hypothesis that productivity is driven by direct subsidies to busi-
ness R&D is upheld in a 1981-2010 sample, though the results are weaker. This study o¤ers
unambiguous empirical evidence that temporary changes in policies underpinning the business
environment can have long-lasting e¤ects on economic growth.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The question of how growth is generated and whether it can be inuenced by policy is still hotly
debated among policymakers and academics, more than twenty-ve years after Lucas declared
the causes of growth an appropriate subject for obsession (Lucas, 1988).1 In the intervening
period, endogenous growth theories have proliferated. These theories hold that growth is deter-
mined through the optimising decisions of rational economic agents; if government policy can
a¤ect the decision margins of the individual, there is scope for it to a¤ect the aggregate growth
rate.
Some strong policy implications emerge from such models. For instance, Schumpeterian
creative destruction models in the style of Aghion and Howitt (1992) recommend subsidies
to the research sector, while the knowledge-spillover theory of entrepreneurship (Acs et al.
2009) recommends the removal of regulatory and tax-related obstacles to business start-up and
operation, on the basis that such barriers to entrepreneurshipstie growth. However, these
recommendations are controversial. Subsidies, tax credits, tax rate cuts and deregulation all
have potentially high up front costs to society, and conclusive empirical evidence that these
policies stimulate economic growth at the macroeconomic level remains scarce.
One pervasive issue dogging empirical work in this area is model identication. Aggregate
growth regressions in the style of Barro (1991) characterise policy as an exogenous variable,
1"Is there some action a government of India could take that would lead the Indian economy to grow like
Indonesias or Egypts? If so, what, exactly? If not, what is it about the nature of Indiathat makes it so? The
consequences for human welfare involved in questions like these are simply staggering: Once one starts to think
about them, it is hard to think about anything else." (Lucas, 1988, p.5)
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and growth rates are regressed on this and other control variables in a cross-country or panel
setup. Such regression models are reduced forms of more complex relationships; since they lack
restrictions, they can accommodate more than one underlying structural theory. For instance,
we cannot distinguish between a model in which policy causes growth, and a model in which
policy responds passively to economic expansion, itself driven by other processes.2 The results
are therefore uninformative on the e¤ectiveness of policy. Other misgivings are expressed by
Temple (1999), Durlauf et al. (2005) and Easterly (2005), among others. These centre on bias in
the estimated relationships arising from parameter heterogeneity and omitted variables, and a
general lack of robustness to outliers and changes in specication (regarding both the functional
form, which is uncertain, and the set of covariates). Mankiw gave a scathing judgement on this
literature in 1995, writing that "Policymakers who want to promote growth would not go far
wrong ignoring most of the vast literature reporting growth regressions. Basic theory, shrewd
observation, and common sense are surely more reliable guides for policy" (Mankiw, 1995, pp.
307-308). This opinion is mirrored by more recent comments by Rodrik (2012), and by Myles
on the tax-growth literature, who writes that "Ultimately this line of research is a dead end
if the aim is to understand what causes growth so that we can improve the situation" (Myles,
2009b, p.16), adding that "This is an area of research in which no progress appears to have
been made" (ibid., p.33).
A di¤erent approach to the macroeconometrics of policy and growth is therefore well over-
due. Rodrik (2012) recommends that we "take the theories that motivate our empirical analyses
more seriously. Our failure to undertake meaningful tests often derives from a failure to fully
specify the theoretical model(s) being put to the test" (p.148). Having specied a structural
model that embeds the hypothesis of interest, we must "come clean about what we assume
is and is not observable, and inquire whether the empirical implications of such a model are
consistent with the data" (p. 148). This thesis takes its cue from such statements.
Here I investigate the impact of certain policies on economic growth in recent UK history,
looking at two hypotheses in turn. The rst holds that tax and regulatory policy hinders total
factor productivity growth by acting as a barrier to entrepreneurship; the second proposes that
2 Instrumental variable strategies can go some way to addressing these issues, but nding an instrument that is
both exogenous and strongly related to the policy of interest is not straightforward. Most potential instruments
can be argued to be a direct cause of growth themselves.
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direct government subsidies to private sector research and development (R&D) activity have a
positive e¤ect on productivity growth. For each of these hypotheses the existing literature points
to theoretical ambiguity over the direction of causation in the policy-growth relationship, which
undermines the interpretation of most empirical studies. I apply a simulation-based testing and
estimation methodology to a structural model in which identication is assured, representing a
novel approach to the issues.
Each hypothesis is examined within a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model
of the United Kingdom. The models implied behaviour is formally tested at the aggregate
level for its closeness to the UK experience through Indirect Inference, which uses an auxiliary
model to describe both the simulated and the observed data; the statistical closeness of these
descriptions is summarised in a Wald statistic. In this way we see whether the precisely specied
causal relationships embedded in the DSGE model are rejected by the historical UK data. The
approach throughout is therefore positivist it is an attempt to see how the economic data we
have was generated, not how the best potential outcome could be achieved. The positivist e¤ort
is a necessary step in the normative search for better policy, which always rests on modelling
choices around the underlying setup.3
Traditionally, calibrated Real Business Cycle (RBC) models have been evaluated by an in-
formal comparison of the moments of the simulated variables with the moments of the observed
series, taken one at a time (e.g. Kydland and Prescott, 1982; also Chari et al., 2002). This
indicates whether the model can replicate certain stylized facts. Indirect Inference follows a
similar procedure, extending it to a formal statistical comparison of the joint behaviour of the
variables, so ensuring that the models implications for cross-moments are not neglected. It
provides a formal evaluation criterion on which to judge the models performance. Thus in con-
trast to the calibrationist stance that a DSGE model is inherently false and so "should not be
regarded as a null hypothesis to be statistically tested", this study "take[s] the model seriously
as a data-generating process" in confronting it with the data (Canova, 1994, p. S124). While
3Friedman noted this in 1953: "The conclusions of positive economics seem to be, and are, immediately
relevant to important normative problems, to questions of what ought to be done and how any given goal can be
attained" (p. 146). The assumption, that some would reject, is that of Keynes and Friedman that economics can
be "a positive science . . . a body of systematized knowledge concerning what is" (Keynes, 1890, p.23); that is, we
claim that searching for macroeconomic models that stand up to empirical tests is a worthwhile and important
exercise.
3
calibrated studies of the macroeconomic impacts of policy reform are useful illustrations of the
theories on which they are constructed, they give back the modelers assumptions with little
indication of their validity.
In addition to testing the starting calibration for each growth model, the structural parame-
ters are estimated by Indirect Inference. This involves searching across the models parameter
space for the parameter set which minimises the test statistic, in a similar approach to Smith
(1993) and Canova (1994, 2005). As the literature reviews make clear, strong priors do not
exist for the calibration of the role of policy in the models, making this estimation procedure a
necessary step for testing the hypotheses themselves rather than simply a particular numerical
set of their parameters. This is the rst time that the Indirect Inference methodology has been
applied to a growth model of the UK. The study is conducted using unltered data for all
endogenous variables. The two-sided ltering common in the RBC literature can alter the time
series properties of the data (see e.g. Canova, 2014) and, mostly importantly in this context,
may remove short- to medium-run changes in growth, interpreting them as changes in underly-
ing potential. Since these transitional growth episodes are precisely what we wish to investigate
here with respect to policy variation, ltering would incur the loss of signicant information
from the data.
The Indirect Inference estimation results in Chapter 5 show that the tax and regulatory
policy environment did have a causal e¤ect on productivity and output in the 1970-2009 period,
when the policy environment is proxied by an equally weighted combination of the top marginal
rate of personal income tax and a labour market regulation indicator (itself constructed from
a survey-based centralised collective bargaining indicator and an index of the marginal cost of
hiring calculated by the World Bank). This conclusion is robust to adjustments around the
policy variable, continuing to hold when the small companies rate of corporate tax is used
in place of the top marginal income tax rate, and when tax rates are excluded altogether.
Further, the model performs strongly on the Wald test when more endogenous variables are
added to the auxiliary model, explaining real interest rate and real exchange rate behaviour as
well as physical capital, labour supply and consumption in various combinations. The test and
estimation results in Chapter 7 also provide positive support for the hypothesis that productivity
is driven by direct subsidies to private sector R&D for a 1981 to 2010 sample, though this model
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is rejected when other important endogenous variables are added to the auxiliary model, making
the evidence for it less strong. Variance decompositions for both estimated models show that
the policy variable is responsible for much of the endogenous variablessimulated variance, due
to its permanent e¤ects on non-stationary productivity. The power of the Indirect Inference
test to reject a false hypothesis is high (Le et al. 2011, 2015), so these results taken together
constitute strong empirical support for the hypothesis that UK government policy had a causal
e¤ect on total factor productivity growth in the past thirty to forty years, in particular through
framework policies underpinning the business environment.
The thesis is structured as follows. In Chapter 2, an open economy DSGE model of the UK
is described as a testing vehicle for both policy-driven growth hypotheses. From the models
optimality conditions, a systematic relationship between productivity and policy is derived, ac-
cording to which persistent but temporary shocks to policy around trend permanently shift the
level of productivity, also generating a short- to medium-run growth episode above productiv-
itys deterministic drift. Hence this is strictly a semi-endogenousgrowth model in the sense of
Jones (1995b), as policy is not assumed to determine long-run growth rates in steady state. A
starting calibration is proposed, and the model is used to generate impulse response functions
which illustrate the real business cycle and growth behaviour of the model after a controlled
policy shock. Chapter 3 outlines the Indirect Inference Methodology. The subject of Chapters
4 and 5 is the relationship between tax and regulatory policy, entrepreneurship and aggregate
productivity; Chapter 4 reviews the literature on this relationship, while Chapter 5 presents
the associated empirical work. The following two chapters deal similarly with the relationship
between direct subsidies to business R&D and productivity, with a literature review in Chapter
6 and empirical work in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 presents a welfare analysis of a one-o¤ 1% policy
shock in each model in turn, and Chapter 9 concludes the thesis.
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Chapter 2
A Model with Policy-Driven
Productivity
Here I present the DSGE model that is the basis for empirical work in the rest of the study.
It is an open economy Real Business Cycle model adapted from Meenagh et al. (2010), with
the addition of an endogenous growth process based on Meenagh et al. (2007). Meenagh et
al. (2010) suggest that a model of this type with exogenous growth can explain UK real ex-
change rate behaviour without the assumption of nominal rigidities in the style of Obstfeld
and Rogo¤ (1995) or Chari et al. (2002). This has been chosen as an appropriate backdrop
against which to examine the relationship in the UK data between certain government policies
and macroeconomic aggregates. The endogenous growth process is similar to Lucas (1990), in
that productivity growth depends on investments of time in innovative activity. While growth
in Lucas (1990) is driven by human capital accumulation, here the growth mechanism is less
specically dened, characterised ultimately by the policy variable assumed to govern incen-
tives surrounding it; in Chapters 5 and 7, policy variables are chosen to equate the innovative
activity, in turn, to entrepreneurial activities and to formal research and development. Below,
a systematic function relating non-stationary productivity to this policy variable (in general
terms) is derived from the representative agents optimising behaviour. The policy variable is
modelled as a trend stationary process, and the focus is on how temporary shocks perturbing
the policy around its long run trend can lead to permanent e¤ects on the level of productivity;
6
since these temporary shocks are highly persistent, their impacts on the level are long-lasting,
leading to medium-run growth episodes, though the long run rate of productivity growth is
unchanged. Therefore this is not strictly an endogenous growth model in the sense of the New
Endogenous Growth Theory (see Solow, 1994), in that policy cannot a¤ect the balanced growth
path of the economy but has transitional and reasonably long-lasting e¤ects on growth, as well
as permanent e¤ects on the level.
The model is presented in Section 2.1. Then a baseline calibration is outlined in Section
2.2, followed by a discussion of the impulse response functions generated from a policy shock.
2.1 The Model
Outlined below is a two country Armington-style model, with a single industry (Armington,
1969). Thus there is one broad type of consumption good traded at the international level,
but the product of the home goods sector is di¤erentiated from that of the foreign country;
consumers demand both the home good and the imported good, but there is scope for preference
bias towards the home good. The home country here is identied with the UK economy and
the foreign country represents the rest of the world; its size therefore allows us to treat its prices
and consumption demand as exogenous. International markets are cleared by movements in
the real exchange rate.
In the home country, there is one representative consumer, a representative prot-maximising
rm operating in a perfectly competitive nal goods market (the only sector in the economy),
and a government which spends on the consumption good and raises funds through taxation
and through bond issue. The price-taking consumer chooses to consume, hold savings instru-
ments, and divide time among competing activities in order to maximise utility subject to time
and budget constraints. The price-taking rm hires workers and nances its capital purchases
by issuing bonds. The consumer is also the shareholder of the rm. Productivity growth is a
non-stationary process with systematic dependence on the level of time spent in an activity zt,
itself a choice variable of the representative consumer. This activity is subject to a proportional
cost due to government policy.
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2.1.1 Consumer Problem
A representative consumer chooses paths for consumption (Ct) and leisure (xt) to maximise her
lifetime utility, represented by the function U :
U = maxE0[
1X
t=0
tu(Ct; xt)] (2.1)
where u(:) takes the following additively separable form.
u(Ct;xt) = 0
1
(1  1)
tC
(1 1)
t + (1  0)
1
(1  2)
tx
(1 2)
t (2.2)
1; 2 > 0 are the Arrow-Pratt coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion for consumption and leisure,
respectively, the inverse of 1 (2) being the intertemporal substitution elasticity between con-
sumption (leisure) in two consecutive periods. t and t are preference shocks, and 0 < 0 < 1
is a preference weighting on consumption.
The agent divides time among three activities: leisure, labour Nt supplied to the rm for
the real wage wt, and an activity zt that is unpaid at t but known to have important future
returns. This is summarised in the time constraint (the time endowment is normalised at one):
Nt + xt + zt = 1 (2.3)
The choice of zt is left aside for now; I return to this in Section 2.1.5 on endogenous growth. This
section outlines the agents choices of leisure versus non-leisure activity, consumption, savings
instruments in the form of domestic and foreign bonds (bt+1, b
f
t+1) and a bond issued by the
rm to nance its capital investment (~bt+1), and new shares (S
p
t ) purchased at the current price
(qt). All bonds with time subscript t+1 are issued at a unit price at t, and pay out one plus the
rate of interest agreed at t in the following period. The agent receives income at t in the form
of labour wages (wtNt), maturing bonds, and dividends (dt) on share holdings purchased last
period, holding additional purchasing power from the current sales value of her shareholdings
which is qtS
p
t 1. The agent is also liable for a taxbill Tt, which will be dened further below.
Since zt is the only taxed choice variable in the model, with all other taxes treated as lump
sum and adjusting to rule out any wealth e¤ects, the taxbill is not relevant at this stage of
8
the problem. The agents real terms budget constraint is as follows, with the price Pt of the
consumption bundle normalised to unity.
Ct + bt+1 +Qtb
f
t+1 + qtS
p
t +
~bt+1 = wtNt   Tt + bt(1 + rt 1)+
Qtb
f
t (1 + r
f
t 1) + (qt + dt)S
p
t 1 + (1 + r^t 1)~bt
(2.4)
where Qt is a unit free measure of the price of the foreign consumption good relative to the
general price level at home dened as Qt =
P ft
Pt
:E^t. E^t is the nominal exchange rate (the
domestic currency value of one unit of foreign currency). The variable Qt therefore moves
inversely to the real exchange rate, generally thought of as the price of exports relative to the
price of imports. The foreign bond bft+1 is a real bond, in that it costs the amount of money that
a unit of the foreign consumption basket (Ct ) would cost, i.e. P t , where P t is the foreign CPI.
In terms of the domestic currency, this is P t E^t. Given that everything is the budget constraint
is relative to Pt, and assuming that P t ' P ft (i.e. exported goods from the home country have
little impact of the larger foreign country) the unit cost of the real foreign bond is Qt. The
domestic bond is likewise equivalent in value to a unit of the home consumption basket.
I abstract from the nominal exchange rate E^t throughout the analysis, assuming E^t  E^
and normalising E^ at one, so that Qt is treated as the import price relative to the domestic
CPI. For xed E^, a rise in Qt implies a real depreciation of the domestic good on world markets
and hence an increase in the competitiveness of domestic exports; this can be thought of as a
real exchange rate depreciation.
The consumer maximises his utility (equations 2.1 and 2.2) with respect to Ct, xt, bt+1,
bft+1, ~bt+1 and S
p
t , subject to his time and budget constraints (equations 2.3 and 2.4). The
Lagrangian is
L0 = E0
1X
t=0
tEtf 01 1tC
(1 1)
t +

1 0
1 2

tx
(1 2)
t  
t[Ct + bt+1 +Qtb
f
t+1 + qtS
p
t +
~bt+1   wtNt + Tt 
bt(1 + rt 1) Qtbft (1 + rft 1)  (qt + dt)Spt 1   (1 + r^t 1)~bt]g
(2.5)
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and the problem yields the following rst order conditions:
Ct : 0 = t0C
 1
t   t (2.6)
xt : 0 = t(1  0)x 2t   twt (2.7)
bt+1 : 0 =  tt + t+1t+1(1 + rt) (2.8)
bft+1 : 0 =  ttQt + t+1t+1EtQt+1(1 + rft ) (2.9)
~bt+1 : 0 =  tt + t+1t+1(1 + r^t) (2.10)
Spt : 0 =  ttqt + t+1t+1(qt+1 + dt+1) (2.11)
The rst order conditions for Ct and bt+1 combine for the Euler equation, describing intertem-
poral substitution in consumption. The price of an extra unit of utility from consumption today
is 1(1+rt) in terms of tomorrows expected consumption utility discounted by time preference.
1
(1 + rt)
tC
 1
t = Et[t+1C
 1
t+1 ] (2.12)
The intratemporal condition follows from the f.o.c. for Ct and xt.
Ux
Uc
jU=0 = (1  0)tx
 2
t
0tC
 1
t
= wt (2.13)
This equates the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure to their price
ratio, the real wage - the price of consumption is the numeraire1. The optimality conditions for
bft+1 and bt+1 yield the real uncovered interest parity condition (RUIP), so that any di¤erence
between the domestic and foreign real interest rates is o¤set by an expected appreciation in the
real exchange rate.
(1 + rt) = Et
Qt+1
Qt
(1 + rft ) (2.14)
The rst order conditions on ~bt+1 and bt+1 combine to show that r^t = rt, equating the real
rate of return on the rms bond to the domestic real interest rate. From the conditions for Spt
and bt+1 we nd the share price formula. Forward substitution in this formula reveals that qt
1Later it will be shown that the return on time spent in labour, wt, is equal at the margin to the return on
zt, the alternative non-leisure activity.
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reects the present value of the rms future prot (i.e. dividend) stream per share.
qt =
qt+1 + dt+1
(1 + rt)
=
1X
i=1
dt+i
i 1Q
j=0
(1 + rt+j)
(2.15)
The condition in equation 2.15 rests on the further assumption that qt does not grow faster than
the interest rate, limi!1
qt+i
i 1Q
j=0
(1+rt+j)
= 0. These rst order conditions show that the returns on
all assets (Spt , bt+1, ~bt+1 and b
f
t+1) must be equal at the margin - the prices move to ensure that
this is so.
This two-country model assumes that the domestic country has a single, perfectly compet-
itive nal goods sector, producing a version of the nal good that is di¤erentiated from the
product of the (symmetric) foreign industry. It is therefore a single-industry version of the
Armington model (Armington, 1969; see also Feenstra, Luck, Obstfeld and Russ, 2014). The
Armington model assumes a multi-level utility structure: the consumer obtains utility from
consuming an overall amount of each industry product type(in this one-industry case that
is simply Ct) and she allocates her budget between each type of good accordingly; she then
decides how to divide that spending allocation across the di¤erentiated products within that
group (here Cdt and C
f
t ).
2 Di¤erentiated products of a given type yield utility to the agent via
a CES sub-function and it is to this sub-utility maximisation problem we now turn: having
discovered the agents optimally chosen amount of Ct for the level-one utility maximisation, we
can treat it as a parametric value and consider how that amount of the consumption bundle
should break down between consumption of the domestic variety, Cdt , and the foreign variety,
Cft . The level of consumption Ct chosen above must satisfy the expenditure constraint on
consumption,
Ct = p
d
tC
d
t +QtC
f
t (2.16)
where pdt and Qt are domestic and foreign prices relative to the general price level, Pt . To
reiterate, the nominal exchange rate has been xed at unity, and Qt is the ratio of foreign
2Thus although at the industry level individual rms operate in an intensely competitive environment, on
world markets the rm sector in a particular country is the sole source of that variety of the nal good, implying
potential for monopoly power at the international level.
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prices to the domestic CPI multiplied by the nominal exchange rate so as to make it a unit
free measure. Pt is a weighted combination of import and export prices corresponding to the
Consumer Price Index.3 Given the identity in equation 2.16, the consumer chooses Cdt and
Cft to maximise ~Ct according to the following CES aggregator utility function (equation 2.17),
subject to the constraint that ~Ct 6 Ct.
~Ct = [!(C
d
t )
  + (1  !)&t(Cft ) ] 
1
 (2.17)
At the point of the maximum the constraint is binding, so that the consumption-equivalent
utility, ~Ct, is equal to the amount spent on consumption goods, Ct (the variable that appears
in the budget constraint of the main consumer problem). The assumption here is that domestic
consumers have some xed preference bias towards the domestic good, reected in the parameter
!; 0 < ! < 1. The demand for imports is subject to a stochastic shock, &t . The elasticity of
marginal substitution between domestic and foreign varieties of the good is constant at  = 11+ .
The Lagrangian for the problem is M ,
M = [!(Cdt )
  + (1  !)&t(Cft ) ] 
1
 + (Ct   pdtCdt  QtCft ) (2.18)
and the rst order conditions are4:
Cdt : 0 = !C
(1+)
t (C
d
t )
 (1+)   pdt (2.19)
Cft : 0 = (1  !)&tC(1+)t (Cft ) (1+)   Qt (2.20)
Since at the maximum, ~Ct = Ct, and d Md Ct =  while
d M
d ~Ct
= 1 , it follows that  = 1 when the
constraint binds. Hence the relative demand for the imported good is given by equation 2.21
and the relative demand for the domestic consumption good by equation 2.22.
Cft
Ct
=

(1  !)&t
Qt

(2.21)
3This would be a CES function but it is left out here since we do not need it for the analysis.
4Using the substitution [!(Cdt )
  + (1  !)&t(Cft ) ] 
1

 1
= f[:::]  1 g(1+) = C(1+)t
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Cdt
Ct
=

!
pdt

(2.22)
2.1.2 Open economy relations
Given equation 2.21 above, the symmetric equation describing foreign demand for domestic
goods (exports) relative to general foreign consumption is
(Cdt )
 = Ct
  
1  !F  &t F (Qt ) F (2.23)
where * signies a foreign variable and !F and F are respectively the foreign equivalents to
home bias and the elasticity of marginal substitution between domestic and imported goods.
Qt is the foreign equivalent of Qt, the ratio of the import price to the CPI. By symmetry,
Qt =
P dt
P t
, so that lnQt = ln pdt   lnP t . Since Qt = P
f
t
Pt
, and Pt is the numeraire, Qt = P
f
t .
Adding the assumption that P t ' P ft on the basis that the domestic export goods price has
little inuence on the foreign CPI means that lnQt depends on ln pdt and Qt.
An expression for pdt as a function of Qt follows from the maximised equation 2.17 where
~Ct = Ct combined with the relative demand functions 2.21 and 2.22:
1 = !(pdt )
 + [(1  !)&t]Qt (2.24)
A loglinear approximation for this expression is derived by taking a rst order Taylor expansion
around a point where pd ' Q ' & ' 1, with  = 1. This yields
ln pdt = k^  
1  !
!
1

ln &t   1  !
!
lnQt (2.25)
where k^ is a constant of integration.
Returning to export demand, it was established above that
ln(Cdt )
 = lnCt + 
F ln
 
1  !F + F ln &t   F ln pdt + F lnQt
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since lnQt = ln pdt   lnQt. Given the relationship in 2.25, this is
ln(Cdt )
 = lnCt + 
F ln
 
1  !F + F ln &t   F (k^   1  !! 1 ln &t) + 1!F lnQt
The export demand equation is then
ln(Cdt )
 = c+ lnCt + 
F 1
!
lnQt + "ex;t (2.26)
where c collects the constants and "ex;t = 
F ln &t + F
1 !
!
1
 ln &t.
Assuming no capital controls, the real balance of payments constraint is satised so that
the current account surplus (real net exports plus income ows on foreign assets) and capital
account decit (the decrease in net foreign assets) sum to zero. In other words, for net saving or
asset accumulation in period t the country must run a trade surplus. Expressed in real terms,
the balance of payments is
bft+1 = r
f
t b
f
t +
pdtEXt
Qt
  IMt (2.27)
2.1.3 Firm Problem
There is a representative rm which produces a homogeneous consumption good using constant
returns to scale production technology, with diminishing marginal products to labour and cap-
ital inputs. Production is described by the following Cobb Douglas function, where At is total
factor productivity:
Yt = AtK
1 
t N

t (2.28)
The rm also faces convex adjustment costs to capital which are assumed, for the sake of
tractability, to take a quadratic form. The rm undertakes capital investment in this model,
raising the necessary funds to purchase new capital not by issuing new shares (the number of
shares is xed at one) but by issuing debt (~bt+1) at t, the cost of which is r^t payable along with
the face value at t+ 1. Bonds are issued one for one with units of capital demanded:
~bt+1 = Kt
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The cost of capital covers not only the return demanded by debt-holders, but also capital
depreciation  and adjustment costs, represented by ~at 5. The rms prot function is:
t = Yt   ~bt+1(r^t +  + t + ~at)  ( ~wt + t)Nt
where t and t are shocks to the net rental costs of capital and labour, respectively - these
could capture random movements in marginal tax rates, for instance in depreciation allowances
or national insurance. It was shown using the consumer rst order conditions above (2.8 and
2.10) that r^t = rt. Substituting in the constraint that ~bt+1 = Kt, and that the cost of the bond
is rt, the prot function is in 2.29
t = Yt  Kt(rt +  + t)  1
2
(Kt)
2   ( ~wt + t)Nt (2.29)
Here adjustment costs are explicit, having substituted ~bt+1~at = Kt~at = Kt:12
(Kt)2
Kt
= 12(Kt)
2.
The rm maximises expected prots subject to these constraints, through its choices of
capital (Kt) and labour (Nt), taking prices rt and ~wt (the respective real rental rates of capital
and labour) as given. Assume free entry into the sector and a large number of rms operating
under perfect competition. The Lagrangian for the problem is L0:
L0 = E0
1P
t=0
dtEt

Yt  Kt(rt +  + t)  1
2
(Kt)
2   ( ~wt + t)Nt

(2.30)
 is a multiplicative constant a¤ecting adjustment costs, while d is the rms discount factor
(these parameter allow some empirical exibility when the model is calibrated). The rst order
conditions are:
Kt : 0 =
Yt
Kt
(1  )  (rt +  + t)  (Kt  Kt 1) + d(EtKt+1  Kt) (2.31)
Nt : 0 =
Yt
Nt
:  ( ~wt + t) (2.32)
Equation 2.31 sets the marginal product of capital (net of the cost of input adjustment and
5where the adjustment cost attached to ~bt+1 is: ~bt+1~at = ~bt+1: 12

~bt+1 +
~b2t
~bt+1
  2~bt

= ~bt+1:
1
2

(~bt+1)
2
~bt+1
=
1
2
(~bt+1)
2
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depreciation) equal to its unit price, plus a cost shock.
(1  ) Yt
Kt
     Kt + dEt(Kt+1) = rt + t (2.33)
It can be rearranged to give a non-linear di¤erence equation in capital.
Kt =
1
1 + d
Kt 1 +
d
1 + d
EtKt+1 +
(1  )
(1 + d)
Yt
Kt
  1
(1 + d)
(rt + )  1
(1 + d)
t (2.34)
This equation could be described as the demand for capital, its non-linearity resulting from the
quadratic capital adjustment costs that the rm faces. Given capital demand from equation
2.34, the rms investment, It, follows via the linear capital accumulation identity (equation
2.35).
Kt = It + (1  )Kt 1 (2.35)
The rst order condition with respect to labour equates the marginal product of labour to
its price, the real unit cost of labour to the rm ( ~wt) plus the stochastic cost shock term t.
This is rearranged for the rms demand for labour condition.
Nt = :
Yt
~wt + t
(2.36)
Throughout this exposition of the rms problem the notation for the rental rate of labour,
~wt, has di¤ered from the real wage referred to in the consumer problem, wt. In this Armington-
style open economy the domestic rm sector produces a variety of the nal good that is di¤er-
entiated from the product variety of the foreign rm sector, therefore facing an elastic demand
curve in world markets (Armington, 1969). Hence although the representative rm is a price-
taker operating in a perfectly competitive sector within the domestic economy, at the country
level Q the home price (relative to foreign prices which are exogenous) is set to clear the do-
mestic market in goods. This assumption of di¤erentiated goods introduces a wedge between
the consumer real wage, wt, and the real unit cost of labour from the perspective of the rm,
~wt. The real rental price of labour faced by the domestic rm is the nominal wage Wt relative
to the unit value of the domestic good produced, P dt , while the real wage in the consumer
budget constraint is the nominal wage Wt relative to the general price level, the price Pt of the
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consumption bundle which combines both domestic and imported goods (Pt is treated as the
numeraire throughout). Since pdt  P
d
t
Pt
, the wedge can be expressed as
pdt =
wt
~wt
(2.37)
implying, via 2.25, the relationship in equation 2.38.
lnwt = k^ + ln ~wt  

1  !
!

lnQt  

1  !
!
 1

ln &t (2.38)
2.1.4 Government
The government spends on the consumption good (Gt), which is assumed to be non-productive
and made up strictly of welfare transfers, subject to its budget constraint.
Gt + bt(1 + rt 1) = Tt + bt+1 (2.39)
where Tt is revenue collected from consumers. As well as raising tax revenues the government
borrows, issuing bonds maturing one period ahead; a bond issued in period t at a unit price is
denoted bt+1, paying out (1+rt) times its face value at t+1. Each period the government raises
tax revenues to cover spending on transfer payments and the current bill for debt interest, so
that Tt = Gt + rt 1bt and bt = bt+1. Therefore the level government debt is assumed xed
in this model and the government is fully solvent in every period. Revenue Tt is made up as
follows.
Tt =  tzt +t (2.40)
 t is a proportional rate on time spent in innovative activity zt. This could be a penalty
representing costs incurred by the innovator not just due to direct monetary taxes or fees levied
by the government but also due to time and costs associated with regulatory compliance. If
we assume that all policy costs on zt are genuine external social costs, redistributed to the
consumer by the government via a reduction in the lumpsum levy t, then the tax revenue
collected by government is equal to that taxbill paid by consumers.6 Alternatively  t could be
6 It is possible that only a proportion 0 <  < 1 of the penalty paid on zt by the innovator enters the
government budget as revenue, the rest being deadweight loss that reduces the payo¤ to innovation activities
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a negative tax, such as subsidy measures to incentivise the innovative activity; this scenario is
investigated in Chapter 7. By construction in this model, a higher penalty (or lower subsidy)
on zt leads to less of this activity and consequently more standard labour (or leisure) for a
given real wage, while a lower tax (or higher subsidy) should lead to a greater investment of
time in z and so higher productivity growth, ceteris paribus. This relation is examined in more
detail in Section 2.1.5. The remainder of government revenue is collected by t, a lumpsum tax
capturing the revenue e¤ects of all other tax instruments a¤ecting the consumer. t responds
to changes in  tzt, adjusting to keep tax revenue neutral in the government budget constraint.
Government spending is modeled as an exogenous trend stationary AR(1) process.
lnGt = go + g1t+ g lnGt 1 + g;t (2.41)
where j g j< 1 and g;t is a white noise innovation.
2.1.5 Endogenous Growth
Assume that productivity growth is a linear function of time spent in some innovation-enhancing
activity zt.
At+1
At
= a0 + a1zt + ut (2.42)
d lnAt+1 = (a0   1) + a1zt + ut (2.43)
where a1 > 0. zt is the systematic channel through which policy incentives,  t, can drive
growth7. The characterisation of zt in practice depends on the data used for its tax, and on
certain elements of calibration. It will become clear from manipulation of its rst order condition
that zt can be bypassed altogether in the model, since productivity growth ultimately depends
on the tax variable  0t alone (equation 2.53). This section derives the linear relationship between
productivity growth and  0t that drives the RBC models dynamic behaviour in simulations.
The model is conceptually similar to Lucas (1988, 1990), where growth is determined endoge-
without beneting the consumer in other ways. In that case revenue is ~Tt =   tzt +t while the consumer tax
bill is Tt =  tzt +t. Here  is assumed to be 1, though notionally it could vary stochastically.
7All other factors that might systematically a¤ect growth - such as human capital or rm specic R&D
investment - are therefore in the error term.
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nously by the agents decision to devote a proportion of time to human capital accumulation.
Once accumulated, human capital enhances labour e¢ ciency in the production process and
increases earnings, though in the short term the return to labour (for a given level of human
capital) must be foregone in order to raise the human capital stock. Thus there is a tradeo¤
in terms of how a unit of time can be allocated; as an input to the human capital production
function, as an input to goods production, or in leisure. The particular endogenous growth
process used here is from Meenagh et al. (2007), adapted for a decentralised framework.
Earlier the consumer utility maximisation problem was developed for all control variables
except zt, the choice of time spent in innovative activities, so we now turn to that decision
margin, taking all other choices as given. The consumer maximises utility in equations 2.1 and
2.2 with respect to zt, subject to budget and time constraints (equations 2.3 and 2.4) as before.
The Lagrangian L0 is repeated here for convenience (cf. equation 2.5); now the taxbill is made
explicit (eq. 2.40) in the budget constraint. I add a further assumption that in every period t,
the consumers shareholdings are equivalent to a single share, i.e. 2.44 holds for all t.
Spt 1 = S
p
t =
S = 1 (2.44)
This is not to say that the consumer makes no decision to hold shares in every period; each
period the consumer demands Spt and the price per share must be such that the number of
shares supplied (normalised at one for all t) are held by the consumer. The value per share
given in equation 2.15 is then the value of the rm as a whole. The assumption in 2.44 allows
the substitution to be made in the budget constraint that qtS
p
t   (qt + dt)Spt 1 =  dt.
L0 = E0
1X
t=0
tEtf 01 1tC
(1 1)
t +

1 0
1 2

tx
(1 2)
t   t[Ct + bt+1 +Qtbft+1+
~bt+1 +  tzt +t   wtNt   bt(1 + rt 1) Qtbft (1 + rft 1)  (1 + r^t 1)~bt   dt]g
(2.45)
Note that the dividend income dt received by the shareholder is everything leftover from revenue
after labour and capital input costs are paid, i.e. prots.
It is worth saying something here about how the rational agent expects zt to raise his own
consumption possibilities. This hinges on his role as the rms sole shareholder. Given the
relationship in equation 2.42, the agent is aware that a marginal change in zt will result in
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permanently higher productivity from period t+1. This higher productivity is fully excludable
and is donated exclusively by the agent to the atomistic rm he owns; the productivity increase
is then anticipated to raise household income through higher rm prots paid out as dividends.
The agent assumes that his choice here will not a¤ect economy-wide aggregates; all prices
are taken as parametric (note that the productivity increase is not anticipated to increase the
consumer real wage here, though it will do so in general equilibrium). Annex 1 contains more
discussion of this.
Given the time endowment 1 = Nt + xt + zt , a full set of optimality conditions for time
allocations will describe the agents indi¤erence relations between zt and xt, between xt and Nt,
and between zt and Nt. Once two have been found, the third follows. We have already derived
the margin at which the agent is indi¤erent between spending a unit of time in xt and a unit
in Nt (the intratemporal condition in 2.13); here I focus on the decision margin between zt and
Nt, so that the margin between zt and xt is implied. Therefore the substitution Nt = 1 xt zt
can be made in the budget constraint.8
The rst order condition is given in equation 2.46:
dL
dzt
= 0 =  ttwt   tt t + Et
1X
i=1
t+it+i:
d dt+i
dzt
(2.46)
Note that  t may be negative if it represents a subsidy to zt. At the (Nt; zt) margin, the
optimal choice of zt trades o¤ the impacts of a small increase dzt on labour earnings (which will
be lower in period t, due to reduced employment time), the innovation costs to be paid (higher
at t in proportion to the increase in zt), and expected dividend income. Given equation 2.42,
dAt+i
dAt+i 1 =
At+i
At+i 1 . Therefore, for i  1,
d At+i
dzt
=
d At+i
dAt+i 1
:
d At+i 1
dAt+i 2
:::::
d At+2
dAt+1
:
d At+1
dzt
= At+i
At
At+1
a1 (2.47)
8 If we were to examine the (xt; zt) margin we would substitute xt = 1 Nt   zt in the utility function. This
would just yield the relationship that we can deduce from the intratemporal condition between the MRS (xt; Ct)
and the returns on zt. Intuitively, the agent has preferences for leisure and consumption over all t, and the
consumption path is funded by non-leisure activity - either labour, or zt. We look rst of all at the possibility
that all consumption is funded by the proceeds of Nt. This gives the intratemporal condition, where MUxMUC = w.
That is, the opportunity cost of xt is the real wage, the proceeds of labour foregone. The opportunity cost of xt
(from the perspective of zt foregone) is also the return on zt, the value of higher permanent income from t + 1
onwards, less the penalty incurred at t. These opportunity costs must be equated.
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so that ddt+idzt =
Yt+i
At+i
At+i
At
At+1
a1: See Annex 1 for a full explanation of the expected e¤ect of dzt
on the rms prot function at t+ 1 (and for any t+ i). Equation 2.46 becomes
tt(wt +  t) = Et
1X
i=1
t+it+i:
Yt+i
At+i
:At+i
At
At+1
:a1
We can rearrange this so that the return to Nt and the return to zt are equal at the margin, in
terms of utility from consumption.
ttwt =
a1
a0 + a1zt + ut
:Et
1X
i=1
t+it+iYt+i   tt t (2.48)
On the left hand side, the return on the marginal unit of Nt is of course the real consumer wage;
on the right is the present discounted value of the expected increase in the dividend stream as a
result of a marginal increase in zt, net of the contemporaneous costs associated with innovative
activities which are captured in this model by  t.9  t therefore stands for the extent to which
the returns from higher productivity resulting from zt are not appropriated by the innovator
responsible for generating them or, when it represents a subsidy, the extent to which innovation
costs are reduced by government intervention.
Equation 2.48 can be rearranged for zt, substituting for the multiplier using the rst order
condition for consumption, equation 2.6.
zt =
1
t
Et
1X
i=1
t+it+iC
 1
t+i Yt+i
tC
 1
t (wt +  t)
  (a0 + ut)
a1
(2.49)
From equation 2.42,
a1zt =
At+1
At
  (a0 + ut)
9The non-policy cost of generating new productivity via zt is assumed to be zero.  t does not include any
xed or sunk cost of innovating. Moreover, time in zt leads in a certain fashion to higher productivity, except in
so far as the relationship is subject to a random shock.
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Equation 2.49 then becomes
At+1
At
= a1:
Et
1X
i=1
it+iC
 1
t+i Yt+i
tC
 1
t (wt +  t)
(2.50)
Modeling the preference shock to consumption, t, as an AR(1) stationary process such that
t = t 1 + ;t, a substitution can also be made for Et
1X
i=1
t+i as i goes to innity.
Et
1X
i=1
t+i = t
1X
i=1
i
Setting 1 ' 1 and approximating CtYt as a random walk (see Appendix 1, Section A), so that
Et
Yt+i
Ct+i
= YtCt for all i > 0, the expression becomes
At+1
At
= a1:

1  :
Yt
Ct
wt
Ct
(1 +  0t)
(2.51)
where  twt   0t. This refocuses the driver variable as the ratio of the penalty rate on time
spent in zt to the current wage level, which is the opportunity cost of spending time outside
the regular workforce.  0t is a unit free measure with the dimensions of a tax rate, as opposed
to  t which, like the wage, is an amount of money payable on units of time. This variable  0t is
easier to take to the data.
A rst order Taylor expansion of the righthand side of equation 2.51 around a point where
Yt
wt
= Yw and 
0
t = 
0 gives
At+1
At
= a1:

1 
Y
w
(1 +  0)
+ a1:

1 
(1 +  0)
d
Yt
wt
  a1:

1 
Y
C
w
C (1 + 
0)2
d 0t (2.52)
Equivalently, for a model assuming subsidies to increase innovation i.e. with an opposite signed
e¤ect (see Chapters 6 and 7), this relationship is:
At+1
At
= a1:

1 
Y
w
(1  s0) + a1:

1 
(1  s0)d
Yt
wt
+ a1:

1 
Y
C
w
C (1  s0)2
ds0t
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where the policy variable is called s0t in order to distinguish it explicitly from the penalty variable
 0t. Treating the ratio
Y
w as roughly time invariant - on the basis that
wt
Yt
= :Nt and labour
Nt is a long-run stationary variable - and modeling the policy variable as stationary, a linear
relationship exists between At+1At and 
0
t of the form
d lnAt+1 = b0 + b1
0
t + "A;t (2.53)
where b1 =  a1:

1 
Y
C
w
C
(1+ 0)2 for a policy raising the costs of innovation. Alternatively b1 =
a1:

1 
Y
C
w
C
(1 s0)2 for a subsidy policy in the equivalent relationship, d lnAt+1 = b0 + b1s
0
t + "A;t.
Note that this relationship came out of the rst order condition for zt. The household makes
its zt choice taking all other sources of productivity growth as exogenous; other growth factors
outside the model (like human capital accumulation) therefore a¤ect the constant b0 and the
error term in the productivity time series. Equation 2.53 drives the behaviour of the model in
simulations. Calibration of b1 is discussed in Section 2.2 and in Chapter 5. To summarise the
process gone through between equations 2.42 and 2.53, we have used the productivity growth
hypothesis with the agents optimal choice of zt to derive productivity growth as a linear func-
tion of  0t (or s0t), the percentage tax(or subsidy) rate on zt.
Examination of the relationship in equation 2.49 reveals a relationship between zt and  0t.
Dene @zt
@ 0t
 c1 , and assume this to be a constant. This parameter enters the simulation ex-
plicitly in the producer real wage equation, derived as follows from the intratemporal condition
(equation 2.13) which governs labour supply choices. Taking the total derivative of the time
endowment in 2.3 gives dxt =  dNt dzt, and hence dxtxt =  dNt dztxt . Assuming that N  x  12
in some initial steady state with approximately no z activity implies
dxt
x
= d lnxt   d lnNt   dztN =  d lnNt   2dzt (2.54a)
In log di¤erences, the intratemporal condition is
 2d lnxt =  d ln t + d ln t   1d lnCt + d lnwt (2.54b)
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Substituting for lnwt from 2.38 (dropping the constant) and using 2.54a, this becomes
d lnNt + 2c1d
0
t =   12d ln t +
1
2
d ln t   12d lnCt+
1
2
h
k + d ln ~wt   1

1 !
!

d ln &t  

1 !
!

d lnQtg
i (2.54c)
Integrating this and rearranging for the log of the real unit cost of labour to the rm, ln ~wt,
gives
ln ~wt = const4 + 2 lnNt + 1 lnCt +

1  !
!

lnQt + 22c1
0
t + ew;t (2.55)
where
ew;t =   ln t + ln t +
1


1  !
!

ln &t (2.56)
i.e. the unit labour cost shock is a combination of preference shocks to consumption and leisure
and to import demand. When  0t represents a penalty on innovative activities, c1 < 0 and hence
d ln ~wt
d 0t
< 0 and equally d lnNt
d 0t
> 0, since equation 2.55 is simply the labour supply condition
rearranged; so the workers response to a higher penalty rate on zt is to raise time spent in
ordinary employment. Conversely when  0t is replaced by a subsidy s0t or other nancial incentive
towards innovative activities, the signs of these e¤ects are reversed. Taking the derivative of
the relationship in 2.49 shows c1 =  

1 
Yt
C
1
t
wt
C
1
t
(1+ 0t)2
, or c1 =

1 
Yt
C
1
t
wt
C
1
t
(1 s0t)2
in the subsidy case.
To be clear, what has been done here is the following. I took the optimal condition governing
the (x;N) margin (equation 2.13) and substituted in from the time endowment to relate the
marginal rate of substitution between x and C to the amount of time left for N and z (given
the optimal x choice). The amount of time chosen for x is of course consistent with the time
endowment. Moreover I evaluate the time endowment at some point where the proportions of
time given to N and x are roughly equal at a half (this is somewhat arbitrary). I then substitute
in for the real consumer wage using the expression for the wedge between wt and ~wt (equation
2.38). I also use the relationship between z and  0 in 2.49 to substitute out dzt in terms of d 0t.
This leaves the relationship in 2.55.
2.1.6 Closing the model
Goods market clearing is required to close the model. In volume terms, the supply of the domes-
tic good is equated to the demand for consumption (net of imports), investment, government
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consumption and exports.
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + EXt   IMt (2.57)
Relative prices (i.e. the real exchange rate, linked to the real interest rate through RUIP) move
to ensure that market clearing also holds in value terms. Since the goods market clears and
income can be spent only on goods or assets, by WalrasLaw the overall assets market must
also clear.
St +b
f
t+1 +bt+1 +
~bt+1 = S
p;D
t +b
f;D
t+1 +b
D
t+1 +
~bDt+1 (2.58)
Change in demand for assets on the right hand side is equated to changes in supply on the left
by movements in the asset returns; since marginal returns are equal across di¤erent asset types
(by virtue of their rst order conditions) we can refer to a single asset return, rt. Equality in the
overall asset market signies that total savings equals total investment. Given the government
budget constraint is balanced in every period and the government keeps the domestic bond
stock xed (bt+1 = 0), government savings are zero. Therefore total private savings equal
total investment. Private investment is made up of domestic investment demand and net foreign
investment (i.e. negative holdings of bft ). The price qt ensures that the domestic shares market
clears in every period
Spt = St (2.59)
so St = S
p;D
t (and St = S). Thus
bft+1 +
~bt+1 = b
f;D
t+1 +
~bDt+1 (2.60)
Since ~bt+1 = Kt, and both capital and labour markets are cleared by their respective prices,
the market for the rms bond clears: ~bDt+1 = ~bt+1. WalrasLaw implies that the market
for foreign bonds also clears, so that domestic demand for foreign savings vehicles is equal to
supply: bft+1 = b
f;D
t+1.
A transversality condition is also required to ensure a balanced growth equilibrium is reached
for this open economy in which trade decits (surpluses) cannot be run forever via borrowing
from (lending) abroad. This rules out a growth path nanced by insolvent borrowing rather
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than growing fundamentals. The transversality condition imposes the restriction on the balance
of payments identity that in the long run the change in net foreign assets (the capital account)
must be zero. At some notional terminal date T when the real exchange rate is constant, the
cost of servicing the current level of debt must be met by an equivalent trade surplus.
rfT b
f
T =  

pdT :EXT
QT
  IMT

(2.61)
This is the only transversality condition in the model, and the numerical solution path is forced
to be consistent with the constraints it places on the rational expectations. In practice it is
a constraint on household borrowing since government solvency is ensured already by other
means, and rms do not borrow from abroad.
When solving the model, the balance of payments constraint is scaled by output so that
the terminal condition imposes that the ratio of debt to gdp must be constant in the long run,
b^ft+1 = 0 as t ! 1, where b^ft+1 =
bft+1
Yt+1
. This implies that the growth rate of debt equals
the growth rate of real gdp (gY ). The solvency condition on international borrowing strictly
demands that the real rate of interest on foreign bonds (rf ) is higher than the growth rate of
debt (gY ) as t!1. This is because solvency requires that the present value of debt held at T
goes to zero, b
f
T
(1+rf )T
! 0, as T !1. Knowing that at T debt is growing at gY ,
bfT
(1 + rf )T
=
bf0(1 + gY )
T
(1 + rf )T
= bf0(1 + gY   rf )T (2.62)
For this to go to zero, we require rf > g. Note that imposing b^fT+1 = 0 does not ensure
rf > g in the long run. We must assume that rf > g holds. If it did not hold the economy
would be in a state of dynamic ine¢ ciency; when rf < g it is irrational not to borrow more,
since investment will yield growth which more than covers the cost of investment. Logically
speaking, borrowing should increase until rf > g. This issue is out of scope here.
2.1.7 Stochastic processes
There are eleven auto-regressive (AR) shocks in the model. Seven of these are residuals in the
structural equations, and four are exogenous variables. Just one of the eleven is non-stationary
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(the productivity shock) while the rest are I(0), either straightforwardly stationary or trend
stationary. All stationary residuals take the following AR(1) form:
ei;t = ai + bit+ iei;t 1 + i;t (2.63)
where i;t is an i.i.d mean zero innovation term, and i identies the endogenous variable to which
the residual belongs. The exogenous variables take a similar form. The AR(1) coe¢ cients i
are estimated using the residuals backed out of the structural model, given the calibration. To
back out the models structural residuals where expectations enter, expectational variables are
estimated using a robust instrumental variable technique due to Wickens (1982) and McCallum
(1976); they are the one step ahead predictions from an estimated VECM. Where ai 6= 0 and
bi 6= 0, the linearly detrended residual e^i is used, where
e^i;t = ie^i;t 1 + i;t (2.64)
and
e^i;t = ei;t   a^i   b^it (2.65)
The innovations i;t are approximated by the tted residuals from estimation of equation 2.64,
^i;t.
10 These are then used to bootstrap the model. New innovation series are created by
drawing from these residuals with replacement, drawing by time vector (i.e. horizontally) so
as to preserve any contemporaneous correlation between them. One exception to this is the
policy variable which is bootstrapped separately, on the basis that contemporaneous correla-
tion between this shock and the separate, exogenous productivity shock would hamper the
identication of the growth hypothesis. Further discussion of the bootstrapping methodology
is deferred to Chapter 3.
There are I(0) shocks to domestic interest rates, labour demand, capital, the real producer
10 In Chapters 5 and 7, the trend terms bit form the basis for the deterministic growth path over the sample
period, which is added back into simulated paths generated by the model before those paths are formally compared
to the real data in the Wald statistic, via the auxiliary model (the VECM). Since for each residual the linear
trend is estimated in isolation rather than jointly, we can expect some inaccuracy in these deterministic growth
terms. For this reason the model is not assessed on its ability to capture these trends which, though included in
the auxiliary model, are left out of the Wald statistic. More is said of this in Chapter 3.
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wage (or unit cost of labour), exports and imports. Foreign interest rates, foreign consumption,
government spending and  0t (or s0t) are stochastic exogenous variables that are also treated as
stationary AR(1) processes. The Solow residual At is modelled as a unit root process with drift
driven by an AR(1) shock and by exogenous variable  0t or s0t, based on equation 2.53.11
At = d+At 1 + b1 t 1 + eA;t (2.66)
eA;t = AeA;t 1 + A;t (2.67)
Since the drift term in productivity is exogenous and the penalty variable  0t is moving
stochastically around a constant mean, the long run growth rate of At in the absence of any
shocks is constant. AlthoughNt is stationary and cannot grow in steady state, Yt = F (Kt; AtNt)
will grow at a constant rate when Kt and AtNt grow at the same rate along a balanced growth
path, and the balanced growth rate of At could theoretically rise if the steady state proportion
of time zt could be increased, which would in turn require the steady state level of  to decrease.
However, that is not the focus in the present paper. A balanced growth path of the model is
assumed to exist, in that at some notional future date when all shocks have ceased, variables
settle down to constant growth rates that are functions of deterministic trends or drift terms in
the residuals; but the steady state growth behaviour of the economy in our nite sample is not
the empirical issue of interest. The aim here is to look at how productivity growth changes along
the models transition path as it is shocked out of equilibrium, in particular by policy shocks
to the incentive structures governing certain innovative activities; we focus on entrepreneurial
activities and on R&D. The non-stationarity of productivity implies that even temporary shocks
to incentives will have a permanent e¤ect on the level, and a stream of positive shocks would
raise the productivity growth rate over the corresponding period.
11The growth rate of productivity may itself be non-stationary At is certainly non-stationary, and could
be I(1) or I(2). If  0t and the shock are both stationary, productivity will be I(1), but if 
0
t is I(1) then the
productivity level At would be I(2). An I(2) productivity process would make the whole model I(2), which does
not necessarily match the facts - though unit root tests have been shown to have limited power to demonstrate
order of integration conclusively when it is borderline. The penalty rate is a pure exogenous variable which can
be modelled at our discretion; the model should be rejected if we make the wrong choice. Since the index seems
to have some trended behaviour we can characterise it as trend stationary.
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2.1.8 The Log-Linearised Model
The linearised system of optimality conditions and constraints solved numerically to obtain
paths for the endogenous variables as functions of the exogenous shocks is given below. Each
equation is normalised on one of the endogenous variables. All variables are in natural logs,
except where variables are already expressed in percentages (e.g. b^ft , which is the ratio of net
foreign assets to output). See Appendix 2 for data descriptions and symbol key. The solution
method with non-stationary data is explained in Appendix 1, Section A. For notational clarity,
ln(Cdt )
 and lnCft have been replaced with lnEXt and ln IMt, respectively.
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rt = r
0 + 1 (Et lnCt+1   lnCt) + er;t (2.68)
lnYt =  lnNt + (1  ) lnKt + lnAt (2.69)
lnNt = lnYt   ~wt + en;t (2.70)
lnKt = 1 lnKt 1 + 2 lnKt+1 + 3 lnYt   4:rt + ek;t (2.71)
lnCt =
Y
C
lnYt   EXC lnEXt +
IM
C
ln IMt  
K
C
lnKt + (2.72)
(1     k)
K
C
lnKt 1  
G
C
lnGt
ln ~wt = 2 lnNt + 1 lnCt +

1  !
!

lnQt + 22c1
0
t + ewh;t (2.73)
lnwt = ln ~wt  

1  !
!

lnQt + ew;t (2.74)
lnEXt = lnC

t + 
F 1
!
lnQt + eX;t (2.75)
ln IMt = lnCt    lnQt + eM;t (2.76)
lnQt = Et lnQt+1 + r
f
t   rt (2.77)
b^ft+1 = (r
f
t   g)b^ft +

1
1 + g
0@ EX~Y : ~pd~Q lnEXt   EX~Y : ~pd~Q 1! lnQt
  IM~Y ln IMt
1A (2.78)
lnAt = lnAt 1 + b1 0t 1 + eA;t (2.79)
lnCt = C lnC

t 1 + C;t (2.80)
lnGt = G lnGt 1 + G;t (2.81)
rft = rfr
f
t 1 + rf;t (2.82)
 0t = 
0
t 1 + ;t (2.83)
Note that in the model tested in Chapter 7, the variable s0t replaces  0t in equations 2.73, 2.79 and
2.83. Three of these equations hold as identities (market clearing, real uncovered interest parity
and the balance of payments), and the consumer wage shock is also set to zero (it has common
elements with the shock to vt, see equations 2.38 and 2.56). The last four equations describe the
exogenous variables: foreign consumption demand, government consumption demand, foreign
interest rates and the policy variable. The shocks ei;t are ARIMA(1,0,0) processes, where i
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denotes the endogenous variable on which the relevant equation has been normalised.
Where equations are not straightforwardly linear in logs, they are linearised around sample
mean values, denoted by the overbar. The capital demand equation and market clearing con-
straint contain intertemporal dynamics; these equations are linearised around a point at which
Kt = K , and Kt 1 and Kt+1 are related to K by a xed balanced growth rate k. Likewise, the
balance of payments constraint is scaled by output and its linearisation therefore includes the
parameter g, the assumed balanced growth rate of output. An additional assumption applied
in the linearisation of the balance of payments is that k^ = 1 !!
1
 ln &t = 0 in equation 2.84,
allowing the following approximation:
ln pdt   lnQt =  (
1  !
!
+ 1) lnQt =   1
!
lnQt (2.84)
Whether these approximations are good enough is an empirical matter.
Why choose not to lter the data?
Since Nelson and Plosser (1982), there has been signicant interest in the possibility that
macroeconomic time series variables are non-stationary; that is, their moments depend on time
in a way that is at least partly unpredictable. In much of the real business cycle literature
the approach has been to stationarise data before using it to solve or test the implications of
a model, by ltering out trends (both deterministic and stochastic elements) using a Hodrick-
Prescott (HP) or Band Pass procedure (Hodrick and Prescott, 1997; Baxter and King, 1999).
While many have acknowledged the di¢ culties presented by HP ltering (Canova, 2014), it is
still a dominant practice. The HP lter separates a time series into a cyclical component and a
trend component, the latter reecting underlying potentialwhile the cycle reects temporary
deviations from it. The trend is obtained by smoothing the series using a two-sided moving
average, for which the degree of smoothness is arbitrarily specied. Anything not satisfying this
smoothness criterion is extracted and termed business cycle volatility. When the focus is on
stochastic growth behaviour, however, it does not seem appropriate to decompose a time series
arbitrarily into a long run potentialcomponent and uctuations around it. Those uctuations
would correspond in this model to short-run or transitional growth episodes in the data;
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those are of crucial interest in this study and we would want to be sure they are extracted
accurately, but there is some reason to think that HP ltering would not achieve that. First of
all, these transitional periods following a shock may be reasonably long and, secondly, there may
occasionally be large shocks. In both cases the HP lter generates distortion in the estimates
of underlying trends, and because it is a two-sided process, these distortions occur both before
and after the shock. Thus where we would want to analyse the adjustment of the model to
the shock, the HP lter may interpret it as a change in underlying potential and remove it. In
general, it can induce spurious autocorrelations and variability in the series individually and
spurious comovement between series - in other words it alters the time series properties of the
data (Canova, 2014). It is therefore inappropriate to use data stationarised in this way for this
applied work on the short- and medium-run growth impacts of policy, just as it is inappropriate
for models of crisis (e.g. Le et al. 2014).
I am interested in testing what is strictly speaking a semi-endogenousgrowth process (cf.
Jones, 1995b), since the hypothesis does not make the strong claims of the New Endogenous
Growth theory that policy systematically a¤ects the long-run balanced growth rate. So the
emphasis is not on a long-run relationship between the growth rate of productivity and the
policy variable, but on the short- to medium-run dependency of productivity growth changes
on policy shocks. Such policy shocks are temporary, and the policy variable itself is modelled
as stationary around some long run level; however, policy shocks have the e¤ect of permanently
shifting the level of productivity, generating an episode of productivity growth above its long
run deterministic drift rate. Through their impact on non-stationary productivity, temporary
policy shocks therefore a¤ect the behaviour of all the endogenous variables in their transition
back to long run trend, as well as having a permanent impact on the level to which they will
converge. This is illustrated in the impulse response functions below.
Since, by denition in the model, changes over time are not driven solely by an exogenous
trend but by permanent productivity responses to temporary changes in policy, stationarising
the data in a potentially distortive way may obscure some of the interactions of interest; we
certainly do not want to remove the stochastic trend from the model. Therefore unltered data
is used for the endogenous variables when solving, testing and estimating the model. Only the
exogenous variables are detrended where they are modelled as stationary, as described in the
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previous section.
2.2 Calibration and impulse response functions
In this section I present a starting calibration and a set of impulse response functions (IRFs)
to illustrate the internal logic of the model, using the data described in Appendix 2. The
IRFs represent the response of the solved endogenous variables to a controlled one-o¤ shock.
IRFs were analysed for all 11 of the exogenous shock processes, and they produce behaviour
consistent with the existing RBC literature. Here the analysis focuses on growth policy, so only
the shock to the policy variable is discussed.
The data chosen for the policy variable,  0t, play an important role in the study. The growth
channel zt itself is not included in simulations of the model, so  0t should reect policies which
incentivise (or disincentivise) the innovation activity specied in the chosen hypothesis. In
Chapters 5 and 7 the data used to proxy policy are discussed in more detail. Here the policy
variable used to illustrate the models behaviour is the ratio of government funded business
expenditure on R&D (BERD) to the total BERD from all funding sources. This represents
direct subsidies to R&D performed by the private sector. Therefore the marginal e¤ects of policy
on the innovative activity and on productivity - c1 and b1, respectively - are both positive. These
IRFs are representative of all policy variables used in later chapters; all have been examined,
and none have qualitatively di¤erent behaviour.
2.2.1 Calibration
This section outlines the set of parameter values used to generate the impulse response functions
analysed below. This is a starting calibration only and, as such, limited attention is given to
its justication. Given the size of the model, there is considerable theoretical freedom over
what values the parameters could take. In Chapters 5 and 7 the model parameters are jointly
estimated to minimise the Indirect Inference Wald statistic, and that estimated parameter set
will replace the calibration outlined here. The Indirect Inference estimator, discussed in Chapter
3, is asymptotically equivalent to Full Information Maximum Likelihood. The parameters
chosen below must of course be consistent with the logic of the model and with the UK data,
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to some level of approximation, but beyond that their importance should not be overstated.
Preference parameters are calibrated as follows. The quarterly discount factor, , is set at
0.97 as in Meenagh et al. (2010). This value may be somewhat low relative to other literature
- King et al. (1988) use 0.988 as their baseline, and benchmark priors used for Bayesian model
estimation are often higher still (e.g. Chang et al. 2007). However, the value is well within the
wide range of empirically estimated discount factors reported in the metastudy of Frederick et
al. (2002, Table 1); as that paper makes clear, the empirical consensus on discount rates is not
strong. A quarterly factor 0.97 implies an annual discount factor of roughly 0.89, consistent
with a 3% quarterly real rate of time preference, or an annual real rate of 12%.12
Coe¢ cients of relative risk aversion 1 and 2 are set at 1.0 and 1.2 respectively. An
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (IES) 11 of unity is consistent with the real business
cycle literature.13 Reduced form estimates of the Euler equation point to lower intertemporal
elasticity values (Hall, 1988; Yogo, 2004), but more recent empirical work focusing on low
frequency consumption data has shown that an IES of one is empirically defensible (Favero,
2005).
Meenagh et al. (2010) set the coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion for leisure, 2, at 1.0; here
2 is calibrated at 1.2 implying a less than unit intertemporal elasticity of substitution in leisure.
This calibration implies that the curvature of the utility function in the leisure dimension is
more pronounced than for the consumption dimension; the marginal utility of leisure diminishes
faster as leisure increases. The xed preference weight on consumption, , is calibrated at 0.5
following Meenagh et al. (2010), implying an equal weight on leisure.
Preference bias for the domestic good, !, is set at 0:7 after Meenagh et al. (2010, 2012);
the foreign equivalent !F is set likewise at 0.7, by symmetry. The import demand elasticity 
is set to unity (i.e. the response of imports to a one percent change in the relative price of the
12There is a model restriction on the value of ln that comes from the Euler equation and the RUIP identity.
Since rt is constrained by the movement of the real exchange rate (which in turn is constrained by the terminal
condition to ensure that the current account is balanced in the long run; the terminal condition thus constrains
Qt along the whole simulation path), the Euler equation must be consistent with that value of rt and the long run
rate of consumption growth, otherwise the real interest rate is overdetermined. This is ensured by the constant
in the Euler equation, made up of ln plus any constant from the shock process, i.e. ln
Ett+1
t
= ln(1+) = 
in the long run. Since the value of  must be found empirically, this allows some exibility on the value of .
13Lucas (1990) calibrates the CRRA parameter at 2.0, but writes that it "seems high" given the cross-country
interest di¤erentials it implies through the Euler equation.
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imported good, Qt). The sensitivity of export demand to a one percent change in Qt is F 1! ,
also set to one, implying that F = 0:7 (given ! = 0:7). This calibration is consistent with the
Marshall-Lerner condition that the sum of the elasticities of imports and exports with respect
to the real exchange rate should be greater than one; this condition must be satised for the
current account decit to be reduced by a real exchange rate depreciation. The parameter  is
also the elasticity of substitution between the domestic variety of the good Cdt and the imported
variety Cft , known as the Armington elasticity (the macroArmington elasticity in Feenstra
et al. (2014)). F is the equivalent substitution elasticity in the foreign country. The US
estimates obtained by Feenstra et al. (2014) for these elasticities are "in the neighbourhood of
unity regardless of sector" (p.34). The chosen values for import and export demand elasticities
with respect to a relative price change are also in the region of UK estimates from empirical
studies such as Hooper et al. (2000).
On the production side the share of labour in output, , is calibrated at 0.7, consistent with
the UK estimates reported by Gollin (2002). Quarterly capital depreciation is set at 0.0125,
implying an annual rate of 5%; this value is used in Meenagh et al. (2010). The capital demand
equation is non-linear and must be linearised around the moving steady states of K and Y .
The loglinear relationship is, in general terms:
lnKt = 1 lnKt 1 + 2Et lnKt+1 + 3 lnYt   4:rt (2.85)
The presence of  (a xed coe¢ cient in the adjustment cost function) and d (the rms discount
factor) in these coe¢ cients allows some empirical exibility, though 3 = 1   1   2 is an
important constraint to ensure consistency with the long run 14. Following Meenagh et al.
(2010), the baseline calibration is:
lnKt = 0:51 lnKt 1 + 0:47Et lnKt+1 + 0:02 lnYt   0:25 ln rt (2.86)
14 In long run steady state when all temporary shocks have died out, capital and output must be growing at
the same rate; since by detrending the shocks we have removed the deterministic growth path here, we require
K = Y , so that adding back the long run growth path will imply K(1 + gk)t = Y (1 + gy)t and gk = gy, and the
long run capital-output ratio is constant. This condition has been imposed by the terminal conditions on the
solution - see Appendix - and the capital equation must not contradict it.
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The loglinearised balance of payments condition is:
b^ft+1 = (r
f
t   g)b^ft +
1
(1 + g)

EX
~Y
: lnEXt   EX~Y :
1
!
lnQt   IM~Y ln IMt

(2.87)
This is calibrated from UK post war data averages (1955  2011) with MY = 0:2135, XY = 0:208,
and the quarterly output growth rate g = 0:005. Note that b^ft+1 
bft+1
Yt+1
, so that net foreign
assets is expressed as a ratio to GDP, and the whole equation has been scaled by the sample
average of output.15 The loglinearised market clearing constraint in volume terms is
lnCt = c
0+
Y
C
lnYt 
X
C
lnEXt+
M
C
ln IMt 
K
C
lnKt+(1  k)
K
C
lnKt 1 
G
C
lnGt (2.90)
where Kt 1 is linearised around a point ~Kt 1 = K(1+K) 1. The starting calibration of
Y
C and
G
C is based on UK 1955 to 2011 averages:
Y
C = 1:732,
G
C = 0:44. To ensure consistency with these
and with the values of XY and
M
Y used in the balance of payments condition,
X
C =
X
Y :
Y
C = 0:361
andMC =
M
Y :
Y
C = 0:369. The long-run quarterly growth rate of the capital stock is assumed to
be k = 0:005. The assumption of
K
Y = 3 implies that
K
C = 3:
Y
C = 5:196: Ultimately whether
this is a good enough approximation of the true coe¢ cients is an empirical issue.
The parameter c1 capturing the response of time spent in innovative activities (zt) to the
subsidy rate (s0t) is more of a challenge to calibrate. As will be argued in Chapter 6, the macro-
econometric literature does not o¤er a strong prior for this relationship in terms either of sign
or magnitude. Among studies nding a positive impact, Falk (2006) estimates the impact of
government funded business R&D intensity (i.e. as expenditure as a proportion of GDP) on
total business R&D intensity, obtaining signicant estimates of 0:13   0:17 in a xed e¤ects
15The BoP condition is scaled by steady state output and loglinearised as follows
bft+1
~Y
  rft :
bft
~Y
=
1
~Y
pdtEXt
Qt
  1
~Y
IMt (2.88)
Dening b^ft  b
f
t
Yt
and approximating around a point where Yt+1~Y = 1 + g and
~Q = ~pd = 1 this becomes
(1 + g)(b^ft+1   (rft   g)b^ft ) = const+
EX
~Y
: lnEXt +
EX
~Y
:(ln pdt   lnQt)  IM~Y ln IMt (2.89)
Using the substitution ln pdt   lnQt =   1! lnQt, where we have imposed k^ = 1 !! 1 ln &t = 0, gives the BoP
constraint shown.
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model, though the impact becomes insignicant in the preferred system GMM specication.
Westmore (2013), on the other hand, nds a long run elasticity of business R&D expenditure
(or the change in the stock) with respect to government funded business R&D of 0:47. Of
course, the units of zt are hours and not R&D expenditure as a proportion of GDP, but R&D
expenditure variables might be a reasonable proxy for time invested. However, the lack of
identication in the models estimated in this literature suggests we should approach the results
with caution. Therefore I use the analytical relationship derived from the rst order condition
for zt in the model (equation 2.49 above, repeated here); at a given period of time t, this
relationship is a constant. Abstracting from the possibility that it is time-varying allows c1 to
be tied down.16
c1  dzt
ds0t
= (

1  
Yt
wt
)
1
(1  s0t)2
(2.91)
c1 is positive, reecting the hypothesis that subsidies enhance incentives to innovation time.
Since wtNtYt =  in the long run, if Nt ' 0:5 then wtYt = 0:70:5 and Ytwt = 0:714. Setting s0t to 0.1416,
the average value of the subsidy series over the nite sample period (1981 to 2010), setting
the persistence of the unobservable consumption preference error arbitrarily at  = 0:5, and
substituting these values into equation 2.91 puts c1 at 0:912. Evidently this calibration of c1 is
very rough and there is considerable freedom around this parameter, which a¤ects the impact of
subsidies on the supply of labour in goods production.17 The estimation in Chapter 7 will shed
further light on its value so I have done limited sensitivity tests here around c1. The impulse
responses in Section 2.2.2 have been generated on the assumption that c1 = 0:06; a lower value
is preferred on the basis that zt is a relatively small proportion of total non-leisure time, and
changing its incentives would not be expected to perturb the ordinary labour supply to a large
extent, a priori. Setting it according to the estimates from Falk (2006) and of Westmore (2013)
has no qualitative impact on the IRFs, though of course the labour supply response to a policy
shock is magnied.
16 I assume the marginal impact of s0t on zt is the same regardless of the level of s
0
t . If
Yt
wt
is constant and all
other parameters are also constant, but s0t clearly exhibits strong trend over time, then c1 will change with the
level of s0t. However, s
0
t is assumed to be a stationary series in the simulation - the trend is removed, so that it
has some long run value. This allows the assumption of a constant c1.
17Assuming  = 0:9 raises it to 6:66, while  = 0:1 yields c1 = 0:104;  = 0:01 implies c1 = 0:009 .
Assuming di¤erent values for Nt will also a¤ect its magnitude.
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The starting value of the marginal impact of s0t on productivity growth, b1 (2.53), must
ensure that we are examining a model in which the policy variable variation causes a reasonable
amount of the variation in productivity growth; if not, the model is di¢ cult to distinguish from
an exogenous growth model. Therefore we must avoid setting b1 too low - but how low is too
low? Estimates in the literature for the impact of R&D subsidies on productivity growth are
again variable, depending on the data, model and estimators employed (see Chapter 6). Guellec
et al. (2004) nd little evidence of an impact of government funded BERD on the growth rate
of Multi-Factor Productivity (MFP), though they estimate the response of productivity growth
with respect to a unit change in the R&D (stock) intensity at 0:044  0:067; this might roughly
correspond to a1 here (2.42) and b1 can then be calibrated through the relationship b1 = a1:c1.
Taking a value in their range for a1 alongside c1 = 0:06 implies b1 ' 0:003. Westmore (2013)
also nds government funded BERD has no signicant direct e¤ect on MFP growth, though
he nds the long run marginal impact of the stock of BERD relative to GDP on MFP growth
signicant at 0:26 0:33; this together with the estimated 0:47 e¤ect of government subsidies to
R&D on BERD itself could imply b1 between 0:122 and 0:155. Lacking a compelling rationale
for choosing among these o¤erings, b1 is set in the IRFs at 0:1, implying that a 10 percentage
point increase in the proportion of business R&D funded directly by government around its
trend results in a 1 percentage point increase in TFP growth in the following period. This
value is large enough to distinguish this model from an exogenous growth model, as shown
through the variance decomposition in Chapter 7.
The calibration is summarised in Table 2.2.1. Cdt ; C
f
t stand for foreign demand for the
domestic good and foreign demand for foreign-produced good, respectively.
2.2.2 Impulse Response Functions for a policy shock
Figures 2.1 to 2.3 show the di¤erence between the base run of the model and the simulated
solution after a one-o¤positive shock to the subsidy rate in the rst simulation period. The base
run is the solution to the model in the absence of shocks (this solution replicates the original
data). The plots show how a particular controlled shock changes the models behaviour in the
simulation relative to the base run.
A full set of impulse response functions (IRFs) for every shock in the model has been
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Parameter Assignments
 Labour share in output 0:7
 Quarterly discount factor 0:97
 Quarterly depreciation rate 0:0125
1 CRRA coe¢ cient (Ct) 1:0
2 CRRA coe¢ cient (xt) 1:2
 Preference weight on Ct 0:5
! Home bias in consumption 0:7
!F Foreign equivalent of ! 0:7
  Import demand elasticity  1:0
F Elasticity of substitution (Cdt ; C
f
t ) 0:7
1,2,3,4 Capital equation coe¢ cients 0:51, 0:47, 0:02, 0:25
c1
@zt
@s0t
0:06
b1
@[d lnAt+1]
@s0t
0:1
obtained but I limit the discussion here to the dynamic e¤ects of a change in the subsidy rate,
since that is the focus of this thesis. The e¤ects are qualitatively similar to an independent
productivity shock, except for the additional response of labour to a change in incentives to zt.
The impulse is a 10% increase in the subsidy rate s0, measured as the proportion of BERD
funded directly by government.18 Since the detrended shock process is highly persistent with
an AR(1) coe¢ cient of 0.97, the one-o¤ shock has a long-lasting e¤ect on the productivity level,
resulting in a productivity growth episode that lasts over 40 quarters (Figure 2.1). There is a
negative response in labour supply initially, as the lower opportunity cost of z makes labour a
relatively less attractive way to earn. In the initial period, output falls because of this drop
in labour, but as higher innovation in period 1 causes higher productivity in period 2, output
rises steeply from t = 2. Over the simulation period, the real consumer wage rises to o¤set the
income e¤ect on labour supply from the productivity increase, but the resulting substitution
e¤ect does not dominate. Output and the real wage are still growing after 40 quarters, while
labour continues to fall; eventually Y and w will converge to higher levels, while labour converges
to a permanently lower level than the base run. This growth in productivity triggers a real
business cycle upswing. Figure 2.2 depicts the strong responses of consumption and capital
demand to the growth in A. Adjustment costs in capital prevent investment from overshooting
18A large shock is preferred, to make the units of endogenous variable responses easier to read on the graphs.
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Figure 2-1: Growth episode following a 10% R&D subsidy shock.
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in response to anticipated productivity increases. Consumption in the initial period is lower
than in the base run because of intertemporal substitution between N and z, the decision to
sacrice the labour wage at t = 1 for higher consumption possibilities from the next period
onwards. Permanent income rises from t = 2, as the real wage and the unit cost of labour to
the rm (w hat) increase steeply towards a higher long run level, so that consumption increases.
The upswing in domestic demand causes the real interest rate to rise, and in this model a
higher real interest rate must be matched by an expected real exchange rate depreciation for real
uncovered interest parity (Figure 2.3). Recalling that the variable Q is the inverse of the real
exchange rate, reecting the competitiveness of exports, the gure shows that the productivity
increase triggers an instant depreciation of the real exchange rate that continues over the whole
40 quarter simulation period. A lower real exchange rate is required to bring world demand
for the domestic good into line with supply, since not all extra supply resulting from higher
domestic productivity is demanded on domestic markets. With higher permanent income we
would expect higher domestic demand for imports, but the real exchange rate depreciation is
signicant enough to dominate this income e¤ect as the relative price of the foreign good rises.
Import demand rebounds after 25 quarters as the real exchange rate converges to its new long
run (lower) level. Since Q is still moving after 40 quarters, the domestic real interest rate has not
quite converged to zero, though it will in the longer run when the subsidy shock has completely
died out and Q reaches its new steady state level. Net foreign assets accumulate throughout
most of the simulation period due to the increase in net exports on current account, though
converging back to zero by the end of the simulation as imports rebound. The transversality
condition ensures that net foreign assets stabilise by the end of the simulation.
2.3 Conclusion
This chapter has laid out the model used in empirical work in Chapters 5 and 7, and its
properties have been analysed through the impulse response functions from a one-o¤ policy
shock. This model is a standard workhorse in terms of expected macroeconomic and open
economy reactions and therefore highly suitable for testing whether productivity is a¤ected by
a particular policy variable whose presence is controversial. Since the model has been seen to t
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the facts in similar tests (Meenagh et al., 2010), the introduction of the policy variable should
test whether this policy hypothesis alone has caused the rejection.
Annex 1
More on the consumer choice of zt
The expected e¤ect of dzt on the rms prot function at t+1 (and for any t+ i) is as follows:
dt+1
dzt
= @Yt+1@At+1
dAt+1
dzt
+ @Yt+1@Kt+1 :
dKt+1
dzt
+ @Yt+1@Nt+1 :
dNt+1
dzt
 
dKt+1
dzt
(rt+1 +  + t+1 + ~at+1)  dNt+1dzt ( ~wt+1 + t+1)
(2.92)
This is to say that dzt will enhance output directly through its e¤ect on productivity (holding
inputs xed), and will also induce the rm to hire more capital in order to exploit its higher
marginal product (similarly for labour). Decomposing the relation further,
dt+i
dzt
= @Yt+1@At+1
dAt+1
dzt
+ (MPK +MPK):dKt+1dzt + (MPN +MPN):
dNt+1
dzt
 
dKt+1
dzt
(rt+1 +  + t+1 + ~at+1)  dNt+1dzt ( ~wt+1 + t+1)
(2.93)
where MPK signies the expected marginal product of capital (gross of depreciation and
adjustment costs) for t + 1 without the marginal increase in zt , and MPK is the expected
increase in the marginal product accounting for the impact that dzt would have on TFP. From
the rm rst order conditions in equations 2.31 and 2.32 (its decisions on the assumption of
no change in zt), the gross marginal products satisfy MPN = ~wt+1 + t+1 and MPK =
rt+1 + t+1 +  + ~at+1 when dzt = 0 . Since prices are una¤ected by the choices of the
representative rm and agent, terms cancel and the relationship reduces to
dt+1
dzt
=
@Yt+1
@At+1
dAt+1
dzt
+MPK:
dKt+1
dzt
+MPN:
dNt+1
dzt
(2.94)
I assume that the e¤ect of dzt on the future dividend (dt+i = t+i) is simply its direct e¤ect
through higher TFP, on the basis that the second and third terms above - the e¤ects on the
rms input demands - are second order and can be ignored. Therefore the expected change in
the dividend stream is based on forecasts for choice variables (set on other rst order conditions)
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that are assumed to be independent of the agents own activities in context of price forecasts;
she anticipates only the e¤ect of zt on the level of output that can be produced with given
inputs from t+ 1 onwards.
Of course, in general equilibrium under perfect competition there are zero prots and so
after a small change in z there will be zero dividend income (just as before the marginal increase
in z). However, the future real wage will rise as a result of the productivity increase and this in
practice is how the extra income will enter the agents budget constraint. From the perspective
of the f.o.c. for z at t, this is not an important distinction.
To summarise, the contemporaneous e¤ect of a marginal increase in zt on the expected
dividend occurs via an increase in productivity at t+ 1
Et
d dt+1
dzt
= Et
dt+1
dzt
=
@Yt+1
@At+1
dAt+1
dzt
(2.95)
Since @Yt+i@At+i =
Yt+i
At+i
(reiterating the assumption above that second order e¤ects on rm demand
for capital and labour can be ignored) the impact of zt on dividends at a future period t+ i is:
ddt+i
dzt
=
Yt+i
At+i
dAt+i
dzt
> 0, i  1
Note that there is no associated uncertainty about the impact of innovative activity on future
productivity and hence permanent income, except insofar as the rational agent is aware that
future output is subject to several di¤erent types of shock.
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Chapter 3
Methodology: Indirect Inference
Testing and Estimation Procedure
In this chapter I present the Indirect Inference Wald testing methodology applied to the policy-
driven growth hypotheses investigated in chapters 5 and 7, and the estimation procedure used
to nd the calibration of each distinct model that minimises the distance of the simulated from
actual data.
3.1 Indirect Inference
The traditional approach to evaluating calibrated real business cycle (RBC) models is to calcu-
late the moments of the models simulated data series and compare those, singly and informally,
to the moments of the observed data series. The goal is to see where the model fails to replicate
certain stylized facts; see Kydland and Prescott (1982, pp.1364-65); also Kydland and Prescott
(1991) and Chari et al. (2002, pp. 549-50). Indirect inference essentially follows the same
strategy, extending it to a formal statistical comparison of the joint behaviour of the variables
as summarised by an auxiliary model estimated on simulated and observed data. Le et al.
(2010, 2011) point out that basing the evaluation on the closeness of individual time series mo-
ments one by one can lead to erroneous conclusions, as the models simultaneous implications
for cross-moments are neglected. Since DSGE models frequently imply restrictions on the joint
moments, these must also be examined to see whether the data and the model simulations are
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close.1
Here an auxiliary model acts as a descriptor of the joint features of the data (both observed
and simulated). The bootstrapping procedure generates a large number of pseudo-datasets, each
of which provides a set of estimated coe¢ cients for the auxiliary model. Hence the sampling
distribution of the auxiliary model coe¢ cients is generated and we can see whether the set of
coe¢ cient estimates from the observed data sample lies within that model-based distribution,
for a given rejection region. Following Le et al. (2011, 2014), amongst others, I use a Wald
statistic based on the distance between the auxiliary model parameters estimated on simulated
data and the parameters estimated on observed data. This is a formal evaluation criterion for
the model.
Therefore I am to some extent "tak[ing] the model seriously as a data-generating process"
in confronting it with the data, rather than adopting the calibrationiststance, according to
which a DSGE model "should not be regarded as a null hypothesis to be statistically tested"
(Canova, 1994, p. S124; cf. Prescott 1991, p.5). According to the latter view, DSGE models
are inherently falseand their predictions are compared with stylized facts solely to diagnose
where theories need to be modied; though it is not clear how falseness is conceptualised in this
process, nor precisely where the line is drawn between success and failure for the model.
Drawing repeatedly from assumed asymptotic distributions to obtain new sets of shocks is
not justied when we do not know what these distributions are2. Instead we use the sample
residuals themselves as the available data on the distribution, and bootstrap the innovations
in those to obtain the distribution closest to the one generating the data. That is, the struc-
tural model equations - in conjunction with the observed data and a particular coe¢ cient set -
1e.g. in a model with a Fisher equation, one expects the persistence in ination to be highly positively
correlated with persistence in interest rates. Finding that the model can matchthe persistence of ination in
the data and, separately, the persistence of the interest rate in the data, is therefore not a su¢ cient test of the
model; we would like to know if it can match the correlation of those persistence measures at the same time.
Taking the single estimates for each persistence parameter alone and nding them acceptably close to the data,
hence concluding in favour of the model, is equivalent to conducting a joint test on a diagonalised covariance
matrix. However, if the covariance matrix generated by the model is in fact non-diagonal, this implies a di¤erent
joint distribution which could lead to a rejection of the estimates for the two persistence parameters when those
estimates are considered together (see Le et al. 2011, pp. 2082-3, Note 4 and Figure 1).
2Assuming shocks follow asymptotic distributions could lead to bias in the estimation of the auxiliary model
coe¢ cients when they come from near unit-root processes, hence distorting the test; see references given in Le
et al. (2011) e.g. Horowitz, 2001a,b
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imply certain structuralresiduals in order to hold with equality.3 These are in turn modelled
as autoregressive processes, some stationary and one non-stationary (see Chapter 2, Section
2.1.7), depending on identically independently distributed (i.i.d.) innovations. Given the as-
sumed (calibrated or estimated) form for the structural error processes, these i.i.d. innovations
are obtained as residuals. The bootstrapping procedure then involves drawing randomly with
replacement from the set of innovations and using these pseudo-random shocks to generate sim-
ulated datasets under the null hypothesis that the model is true. The small-sample properties
of the bootstrap are checked by numerical methods in Le et al. (2011) and found reliable; Monte
Carlo experiments show only small inaccuracies in the size of the test in small samples. Le et
al. (2011) also show the consistency of the Wald statistic, so that the bootstrap distribution
converges on the true chi-squared distribution as the sample size increases.
The full indirect inference testing procedure is formally outlined elsewhere; the reader is
referred to Minford et al. (2009), Le et al. (2011), and to Meenagh et al. (2012) and Le et al.
(2014) for the application to non-stationary data. Here the steps are given in brief:
1. Using calibrated parameter set (), generate J bootstrap simulations from the DSGE
model.4
2. Add back the e¤ects of deterministic trends removed from shocks, and estimate the aux-
iliary model on all J pseudo-samples.
3. The resulting coe¢ cient vectors aj ( j = 1; :::; J) yield the variance-covariance matrix 

of the DSGE models implied distribution for these coe¢ cients. Hence the small-sample
distribution for the Wald statistic WS() is obtained:
WS() = (aj   aj())0W ()(aj   aj())
aj() is the arithmetic mean of the J estimated vectors and W () = 
() 1 is the inverse
of the estimated variance-covariance matrix. So the Wald statistic utilises the rst and
3Where expectations enter on the right hand side of structural equations they are are estimated using a LIML
procedure due to (McCallum (1976) and Wickens(1982)).
4 In the empirical work carried out in Chapters 5 and 7, the number of bootstrap simulations has been set to
J = 1000.
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second moments and cross-moments of the distribution of the auxiliary model coe¢ cients
that describe the data generated by the model.
4. Find the test statistic, WS()
WS() = (^  aj())0W ()(^  aj())
a function of the distance between aj() and ^, where ^ is the coe¢ cient vector estimated
from the UK data. Then see where this test statistic falls within the model-generated
distribution.
Inference can proceed by comparing the percentile of the Wald distribution at which the
critical Wald statistic falls with the chosen size of the test; for a 5% signicance level, a per-
centile above 95% would fall into the rejection region. Alternatively we can present the same
information as a p-value5 or a t-statistic, obtained from the square root of the Wald, also known
as the Mahalanobis distance.6 This is a useful indicator of how far the Wald from the data lies
in the tail of the distribution. Thus indirect inference tests the ability of the model to gener-
ate simulated data with properties (as evaluated by the auxiliary model) that are statistically
similar to the properties of observed data, unlike direct inference, which tests the ability of the
model to forecast current data (nowcasting). Le et al. (2015b) compare the indirect inference
testing procedure applied here with a direct likelihood ratio based test (as usually applied)
using a Monte Carlo experimental strategy; they nd that the power of the Indirect test here
is substantial in small samples while that of the usual Likelihood Ratio test is relatively weak.
The nding holds whether stationarised or non-stationary data are used to simulate the model.
Therefore we can be condent that false models will be rejected by this Indirect Inference
5This is [100 minus the Wald percentile]/100 .
6Since the Wald is a chi-squared, the square root is asymptotically a normal variable. Applying a small sample
correction, the formula is
MD_Norm =
 p
2WS() p2kp
2WS95  p2k
!
 1:645
where k is the length of ^ (the vector of auxiliary model parameters estimated on the observed data), and WS95
is the value of the Wald statistic falling at the 95th percentile of the bootstrap distribution. This is scaled by
1:645 so that when WS() = WS95 the statistic corresponds to the 95th percentile of the standard normal
distribution.
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test in empirical work. Applications of the test in the macroeconomic literature include Le et
al. (2010), who test a two-country DSGE model with some nominal rigidity calibrated to the
EU and US for 1975-2000; Le et al. (2011), who test the New Keynesian model of the US
economy along the lines of Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), calibrated according to
the Bayesian estimates of Smets and Wouters (2007), for the post-war era as well as various
sub-periods; and an application to a calibrated model of the UK using stationarised data by
Minford et al. (2009). Le et al. (2014) test a model of macroeonomic crisis in China with
non-stationary data. In my study I apply the Indirect Inference methodology for the rst time
to a semi-endogenous growth model of the UK, using non-stationary data.
What is the virtue of testing the policy hypothesis in a DSGE model, as opposed to other
methods? For an unrestricted VAR - the tool of macroeconomic analysis advocated by Sims
(1980) - there are many di¤erent time series models (di¤erent in terms of lag structure and
included variables) that can adequately describe the behaviour of the variables of interest, and
it is not clear which should be preferred or how the results should be interpreted (see Wickens,
2015 for more on this point). Likewise, it has been argued above that the panel approach taken
in much of the empirical growth literature cannot control adequately for regressor endogeneity;
in fact the models that are estimated su¤er in general from a lack of identication, in that the
parameter estimates uncovered could be generated from multiple di¤erent theories. Since the
results therefore do not necessarily distinguish one causal mechanism from another, it is not
clear what conclusions can be drawn in terms of growth policy e¤ectiveness. This applies both
to the estimation results, and to any statistical tests carried out on those results; one is simply
not sure what theory is being tested.
The rational expectations DSGE modelling approach used here has the advantage of being
an identied test of a particular causal explanation of growth. That is, the DSGE model
being tested has a distinct reduced form that in turn could not have been generated by a
di¤erent structural model. In this case we want to rule out other models with a di¤erent causal
mechanism; particularly one in which policy responds to growth rather than the other way
round. Identication is ensured in this model by the rational expectations variables which
imply over-identifying restrictions on its reduced form representation, approximated here by
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the auxiliary model7. Unrestricted estimates of the auxiliary model coe¢ cients on model-
generated data will therefore reect the restrictions imposed by this particular model and no
other; comparison to the unrestricted estimates of the auxiliary model on the observed data
serves as a test of this particular theory.
The policy shock is bootstrapped separately from other shocks since the identifying assump-
tion is that it is uncorrelated with other sources of the general productivity shock. All other
shocks are bootstrapped by time vector so as to preserve potential time correlations.
The Indirect Inference test is the basis for the Indirect Inference estimation carried out in
Chapters 5 and 7 for the di¤erent growth models under investigation. The estimation proce-
dure involves searching over the parameter space, within certain bounds, to nd the vector of
structural coe¢ cients, , which minimises the Wald statistic given the chosen auxiliary model
and the sample data. This idea of optimal calibration, whereby the model is simulated for
di¤erent values of its coe¢ cients and the simulated behaviour in each case is used to construct
a test statistic on which to judge its closeness to the observed data, has been in circulation for
some time. Smith (1993) uses such a method to estimate a dynamic real business cycle model;
see also Canova (1994, 2005) and further references given in Le et al. (2011).8
In Chapters 5 and 7, a simulated annealingalgorithm is employed to perform the indirect
inference Wald test for 1000 points in the parameter space, logging the relevant test statistics
for each. I have searched within 30% bounds of the initial calibration, for selected parameters;
these are generally preference-related parameters, as well as the policy-growth parameter, for
which no strong priors exist. The same auxiliary model is used throughout.
7Le et al. (2014) propose a numerical method to check the identication of rational expectations DSGE
models, and show identication for two widely used models. The model used in Chapter 2 has been checked
for identication using this test. Note that the instance of an unidentied Rational Expectations DSGE model
discussed in Canova and Sala (2009) is a special case and not the rule for this class of models.
8Le et al. (2011) nd that the small sample bias associated with the indirect estimation procedure used here
is far lower than than of full information maximum likelihood, with a mean bias of c. 4% (this is about half the
bias of FIML).
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3.2 Choice of auxiliary model
We know that the solution to a log-linearised rational expectations DSGE model takes the
form of a restricted VARMA, or approximately a VAR, where the expectations will in general
provide overidentifying restrictions on the coe¢ cients to ensure the models identication. These
restrictions should be implicit when an unrestricted VAR is estimated on data generated using
the model; comparison to an unrestricted VAR estimated on the observed data should serve
as a test of the null hypothesis of the model (given identication). An auxiliary model with
stationary errors is required when endogenous variables are non-stationary by virtue of their
dependency on non-stationary exogenous variables. Therefore a Vector Error Correction Model
is appropriate here. Below it is shown, following Meenagh et al. 2012 and Le et al. (2015a, pp.
11-12), how the chosen auxiliary model is an approximation of the reduced form of the DSGE
model under the null hypothesis, and that it can be represented as a cointegrated VARX.
The full log-linearised structural model, comprising a p x 1 vector of endogenous variables yt,
a r x 1 vector of expected future endogenous variables Etyt+1, a q x 1 vector of non-stationary
variables xt and a vector of i.i.d. errors et, can be written in the general form
A(L)yt = BEtyt+1 + C(L)xt +D(L)et (3.1)
xt = a(L)xt 1 + d+ b(L)zt 1 + c(L)t (3.2)
xt is a vector of unit root processes, elements of which may have a systematic dependency on
the lag of zt , itself a stationary exogenous variable (this variable is dropped in the rest of
the exposition, we can subsume it into the shock). t is an i.i.d., zero mean error vector. All
polynomials in the lag operator have roots outside the unit circle. Since yt is linearly dependent
on xt it is also non-stationary. The general solution to this system is of the form
yt = G(L)yt 1 +H(L)xt + f +M(L)et +N(L)t (3.3)
where f is a vector of constants. Under the null hypothesis of the model, the equilbrium solution
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for the endogenous variables is the set of cointegrating relationships (where  is p x p )9:
yt = [I  G(1)] 1[H(1)xt + f ] (3.4)
= xt + g (3.5)
though in the short run yt is also a function of deviations from this equilbrium (the error
correction term t):
yt   (xt + g) = t (3.6)
In the long run, the level of the endogenous variables is a function of the level of the unit root
variables, which are in turn functions of all past shocks.
yt = xt + g (3.7)
xt = [1  a(1)] 1[dt+ c(1)t] (3.8)
t = 
t 1
s=0"t s (3.9)
Hence the long-run behaviour of xt can be decomposed into a deterministic trend part xDt =
[1  a(1)] 1dt and a stochastic part xSt = [1  a(1)] 1c(1)t, and the long run behaviour of the
endogenous variables is dependent on both parts. Hence the endogenous variables consist of
this trend and of deviations from it; one could therefore write the solution as this trend plus a
VARMA in deviations from it. An alternative formulation is as a cointegrated VECM with a
mixed moving average error term
yt =  [I  G(1)](yt 1  xt 1) + P (L)yt 1 +Q(L)xt + f + !t (3.10)
!t = M(L)et +N(L)"t (3.11)
which can be approximated as
yt =  K[yt 1  xt 1] +R(L)yt 1 + S(L)xt + h+ t (3.12)
9 In fact the matrix  is found when we solve for the terminal conditions on the model, which constrain the
expectations to be consistent with the structural models long run equilibrium.
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or equivalently, since yt 1  xt 1   g = 0,
yt =  K[(yt 1   yt 1) (xt 1   xt 1)] +R(L)yt 1 + S(L)xt +m+ t (3.13)
considering t to be i.i.d. with zero mean. Rewriting equation 3.12 as a levels VARX(1) we
get
yt = [I  K]yt 1 +Kxt 1 + n+ t+ qt (3.14)
where the error qt now contains the suppressed lagged di¤erence regressors, and the time trend
is included to pick up the deterministic trend in xt which a¤ects both the endogenous and
exogenous variables. xt 1 contains unit root variables which must be present to control for the
impact of past shocks on the long run path of both x and y. This VARX(1) approximation to
the reduced form of the model is the basis for the unrestricted auxiliary model used throughout
the estimation in Chapters 5 and 7.
Following Le et al. (2011, 2015a) I use a Directed Waldstatistic to evaluate the model,
rather than the full Wald criterion which would include all the endogenous variables in the
auxiliary model (there are in fact nine non-stationary endogenous variables in the model for
which we would expect a long-run cointegrating relationship to hold). Strictly speaking, the
full Wald would also be based on estimation of a higher order VARX, as this would be a more
faithful representation of the structural models reduced form solution. However, the power of
the full Wald test increases as more endogenous variables are added and as the lag order is raised,
leading to uniform rejections (Le et al. 2015b). The Directed Wald involves selecting certain
endogenous variables viewed as key for evaluating the theory being tested. In this case, the focus
is on the growth hypothesis and on the behaviour of output and productivity, conditional on the
lagged policy variable. The use of the Directed Wald can be seen as a nod towards the inherent
falsenessof DSGE models (not merely at the level of their assumptions but also in their ability
to match the macroeconomic data). We note that there is some misspecication in the model
which prevents it from being the trueDGP for the historical data; it imposes many restrictions
on the reduced form description of the data, some of which are not valid. Nevertheless, the
model serves as an internally consistent backdrop for us to examine, with statistical formality,
the causally identied theory that policy drives the behaviour of productivity and hence output.
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The test is whether the model replicates the features not just of output and productivity taken
singly, but the joint behaviour of those variables, conditional on the behaviour of any non-
stationary predetermined variables and of the policy variable. The chosen auxiliary model
ensures that the model is evaluated on this joint criterion.
The VARX(1) in equation 3.15 serves as the auxiliary model used in the empirical work
presented in Chapters 3 and 4, being a parsimonious description of some key features of the
model.10
24 Yt
At
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3524 Yt 1
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24 c11 c12 c13 c14
c21 c22 c23 c24
35
26666664
bft 1
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t
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37777775+
24 e1t
e2t
35 (3.15)
The coe¢ cient vector aj used to construct the Wald distribution includes OLS estimates of
b11, b12, b21, b22, c11, c12, c21, c22, and the variances of the tted stationary errors e1t and e2t;
the same coe¢ cients make up vector ^ estimated on the observed data. Therefore this is a
test of whether the model can replicate the data features of output and productivity jointly, in
terms of their persistence as well as their variances and covariances. The errors are tested for
stationarity using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. These are included in the test so that the
volatility as well as the interrelations of the variables can be captured. The trend term in the
VARX(1) captures the deterministic trend in the data and in the simulations. Since the focus
of the study is on the stochastic trend resulting from the shocks, the deterministic trend is not
part of the Wald test on which the models performance is evaluated.
Productivity, measured as the Solow residual given the models calibrated production func-
tion, is a key variable in the regression to provide cointegration under the null hypothesis of
the model, being a non-stationary variable on which the non-stationary endogenous variables
depend. The productivity variable enters the VARX as an endogenous variable, since it has
been modelled as a function of the policy variable which has been treated as exogenous and
10 In practice the power of the test remains strong for di¤erent reduced form approximations; Le et al. (2015)
look at the small sample properties of Indirect Inference with various auxiliary models; they nd that for small
samples, although a VARX(1) is a severe approximation the power of the test to reject a false null remains strong.
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trend stationary. The restrictions implied by the DSGE model on this auxiliary model would
impose b21 = 0 and b22 = 1, the hypothesis being that productivity drives output and not that
lagged output sets current productivity. However, the auxiliary model is left unrestricted. Al-
ternative structural models may predict reverse causation or feedback and the auxiliary model
should describe the data in an unprejudicial manner, so we leave it free to express the presence
of feedback if this is found in the data; we would expect the Wald test to reject the model if its
restrictions are strongly violated. Like productivity, lagged net foreign assets, bft 1, is a driving
variable of the system. Given that its unit root preserves the e¤ects of all past current ac-
count imbalances, its stochastic movements a¤ect the long run solution path of the endogenous
variables; it must therefore be included in the regression to guarantee cointegration. That is,
like xt 1 in the general explanation above, it controls for the stochastic trend in the long run
level of xt and hence yt. This is the extent to which the structural model is imposed on the
auxiliary model - we use it to derive what we think is a cointegrated VARX (provided the model
holds in its assumptions around the unit root processes), and then we test that VARX for the
stationarity of its residuals.11 We know that OLS is a biased estimator of the auxiliary model
due to the presence of lagged endogenous variables as regressors, so no emphasis is placed on
the magnitudes of the estimated coe¢ cients. The relevant question is whether the bias of the
auxiliary model estimation procedure a¤ects the properties of the test. Since the same auxil-
iary model and estimator is used for the description of the simulated data and the observed
data, the same bias applies for both; hence the power of the test should not be a¤ected. In
other words, we ask whether the model-implied OLS-estimated-VAR would generate the same
OLS-estimated-VAR as the actual data. Monte Carlo experiments conrm that the power is
high (Le et al. 2011, p.2101).
3.3 Conclusion
This chapter has outlined the Indirect Inference testing and estimation methodology applied
in the empirical work presented in this thesis. In Chapters 5 and 7, I rst give results for an
11Also imposed is the measurement of the productivity variable, which is the Solow residual backed out from
the calibrated Cobb-Douglas production function on the assumption of xed input shares and constant returns
to scale. Since these assumptions are made for both the observed data and the simulated data, the test should
not lose power if the production function is misspecied.
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Indirect Inference test of the model given the starting calibration, and then go on to estimate
the model parameters using Indirect Inference estimation.
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Chapter 4
Policy-driven Growth via
Entrepreneurs: Motivation and
Literature Review
4.1 Introduction
It is deeply embedded in the current European policy approach that the creativ-
ity and independence of the self-employed contribute to higher levels of economic
activity.Carree et al. (2002, p.284).
. . . the revolutionary breakthroughs continue to come predominantly from small
entrepreneurial enterprises, with large industry providing streams of incremental
improvements that also add up to major contributions.Baumol (2004, p.9).
Entrepreneurial activities can be expected to decrease under higher regulations,
administrative barriers and governmental intervention in the market. Acs et al.
(2009, p.22)
Entrepreneurship has been high on the policy agenda for growth across OECD countries
for over a decade, though the importance of an entrepreneurial growth channel is empirically
less than certain: "everybody wants entrepreneurship, even if the link to growth is not clear"
(OECD, 2006, p.3).
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The UK coalition government elected in 2010 has strongly endorsed entrepreneurship as an
element of its Growth Strategy. Its Plan for Growth (HM Treasury, 2011) consists of four
overarching ambitionsin the pursuit of economic growth, the rst being to create the most
competitive tax system in the G20, and the second to make the UK one of the best places
in Europe to start, nance and grow a business(p.5). The third and fourth are, respectively,
to stimulate investment and exports, and to create a more educated workforce that is the
most exible in Europe. Note that human capital accumulation is last on this list and that
even then, the fourth point conates two workforce objectives: skill accumulation and labour
market exibility. This last is to be achieved by ensuring that the UK has the Lowest burdens
from employment regulation in the EU, while the business environment is to be improved by
achieving A lower domestic regulatory burden,amongst other policies (p.6).
This is strong testimony, therefore, to a prevalent belief among UK policymakers that
policy drives economic growth, in particular tax and regulatory policy, as these are thought to
be barriers to entrepreneurship.1 Indeed, since the World Bank began systematically to rank
countries according to Ease of Doing Business, a deregulatory trend has gathered pace across
the OECD; see Figures 4.2 and 4.3 below. The UK was an early starter among OECD countries
in the deregulation of labour and product markets (Figure 4.3; Tables 4.2 and 4.3), and this
has been credited in part with reversing the trend in UK relative economic decline through its
stimulating e¤ects on competition and productivity (Crafts, 2012; Card and Freeman, 2004).
One objective in this thesis is to see whether this credit is duly given.
The impact of taxation on growth via business activity is also a focus of this study. Taxes
may distort investment decisions and hence macroeconomic performance, and this logic led to
sharp cuts in both personal and corporate income tax rates from the early 1980s in the UK
as part of a broader programme of supply side policy reforms. However, Baliamoune-Lutz
and Garello (2014) note that, If in the past some OECD governments have emphasized the
link between tax cuts and entrepreneurship as the basis for their tax cut policies (for example
during the Reagan and Thatcher administrations in the 1980s), most large European Union
1The OECD endorsed the characterisation of regulation as a barrier to entrepreneurship. See for example
OECD (2015), Figure 25, a graph entitled There is scope to reduce barriers to entrepreneurshipwhich plots
the UK Product Market Regulation (PMR) scores against the average of the bestve OECD countries in terms
of freedom from PMR.
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countries today have bad rankings in terms of tax rates and tax regulations.As measured by
the World Economic Forums 2010-2011 Global Competitiveness Report (GCR), a survey-based
measure of perceptions, tax rates were judged the most problematic factor for doing business
in the UK, marginally ahead of access to nance and tax regulations, and three times more of
a problem than insu¢ cient worker skills.2
In the current socio-economic climate, when governments are required to spend without
building up excessive sovereign debt, there is a temptation to increase marginal tax rates,
particularly at the top of the income distribution; this is also a natural response to the perception
of increasing social inequality. The hike in the UK top rate of personal income tax in 2009 is
an example of such a policy, which went ahead in spite of independent analysis at the time
suggesting that revenues would not rise as a result due to behavioural responses (Brewer and
Browne, 2009).
Therefore the demonstration of a relationship from tax rates and tax progressivity to the
individual decision margin and hence to productivity growth is of great interest. Would tax
rate increases at the top of the income distribution a¤ect the growth rate, or is this essentially
rhetoric promoted by vested interest groups who stand to lose from such reforms? This need
not imply overt dissembling by lobbyists, since the historical experience may permit such an
interpretation when casually viewed. Indeed, this is the issue of identication in action, the
problem being that a casual look at the historical evidence permits several alternative expla-
nations of how it was generated. Various models of causation may lead to the reduced form
relationship between tax and growth (or regulation and growth) observed in the data.
For this reason it is desirable to derive the relationship from tax and regulatory policy to
growth in a structural model, and see in Chapter 5 whether that data generating process as
a whole can explain the historical productivity experience in the UK for a particular sample,
when appropriate counterfactuals are provided through bootstrapping.
This chapter provides context and an academic literature review to motivate the empiri-
cal work presented in Chapter 5. From the point of view of this investigation, most of the
studies reviewed here are problematic. Macro-level regression studies su¤er from a variety of
2These three factors still top the list obstacles to business in the GCR 2014-15, though tax rates are now
third on the list, falling from the top spot in 2013-14 perhaps due to reductions in corporate tax rates and R&D
tax credit increases implemented in intervening years.
60
methodological limitations and are rarely identied, making the interpretation of estimated re-
lationships di¢ cult; simulation exercises around the macroeconomic impacts of policy reforms
are usually conducted in structural models which are calibrated and rarely tested in any formal
sense; and micro-level studies, though often more successful at addressing identication issues,
cannot tell us about the macroeconomic impacts of policy. Therefore the following review pro-
vides some context for the contribution of this thesis, highlighting some weaknesses in existing
evidence on the aggregate relationship between UK policy and economic growth, and the need
to test theories in an identied setup where the direction of causation is unambiguous.
4.2 Dening Entrepreneurship
It has been stated that the agent of growth here is the entrepreneur, which requires some
explanation. A sizable literature is devoted to nding a precise and workable denition of
entrepreneurship; if an entrepreneur is dened by his function then this poses problems, since
those identied as entrepreneurs in society and in the academic literature have varied functions,
not all of which are present in every instance. The plurality of denitions blurs the concept of
entrepreneurship and is certainly responsible, in part, for the relative lack of empirical work on
its impact on growth; to be empirically operationalisedin this context, a denition must map
to some measurable phenomenon in the data.
Wennekers and Thurik (1999) gather thirteen roles for the entrepreneur identied in the
economics literature: of these some are economic functions (bearer of uncertainty, innovator,
allocator of resources, arbitrageur, supplier of nancial capital) while others relate to observable
behaviour (the owner-manager of a rm, employer of factors of production, one who starts up
a new business). Cantillon (1755) is generally credited as the rst to identify the entrepreneur,
or undertaker, as the driver of the market process, transacting under uncertainty. Knight
(1921) and later Drucker (1970) also emphasize market decision-making under uncertainty as
the dening characteristic of the entrepreneur; the entrepreneur makes choices in an environ-
ment in which expectations about the future are subjective, and stands to make losses if his
expectations are proved wrong; successful entrepreneurs emerge as those whose expectations
were correct. However, entrepreneurship is rst singled out as a mechanism for change and
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economic development in the work of Schumpeter (1911, translated 1934).
The function of Schumpeters entrepreneur is to innovate, where innovationis "the doing
of new things or the doing of things that are already being done in a new way" (Schumpeter,
1947, p.151), and his sphere of operation is the market, since he is motivated by prot. Schum-
peters denition brings out the link between entrepreneurand enterprise, the latter in the
sense of taking initiative in a market context, and does not therefore tie the entrepreneur
either to smallness or necessarily to start-ups. Entrepreneurship can exist in large and/or in-
cumbent businesses as long as the particular venture is new, so it includes the phenomenon
of intrapreneurship. Schumpeter also draws an important distinction between invention and
entrepreneurship: "The inventor produces ideas, the entrepreneur gets things done, which
may but need not embody anything that is scientically new. Moreover, an idea or scientic
principle is not, by itself, of any importance for economic practice." (p.152)
There is, in other words, a di¤erence between general knowledge and economically useful
knowledge (cf. Arrow, 1962), and the entrepreneurs role is to transform knowledge into some-
thing economically productive. Note that this does not preclude the entrepreneur from being
an inventor, or creating new knowledge, but that would be in addition to transforming that
knowledge into something of commercial value. Schumpeter gives ve manifestations of entre-
preneurship so-dened (1934, p.66): new (or improved) goods, new production methods, new
markets, new supply sources of intermediate goods, and new methods of organisation.
While Schumpeters 1947 article mentions only the entrepreneurs "creative response" to
changing economic circumstances, the assertion being that entrepreneurs are the principal ve-
hicle for this productive creativity in a capitalist market economy, he is most cited in the growth
and innovation literature for his theory of creative destruction, a process which "incessantly rev-
olutionizes the economic structure from within, incessantly destroying the old one, incessantly
creating the new one" (1942, Chapter 7, p.82). The "perennial gale" of creative destruction
arises out of "capitalist enterprise", which drives progress, while forcing those who do not adapt
to exit. We might, therefore, expect creative destruction to show up in the data as high rm
turnover, with high entry as well as high exit rates. The concept is intuitively appealing in the
context of technological progress - clearly new ways of performing a similar production process
build on older technologies, but necessarily replace them in the marketplace, constituting higher
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quality substitutes rather than complements. This theory has therefore found much attention
in more recent literature on endogenous technical change, most notably Aghion and Howitt
(1992), on which more below. For now, we note Schumpeters emphasis on the role of the
entrepreneur in the creative process, which in turn is responsible for pushing the productivity
frontier outwards, constantly shocking the system out of equilibrium.
Another (here it is argued, complementary) interpretation of entrepreneurship is o¤ered by
Kirzner (1973), who denes the entrepreneur as an arbitrageur in a broad sense, one observing
and exploiting opportunities for prot that arise out of market disequilibria. "The entrepre-
neurs activity is essentially competitive" (p. 17): through competition, entrepreneurs eradi-
cate disequilibria and allow markets to allocate resources and welfare optimally. In contrast
to Schumpeters entrepreneur, who pushes the frontier itself forward, Kirzners entrepreneur
pushes aggregate production towards the production possibility frontier. These Schumpeterian
and Kirznerian entrepreneurial activities both play a role in raising the average productivity
level in the economy, though without the creative responder/destructor there would be no
sustained growth.
The entrepreneurial growth channel identied in the present paper excludes neither the
creative responder/destructor nor the arbitrageur, since both identify and exploit new oppor-
tunities for prot and, in doing so, alter the market environment (Karlsson et al., 2004), the
result of which is increased economic activity and higher welfare (via increased consumption
and leisure for the household). In both cases, free entry is a requirement for the entrepreneur
to a¤ect the economy. Another requirement is the appropriability of the returns that result ~at
least enough to cover costs ~since entrepreneurial incentives are otherwise undermined.
In their synthesis of the entrepreneurship literature up to 1999, Wennekers and Thurik
(1999) propose this denition:
"Entrepreneurship is the manifest ability and willingness of individuals, on their own, in
teams, within and outside existing organizations, to: i) perceive and create new economic
opportunities (new products, new production methods, new organizational schemes and new
product market combinations) and to ii) introduce their ideas in the market, in the face of
uncertainty and other obstacles, by making decisions on location, form and the use of resources
and institutions." (p.46-47)
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Wennekers and Thurik (henceforth WT) go on to say that "where on the one hand entrepre-
neurial behavior requires entrepreneurial skills and qualities, it also implies participation in the
competitive process on the other." It may be that entrepreneurial skills are human capital that
can be accumulated through education, or not. Here we abstract from that channel. Human
capital accumulation through education may a¤ect some part of entrepreneurial capital, but
the focus here is on a part of entrepreneurial activity unrelated to general schooling. This study
asks whether entrepreneurship, as identied by the incentive mechanism in the model, causes
productivity growth.3 As long as these incentives cannot be interpreted as incentives to human
capital accumulation, we can be condent that a separate entrepreneurialchannel is targeted.
Implementing new ideas (the substance of the second part of the WT denition) may be more
di¢ cult or slower within large, incumbent rms, so that new economic opportunities are often
pursued through start-ups or within small incumbent rms that have a less hierarchical structure
and are more exible (see Crafts, 2012). If so, start-ups, small rms or self-employment rates
may not be a poor measure of entrepreneurship. The UK self-employment rate is plotted in
Figure 4-1. This shows an upward trend over time, though there are clear breaks in trend;
the steepest increase came between 1979 and 1989, and the series attens o¤ somewhat in
later decades. Of course movements in this series reect certain important changes to the UK
tax schedule that distorted the margin between self-employment and incorporation, such as
corporation tax reforms. Gordon Browns rst budget in 1997 announced cuts in the small
companies rate from 24% to 21%, and the rate proceeded to drop to 20% in 1999 and 19% in
2002. In addition, the introduction from April 2000 of a 10% starting rate for prots between
0 and £ 10,000, and the cut of the starting rate to 0% in 2002, led to a surge in the number of
new companies as the self-employed were tempted to incorporate, paying themselves through
dividend distributions rather than salaries (Crawford, 2008). The starting rate was scrapped
altogether in 2006.
Obtaining better proxies of entrepreneurship for a long enough time series is di¢ cult, though
for more recent years country-level data is available. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor
(GEM) provides survey-based cross-country indicators measuring the rate of nascent("actively
3However, insofar as the incentive mechanism (the chosen policy variable) may stimulate the accumulation of
human capital, that growth mechanism is not ruled out. I come back to this point in the conclusions chapter.
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Figure 4-1: UK Self-employment Rate. Source, ONS.
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involved" in setting up a business that has been operating for less than 3 months), new
(owner-manager of a business in operation for between 3 and 42 months) and established
(owner-manager of a business operating for more than 42 months) entrepreneurs in the adult
population, based on a sample of at least 2000 adults in each country (Reynolds et al., 2005).
Other measures are the OECD-Eurostat Entrepreneurship Indicators (OECD, 2009), the World
Bank Entrepreneurship Survey (World Bank 2011), and the OECD high-growth rm indicator.
These aggregate measures all characterise a country as more entrepreneurial if there are more
individuals attempting to mount new business ventures or if there is a higher rate of formal
incorporation (Acs et al., 2014).
There are also measures of entrepreneurial attitudes, both of entrepreneurs themselves and
of society towards entrepreneurs, such as the Eurobarometer Survey (Gallup, 2009), the In-
ternational Social Survey Programme (1998), and GEM; while these measures are certainly
interesting, we do not know whether attitudes drive or are driven by entrepreneurial action
(Acs et al., 2014, p. 20).
Finally, there are measures of framework conditions, measuring the national regulatory en-
vironment in which entrepreneurs mount and subsequently run a new venture, such as the
World Banks Ease of Doing Business Survey (Djankov et al., 2002). Such indicators measure
the extent to which a countrys environment is favourable to entrepreneurs; whether entrepre-
neurial activity actually follows may depend on additional factors (Acs et al., 2014). In terms
of the model in Chapter 2, framework activities belong in the policy variable  0t rather than
in the variable standing for time spent in entrepreneurial activities zt. The Global Entrepre-
neurship and Development Index (GEDI) developed in Acs et al. (2014) interacts individual
level measures of attitudes and aspirations with country-level institutional indicators so as to
embed entrepreneurial activities in their framework context. The e¤ect is that  in terms of
this model zt and  0t are conated into one measure.4 The index has only existed since 2010,
and the methodology has since changed such that previous years are not comparable to the
current measures so there is no scope to use it in a single country time series analysis.
4This might actually be desirable for our study. A limitation here is that we cannot tie the policy variables
impact on growth tightly to the entrepreneurial channel in Chapter 5, so an interaction at the level of the policy
variable with entrepreneurship variables would go some way to addressing this. Unfortunately, there is insu¢ cient
time series data for us to explore this.
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The model investigated in Chapter 5 assumes productivity growth to be a stochastic process
determined systematically by a choice variable zt, notionally time spent in any or all of the het-
erogeneous entrepreneurial activities admitted by the WT synthesis denition (eq. 2.42). There
is a marginal taxor penaltyrate on zt, reecting the extent to which zt is penalized by the
policy environment i.e. by regulatory barriers (which raise both sunk costs and operational
costs for businesses) and prot taxes (which reduce the appropriability of entrepreneurial re-
turns). Data for the penalty rate is an index composed of factors identied in the literature as
a¤ecting entrepreneurial decisions. A systematic relation between productivity growth and the
disincentives to entrepreneurship is derived from the models optimality condition with respect
to the entrepreneurship choice (See Ch.2, eq. 2.53). In this way entrepreneurship itself is by-
passed and no data on entrepreneurs is required for the models solution and simulation. The
onus is therefore on the choice of data for policy determinants of entrepreneurial activities; as
long as these can be condently related to the activities of entrepreneurs as we have dened
them (and not to other growth drivers), and those relationships can be reasonably calibrated,
then the model being tested is a model of entrepreneur-driven growth. These links (from en-
trepreneurship to growth, and from policy to entrepreneurship) are investigated further below
in the review of existing literature; I look at the theoretical literature and then the empirical
literature.
4.3 Locating the Entrepreneur in Theories of Growth
4.3.1 Schumpeterian Growth Models
Above, emphasis was placed on the importance of competition and free entry in the mech-
anisms through which entrepreneurs can drive technological progress, partly on the basis of
Schumpeterian theory. At this point it might be objected that in appealing to Schumpeters
denition of entrepreneurship we include all prot-motivated innovation and therefore allow
entrepreneurshipto embrace R&D. Indeed, distinguishing clearly between these two concepts
is extremely di¢ cult, and I return to this issue later.5
5The approach taken in this chapter and the next is to look separately at the broad types of policy generally
used to target each of these channelswhile the channels themselves are perhaps not wholly distinct (there
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Endogenous growth models that are Schumpeterian by design, such as the creative de-
struction model of Aghion and Howitt (1992), generally dispense altogether with the word
entrepreneur, focusing instead on the innovator. Innovation in these models is then dened as
quality-improving technological change produced by prot-maximising agents in the research
and development sector. In other words, the focus is on invention, albeit a prot-motivated
kind. Though Aghion and Howitt (1998) dene their research activity as broader than formal
R&D, when we look at how this model is taken to the data, innovation is generally proxied by
formal R&D expenditure and patent counts.6 R&D expenditure is dominated by large estab-
lished rms, and the evidence cited in favour of this growth channel therefore tends to exclude
innovation by small businesses and by new businesses (which are generally also small). This is
discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.
Schumpeter adopted a di¤erent position on the role of start-ups versus large established
rms in the innovation process in other work (Schumpeter, 1942), arguing that incentives to
innovate depend upon the ability to capture monopoly rents in order to recoup the costs of
innovation; ex post perfect competition forces price instantly to equal marginal cost and leaves
the innovator bearing a loss. Larger rms can exploit economies of scale in innovation by
developing specialised R&D departments, and market power o¤ers economic rents to cover up-
front innovation costs. The Aghion and Howitt model (1992) is therefore Schumpeterian in
assuming that the innovator is incentivised by monopoly prots and that innovation is best
produced in a formal research sector (Mark II), while also drawing on Schumpeter Mark I
in that innovation is driven by creative destruction, as the entry of a successful researcher into
intermediate goods production entails the destruction of existing producers.7
The model assumes a competitive research sector from which a successful innovator rises to
replace the incumbent monopolist in the intermediate goods sector. The intermediate good is
are cases in which entrepreneurship involves R&D and vice versa), and certain policies may incentivise both at
once, it seems that subsidies to private sector R&D can reasonably be thought to target the R&D channel rather
than the entrepreneurial channel.
6"When it comes to measuring the input to the innovation process, empirical researchers routinely limit
themselves to expenditures on formal R&D, [...] It is important to keep in mind that when we refer to research
or to R&D,what we have in mind is the whole range of inputs to innovation, not just the small part that is
actually captured in formal R&D statistics." (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 8)
7See e.g. Andersen (2012) for the Mark Iand Mark IInomenclature. The di¤erence in emphasis centres
on the innovation-maximising level of market competition and the role of the independent man of businessin
the process.
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an input to (perfectly competitive) nal goods production, and innovations raise the produc-
tivity of the input in that process, arriving according to a Poisson process. Innovations are
quality-improving, and a newer quality is a perfect substitute for the older. One rm supplies
the whole intermediate goods market, there is a constant markup, and the incumbents inno-
vation is protected by a perpetual patent ensuring monopoly rents until the next innovation
arrives. However, other researchers are allowed to use the patented innovation in creating the
next. This creates an intertemporal spillover e¤ect, increasing the rate of technological progress
for society; though this externality is not internalised by the innovator whose incentives are un-
dermined. There is also an appropriability e¤ect that arises because the current monopolist is
unable to capture the full consumer surplus generated by his innovation today. Spillover and
appropriability e¤ects force the equilibrium growth rate to be lower than the social planners
optimum. The model also features Arrows replacement e¤ect (Arrow, 1962): the incumbent
has no incentive to innovate, as the present value of a new successful innovation net of the de-
stroyed value of the current innovation (plus the cost of innovating) is signicantly lower than
the value of the current monopoly. In other words, the incumbent would rather not destroy its
existing rents.8
A corollary of this is that entrantsincentives to innovate are higher than the incumbents,
so the model exhibits a "business stealing" e¤ect which counteracts the appropriability and
spillover e¤ects. This potentially leads to a higher than optimal level of innovation in the
decentralised economy. The model also has the property that current research is decreasing in
expected future research, since future research raises the arrival rate of the next (destructive)
innovation and hence the destruction of the incumbent monopolists prots. This admits the
possibility of a no-growthequilibrium, where so much future research is expected that current
research is deemed not to be worth it.
The welfare policy recommendations depend on the relative sizes of these opposing e¤ects.
If appropriability and spillover e¤ects dominate the business-stealing e¤ect leading to a lower
than optimal level of innovation, the policy priority is to protect the innovators monopoly,
incentivising research which is socially desirable (e.g. Grossman and Helpman, 1991). The
8This might not hold if R&D costs were much lower for the incumbent than potential entrants; in Aghion
and Howitt (1992) their R&D costs are assumed to be the same.
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purchase of intermediate goods in the nal goods sector must then be subsidized to o¤set the
monopolys negative externality, since the markup leads to a lower than optimal demand. In
this setup, barriers to entry (other than by a replacement monopolist) are helpful to innovation
and welfare, provided of course that subsidies are nanced via lumpsum taxes. The model also
recommends subsidies to research (generally identied with R&D), to ensure that monopolies
are only temporary, allowing the creative destruction process to work. However, with too
much monopoly power in the intermediate goods market (i.e. with too low an elasticity of
demand for the intermediate good), o¤ering high super-normal prots, the business-stealing
e¤ect dominates and there is excessiveresearch in the economy from a welfare perspective;
growth is too high relative to the social planners optimum which would take account of the
incumbents losses at the hands of creative destruction. Note that, whatever the welfare policy
recommendation, the growth policy is clearly to protect monopoly: "product market competition
is unambiguously bad for growth" in this baseline model (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p.58, their
italics), reducing rents and hence innovation incentives.
The model raises political economy issues in distinguishing between the incentives of in-
cumbents and researchers. A tax on research activity would be distortionary and lower the
economys innovation rate; it would also fall solely on potential entrants (the only ones in-
vesting in research due to the replacement e¤ect) and would therefore be lobbied for by the
incumbent, since it would slow down the rate at which their prots are destroyed (Acemoglu,
2008).
In terms of consistency with the empirical evidence, the baseline 1992 model falls short in
certain key respects. Nickell (1996), for instance, nds a positive association between compe-
tition and productivity growth; Crafts (2012) lists more evidence in this vein. This illustrates
the limitations of the ex post monopoly setup in the Aghion and Howitt (1992) model, which
simply does not allow for this relationship, or for incumbent rms to contribute to innovation
to an extent matching the data. Competition and entry can only spur innovation among in-
cumbents in a monopolistic framework when considerable complexity is added. Thus Aghion
and Howitt (1998, Chapter 7) and others have proposed various modications and extensions to
the Schumpeterianmodel, allowing intermediate goods market competition to enhance pro-
ductivity growth under particular circumstances. Aghion et al. (2013) refer to this line of
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research as "Growth meets IO" (p.6). One such model features an escape entrye¤ect which
allows incumbent rms a role in driving innovation (Aghion and Howitt, 2006). New entry or
the threat of new entry "enhance innovation and productivity growth, not just because these
are the direct result of quality-improving innovations from new entrants, but also because the
threat of being driven out by a potential entrant gives incumbent rms an incentive to innovate
in order to escape entry" (ibid., p.282). They use a multi-sector model in which an incumbent
monopolist in each sector earns rents that are threatened by new entry, which occurs with
some probability. The monopolists decision on whether to innovate or not depends on his
proximity to the technology frontier. If he is near to it then he will innovate and see o¤ the
entrant, exploiting a rst-mover advantage; if not, he exits. Given a certain level of proximity
to the technology frontier, the model implies that entry or the threat of it raises productivity
growth, more so when the probability of entry is high. Entry, exit and turnover are important
for growth, and their absence is "an important part of the explanation for the relatively dis-
appointing European growth performance over the past decade" (ibid.,p. 280).9 Contrast the
product variety model (Romer, 1990), in which exit must lead to lower innovation (cet. par.),
decreasing product variety.
Aghion and Howitt (2006) also note a closely related escape competitione¤ect, whereby
in "neck-and-neck" industries (i.e. provided that incumbent rms in an oligopolistic industry
are similar in technological capability,) innovation allows the rm to "break away from the con-
straints of intense competition" (p. 280), since not innovating would lower rents by more than
innovating would. Such step-by-step models generate testable predictions, including: 1) com-
petition enhances growth near the frontier but reduces it far from the frontier, 2) competition
has an ambiguous e¤ect on aggregate innovation depending on the proportion of neck-and-neck
industries in the economy, and 3) stronger patent protection and competition are complemen-
tary policy instruments near the frontier, both enhancing innovation through their e¤ects on
the prot motive - competition spurs innovation by undermining prots for near-frontier rms
that choose not to innovate, while patent protection enhances expected prots for near-frontier
rms that do innovate (Aghion et al. 2013).10
9Evidence cited for this is Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2003).
10For regression evidence supporting these predictions, see Aghion, Akcigit and Howitt (2013, pp. 13-14).
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Acemoglu and Cao (2010) describe a Schumpeterian model with quality improvements and
creative destruction, in which both incumbents and entrants innovate. In this particular setup,
the linearity (rather than concavity) of the incumbents innovation production technology gives
the model an unambiguous prediction that entry barriers (or taxes on entrants) actually raise
growth, as does lowering taxes on incumbents. A tax on entrants could be interpreted as a
strict patent policy, whereby entrants must pay the incumbent to use his innovation in the
R&D process, unlike in the baseline Aghion and Howitt model. A tax on entry also raises
welfare, since the decentralised equilibrium entails too much entry due to the business stealing
e¤ect. This policy prescription is at variance with the step-by-stepmodels just described,
in which both stronger patent protection and greater competition actually promote growth in
neck-and-neck industries.
The bottom line seems to be that creative destruction models can be constructed in such a
way as to imply various distinct (and often conicting) policies regarding barriers to entry, com-
petition and intellectual property protection and their e¤ects on the growth rate. Ultimately,
which of these models applies (whether at the aggregate level or the industry level) is an em-
pirical matter. Here, the aim is to highlight the prediction of some of these models (and the
suggestion of empirical evidence gathered in e.g. Crafts (2012)) that barriers to business entry
are harmful to innovation, while competition enhances it, via Schumpeter/Kirzners innovator.
Also noted is the assumed equivalence in all these models between the creative destructor and
the researcher or inventor, which has led to the mapping of innovation to formal R&D activity
in the data at the empirical testing stage.
4.3.2 Spillover Models
Creative destruction models are not the only models with some claim to the Schumpeterian tag.
The knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship (KSTE; Acs et al. 2005, 2009) channels
Schumpeter Mark Iin refocusing the growth driver on entrepreneurs, as opposed to the prot-
driven inventors emphasized in the R&D literature motivated by Aghion and Howitt (1992).11
Braunerhjelm et al. (2010) suggest that the causality from R&D to growth is not as simple as
the new endogenous growth theory implies, noting the lack of correlation between GDP growth
11Thus the emphasis is more on Schumpeter Mark Iand less on Mark II.
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and the R&D spending to GDP ratio for 29 OECD countries between 1981 and 2002. It is
worth beginning with a brief discussion of Romers knowledge spillover theory (Romer 1986,
1990), since KSTE draws heavily on it.
The Romer (1986) model follows Arrow (1962) and Shell (1967) in making aggregate knowl-
edge accumulate as a costless by-product of the individual rms capital accumulation, due to
its nonrival and partially excludable nature:
"investment in knowledge suggests a natural externality. The creation of new knowl-
edge by one rm is assumed to have a positive external e¤ect on the production
possibilities of other rms because knowledge cannot be perfectly patented or kept
secret." (p.1003)12
Knowledge is supposed to be embodied in physical and human capital; Romer (1990) empha-
sizes spillovers from human capital. Some research technology is assumed that can transform
foregone consumption into new knowledge, which spills over to the aggregate knowledge stock;
the process is motivated by "learning-by-doing" (Arrow, 1962), since investment in capital gives
the rm and its labour force experience which raises e¤ectiveness in production. Knowledge
spillovers overcome private diminishing returns to capital in production leading to constant or
even increasing returns, but the spillover is not internalised by private rms who do not account
for their e¤ect on the aggregate. The competitive equilibrium is therefore Pareto inferior to the
social planners optimum in which all rms would invest more in research, as in Aghion and
Howitt (1992). Government intervention is required for rms to accumulate knowledge at the
optimal rate; "Any intervention that shifts the allocation of current goods away from current
consumption and toward research will be welfare-improving." (Romer, 1986, p.1026) Interven-
tions are subsidies nanced by lumpsum taxation, adjusting the (after-tax) private marginal
product of knowledge to equal its social marginal product.
Unlike the 1986 model, in which growth is a by-product of investment and rms do not
intentionally invest in knowledge generating activities, later spillover models allow analysis
of how growth arises endogenously from rmsR&D decisions. Monopolistic competition is
introduced in expanding input variety models (Romer 1987, 1990), in which a greater number of
12This observation also underlies the Aghion and Howitt (1992) growth mechanism.
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inputs generates increasing returns in nal goods production through greater specialisation and
division of labour. Input varieties are therefore complements in production, and researchers aim
to invent new varieties. The producer of each input is a monopolist whose markup is protected
by patent, creating a pecuniary externality that drives a wedge between decentralised and
Pareto optimal equilibrium. This wedge is compounded by technological spillovers; past R&D
spills over to current R&D so that skilled labour is more productive over time and existing ideas
are inputs in the knowledge creation process. The decentralised innovation rate is again lower
than the social planners equilibrium, since rms ignore the e¤ect of their own R&D expenditure
on aggregate productivity. The policy recommendations are, again as in Aghion and Howitt
(1992), markup-correcting subsidies to nal good inputs and subsidies to research to correct
the disincentive e¤ects of technological spillovers, nanced by non-distortionary taxes.
We now turn to the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship (Acs et al., 2009), which
starts with the question of where entrepreneurial opportunities themselves come from, rather
than taking the existence of opportunities as exogenous and simply noting the role of entre-
preneurs in discovering and exploiting them (as has been the tendency in much literature on
entrepreneurship). Following Romer (1990), they assume that knowledge economic knowl-
edgeas opposed to general knowledge, cf. Arrow (1962) is a factor of production. Firm-level
investment in this factor yields an intertemporal spillover from present to future economy-wide
knowledge. This investment in knowledge production is equated with prot-motivated R&D
activity in incumbent rms, and the source of entrepreneurial opportunities is then identied
as spillovers from that activity.
Acs et al. (2005, 2009) note that Romers theory does not o¤er an explanation of how or
why knowledge spills over from rm-specic R&D to the wider economy, though he divides
economic knowledge into a non-rival, partially excludable part (published research or patent
documentation) and a rival, excludable part (personalised or tacit knowledge, embodied in in-
dividuals and networks). Their innovation is to add an intra-temporal spillover from incumbent
rms investing in R&D to entrepreneurial start-ups, who convert newly produced knowledge
into economic knowledge by perceiving unexploited opportunities for commercialisation. This
arises because higher than usual uncertainty and information asymmetry are associated with
new knowledge that is yet to become economic knowledge, leading to divergent estimates of
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expected value (mean and variance) across agents (Arrow, 1962). The intuition is that incum-
bent rms may undervalue newly generated knowledge, allowing that (personalised) knowledge
to be appropriated and commercialised by a start-up (a former employee or network member).
As such, incumbent R&D generates entrepreneurial opportunities.
It follows that entrepreneurship is an important conversion mechanism for knowledge to
become economic knowledge, the more so when incumbent rms fail to internalise the economic
potential of the knowledge they purposefully create, as may occur due to suboptimal incentive
structures within the rm. The stated implication is that strong intellectual property protection
(IPP) hampers intra-temporal knowledge spillovers and so innovation and growth. IPP allows
all rents from knowledge creation to accrue to the knowledge producer, so incentivising invest-
ments in knowledge production; but if the knowledge producer undervalues his R&D product
he will not take the important step of commercialising it, so keeping growth below potential.
The assumption is that incumbent rms have intrinsically lower commercialisation capabilities
than entrepreneurs.
In the theoretical model (Acs et al. 2009), a representative consumer derives utility from
consumption of di¤erentiated goods, produced by monopolistically competitive rms. Product
innovations in the form of new varieties and quality-improvements to existing varieties arrive as
a result of R&D investment by incumbents and/or by start-ups combining existing knowledge
in innovative ways, via Poisson processes; these two mechanisms are described by separate
innovation functions. Both types of innovation incur xed costs, requiring funds to be raised
on nancial markets; both pay risk premia on loans, since all rms face the threat of entry
which would reduce prots. The model has the scale e¤ect that more researchers increase the
probability of innovation (cf. Romer, 1986, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992) and more R&D
investment will raise innovation and growth; subsidies to R&D should therefore promote growth,
ceteris paribus. A higher exogenous level of average entrepreneurial ability in the economy raises
innovation from entrepreneurship (cet. par.), and a higher stock of knowledge will increase
entrepreneurship, providing more opportunities through the intra-temporal spillover.
The important prediction of their model for our purposes is that entrepreneurship is decreas-
ing in regulatory and administrative burdens and in government intervention in markets. This
e¤ect is termed "barriers to entrepreneurship", which include labour market rigidities, taxes
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and bureaucratic constraints.13 Barriers to entrepreneurship are captured in their model by an
e¢ ciency parameter, , reecting "how smoothly a new discovery is introduced in the market",
though interestingly this parameter enters the R&D-driven innovation function as well as the
entrepreneur-driven innovation function. This illustrates a di¢ culty that we will encounter here
as well, the fact that the same barriers to entrepreneurship (in the form of start-up) may also
be barriers to the commercialisation of knowledge by incumbent, knowledge-producing rms 
i.e. many incumbent rms conduct R&D and commercialisation activities that would be ham-
pered by barriers that we might characterise as entrepreneurship barriers. These barriers to
commercialisation would then disincentivise R&D itself, rather than operating on a distinct en-
trepreneurial channel. The implicit assumption in terming them barriers to entrepreneurship
may be that all commercialisation of new knowledge deserves to be called entrepreneurial, or
that entrepreneurs have a higher propensity to commercialise new knowledge than incumbents
(a priori, incumbents are bad at this) so that these barriers are more relevant to start-ups
(entrepreneurs) than to incumbents.
Braunerjhelm et al. (2010) use a model in which the distribution of scarce resources between
R&D and entrepreneurial activities is just as important for growth as purposeful investment in
knowledge creation (cf. Michelacci, 2003). In their KSTE model, both incumbent (knowledge
producing) rms and entrepreneurs commercialise new knowledge, but with explicitly di¤erent
levels of e¢ ciency in contrast to Acs et al. (2009). They note that cross country di¤erences in
these e¢ ciency parameters may explain how a small knowledge endowment may nevertheless
translate into a higher level of growth than a country with a larger endowment of knowledge but
whose commercialisation process is ine¢ cient; the e¢ ciency parameters are termed "knowledge
lters".
In the model, the individual weighs the expected net payo¤ from entrepreneurial activities
(uncertain) against the expected net payo¤ from being an employee (a certain wage), and the re-
lationship between these payo¤s decides the distribution of labour between these activities. The
share of entrepreneurs increases as commercialisation e¢ ciency rises (equivalent to a decrease
in the entrepreneurial knowledge lter), as well as with policies that increase the expected pay-
13They also note the role of culture, traditions and institutions, which are out of scope for the present paper
 culture and traditions are too di¢ cult to measure, and fundamental institutions are stable over the period
examined for the UK.
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o¤ to entrepreneurship, "e.g. through lowered taxes" (p.110). When the regulatory burden is
reduced and when knowledge is made more accessible, prots from entrepreneurial activity are
associated with a lower level of uncertainty, which also reduces the entrepreneurship knowledge
lter.
Braunerhjelm et al. (2010) note that models in which growth is generated through human
capital accumulation or R&D investment suggest policy instruments relevant to those mech-
anisms, i.e. incentives to invest in human capital and knowledge (e.g. Lucas, 1993): "Thus,
the policy debate on how to generate growth revolves around the e¢ cacy of a combination of
taxes and subsidies in order to promote education, public and private investments in research
and development, training programmes and apprentice systems." (Braunerhjelm et al., 2010,
p. 122). The principal relevance of their paper for our purposes is in their recommendation
of a di¤erent set of policy instruments a¤ecting the "entrepreneurial choice", responsible for
transforming new knowledge into economic knowledge. While the suggestion is not that invest-
ment in new knowledge is unnecessary for growth, the conclusion is that it is not su¢ cient.
The entrepreneur is the "conduit" for knowledge spillovers, which prevent diminishing returns
in production from setting in.
Acs and Sanders (2013) build on a similar KSTE model but enrich the spillover structure.
In this model, all opportunities for commercialisation resulting from R&D in incumbent nal
goods-producing rms spill over intratemporally to entrepreneurs operating in the intermediate
sector upstream that is, no spillovers are absorbed by incumbents. Start-up rms enter the
intermediate sector in the pursuit of positive expected rents accruing to "commercialization,
not invention" (p.781). To this is added an intratemporal spillover from entrepreneurship in
the intermediate sector to incumbent R&D (a downstream spillover). These intratemporal
spillovers are bolted onto the Romer (1990) expanding varieties model, so that there are inter-
temporal spillovers from current to future innovation. Again, the message is that "Policy makers
would be seriously misguided in focusing exclusively on knowledge creation" (Acs and Sanders,
2013, p. 787). The decentralised market equilibrium balanced growth rate is an analytical
function of the various spillover parameters, as is the social planner optimal growth rate when
all externalities are internalised. Policy can adjust the equilibrium growth rate by manipulating
the allocation of skilled labour between R&D and entrepreneurship, so as to replicate the social
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optimum. However, it is not clear a priori how the allocation should be adjusted until the
spillover parameters are robustly estimated, since it will depend on the relative sizes of the
various parameters. This theory incorporates considerable complexity in the growth process,
but is di¢ cult to take to the data; its policy recommendations for the UK remain obscure.
4.3.3 Innovation Under Perfect Competition
The creative destruction and knowledge spillover models share a reliance on monopoly rents
in motivating entrepreneurship. Such models often emphasize the necessity of legally granted
monopoly rights to safeguard the rate of innovation (with the notable exception of KSTE, which
may imply the reverse, though still relying on innovation spillovers for growth to occur). Boldrin
and Levine (2002) point out that assumptions of non-rivalry in technology - leading to costless
spillovers - and of a xed cost of innovating have led much modern endogenous growth theory
to discard perfect competition as a viable market framework, since innovation must incur a
loss. However, they argue against the existence of costless spillovers, since ideas are embodied
in a person or good and their transmission is costly. An idea may exist in the abstract but it
is economically valueless until someone has understood it, which takes time; likewise an idea
may be embodied in a good which must at least be paid for before that idea can be replicated
by someone else. Therefore the appropriability problem attached to spillovers of technology is
not necessarily an issue; the non-rivalry assumption is somewhat relaxed. They note "a great
deal of less formal evidence that shows that innovation can thrive under competition; and that
government grants of monopoly power are more prone to lead to socially costly rent-seeking
behaviour than to foster innovation and growth." (p.4). Like Scotchmer (1991), they emphasize
that legal grants of monopoly power giving the inventor control over how his innovation is used
by others have the e¤ect not only of enhancing the inventors original incentive, but also of
reducing future incentives to innovate o¤ the back of that innovation.14
They argue instead for a model in which innovating entrepreneurs are granted no legal
monopoly but benet from "a well dened right of sale" (p.2); that is, the value of privately
produced commodities is fully appropriable. Entrepreneurs seek prot opportunities:
14This observation is at the heart of Aghion and Howitts escape competitione¤ect. See e.g. Aghion and
Howitt (2006).
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"Technological progress takes place because entrepreneurs nd it advantageous to
discover and produce new commodities. These new commodities themselves may
make protable the employment of new activities that make use of them. Although,
in the ensuing equilibrium, entrepreneurs do not actually end up with a prot, it is
their pursuit of prot that drives innovation." (p.3)
Thus the interaction of entrepreneurs in competitive markets is itself the source of prof-
itable opportunities, though supernormal protitself is absent from the construct in general
equilibrium. This is precisely the situation in the model examined in this chapter.
The standard assumption is that the ability to copy an innovation freely in a perfectly com-
petitive market undermines the incentive to innovate at all, but Boldrin and Levine argue that
there are ways of recouping innovation costs that have little to do with long run or even medium
run monopoly rents. In the highly competitive cases of fashion, open software, basic scientic
knowledge, advertising (the list continues), a lack of e¤ective intellectual property protection
does not undermine the rate of innovation. They explain that returns to technological progress
generated by the entrepreneur accrue formally in the model to xed factors of production:
"If you are good at writing operating systems code when the personal computer
technology is introduced, you may end up earning huge rents, indeed. In principle,
this model allows a separation between the entrepreneurs who drive technological
change by introducing new activities and the owners of xed factors who prot from
their introduction. However, it is likely in practice that they are the same people. . .
In the end, it is necessary only that the rent accruing to the xed factors comprising
the new idea or creation cover the initial production cost." (p.18)
In the next chapter, we test the model (presented in general terms in Chapter 2) assuming
zt to be characterised as entrepreneurial activities by the choice of policy variable. As in KSTE,
it is assumed that a reduction in policy-related barriers to entrepreneurship has a positive
e¤ect on productivity growth over the short to medium run. The stylized setup is as follows:
future protsfrom the entrepreneurs decision to dedicate time to enhancing the technology
used by the incumbent rm (which the entrepreneur owns through shares) will, in general
equilibrium, enter the household budget through higher wages, though in the optimisation
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problem the entrepreneur takes the wage as given and envisages prots accruing to him via
a higher dividend stream. In this respect there are important similarities to the approach
of Boldrin and Levine (2002). I assume that competitive rents to factors of production are
su¢ cient to cover production costs, including the sunk cost of innovation which in this model is
the current labour wage foregone and the policy-related penalty incurred as a result of spending
time in entrepreneurial activities.
The model does not emphasize the non-rival, partially non-excludable nature of innovation,
and in this we depart from the spillover literature. Therefore the policy recommendation of the
model used here is not for the government to intervene by granting legal monopoly rights, for
example, in order to correct a socially sub-optimal level of innovation in decentralised equilib-
rium. The penalty variable represents any wedge between the returns that would come back to
the shareholding household as a result of higher rm-level productivity in a frictionless market,
and the returns after-tax; that is, it represents any distortion to the personal appropriability of
productivity increases resulting from entrepreneurship.
Since the tax/policy penalty is on the growth-driving margin by construction, the revenues
it raises will be undermined by the revenue foregone in terms of lost growth. Moreover, a
proportion of this taxis in fact badly designed regulation. If regulation is poorly designed or
delivered (i.e. the costs of complying are excessive) - if it does not correct a market imperfection
but in fact creates one then it represents not a straightforward welfare transfer from the rm
to the consumer (as in the case of well-designed regulation) but a deadweight loss to society.
Legal grants of monopoly power would constitute a barrier to entry in this model which would,
in theory, belong in the entrepreneurial taxrate.
The model used in this work abstracts from the complexities introduced by formal indivisi-
bilities, business stealing e¤ects, spillovers, and interactions between entrants and incumbents;
in short many aspects of the models discussed above which may recommend them for certain
purposes or in the case of certain industries at a more microeconomic level. What we are in-
terested in is the policy predictions that these models have, some of which are shared by the
present model. In its relative simplicity, this model o¤ers a convenient vehicle for testing some
of these predictions against the UK experience.
Entrepreneurship has traditionally been excluded from the neoclassical framework on the
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basis that the uncertainty, improvisation and creativity inherent in entrepreneurship are im-
possible within it (Kirzner, 1985; Wennekers and Thurik, 1999). The present model introduces
entrepreneurship to the problem of a rational optimising agent operating in a perfect com-
petition general equilibrium model with full information.15 In doing so, I appeal to Milton
Friedmans as ifmethodology (M. Friedman, 1953). Assumptions of full information, of ratio-
nality and perfect competition provide a simplifying framework in which to test the hypothesis
of interest; namely whether a causal relationship from tax and regulatory policies around entre-
preneurship to economic growth is to be found in the UK macroeconomic data. In reality the
aggregate relationship between these variables is the result of myriad mechanisms operating
at the microeconomic level, in a variety of contexts. However, a theory is not to be judged
by its "descriptive accuracy" but on its "analytical relevance" (Friedman, 1953, p.166) and, in
general, simpler theories (provided they can explain the phenomena of interest) are preferable
to complex theories:
"A hypothesis is important if it explainsmuch by little, that is, if it abstracts the common
and crucial elements from the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the
phenomena to be explained and permits valid predictions on the basis of them alone. . . . the
relevant question to ask about the assumptionsof a theory is not whether they are descriptively
realistic, for they never are, but whether they are su¢ ciently good approximations for the
purpose in hand. And this question can be answered only by seeing whether the theory works,
which means whether it yields su¢ ciently accurate predictions." (1953, p.153)
By "accurate predictions" is meant not the ability to forecast future events correctly but the
ability to observe the models implications for macroeconomic phenomena in historical data (p.
157). For Friedman, a models strength has nothing to do with the reality of its assumptions; in
fact those may be diametrically opposed, since realistic assumptions will necessarily be complex
and thus weaken the theory, making it less general. Therefore a model should not be judged
on the ability of its assumptions to t the data, but on its ability to generate behaviour that
15Acs et al. (2013) take a similar position. It may strike entrepreneurship scholars as odd to develop a general
equilibrium model of Schumpeterian entrepreneurship. Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are, after all, upsetting the
static Walrasian equilibrium by introduction (radical) innovations. It should be noted, however, that this model
is not intended to describe the entrepreneurial process at the micro level but rather models its implications at the
macro level. We have to abstract from a lot of micro level heterogeneity and Knightian uncertainty to focus on
the macro-level impact of an entrepreneurial process that on average generates a ow of innovations that create
growth in a dynamic, steady-state equilibrium.PAGE REF.
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mimics real world data in certain dimensions of interest. This is paramorphicmodelling;
contrast the homeomorphicmodelling endorsed by many behavioural economists (Wakker,
2010, p.3), in which not just the outcomes generated by a model but also its assumptions
must t the data to some level of realism. The approach here aims for simplicity, on the
basis that adding complexity obscures the interpretation of the indirect inference test results
reported later in this chapter. It may be that some of the assumptions made here are wrong
in a fundamentally important way, a¤ecting the models data generation process and therefore
its t to the observable data. If so, the model should be rejected at the testing stage and its
assumptions subsequently adjusted (or thrown out). However, if the model is not rejected, the
"perceived discrepancies between the assumptionsand the real world"are unimportant for
the particular economic relationship the model is designed to explain.16
The last important point to lift from Friedmans 1953 essay is that "In general, there is
more than one way to formulate such a description [of the forces that a hypothesis asserts
to be important] more than one set of assumptions in terms of which the theory can be
presented." (p.171) It has been noted that Schumpeteriangrowth models generally assume a
monopolistic industrial structure in which incentives to innovate depend on the appropriability
of economic rents. Here, the incentive to innovate likewise depends on the appropriability
of take-home prots under perfect competition; tax and regulatory treatment of innovative
rms will undermine productivity growth, regardless of the industrial structure. The perfectly
competitive model used here mimics to some extent the predictions of Aghion and Howitts
story in terms of the e¤ects of competition and of rm entry and exit on productivity growth
(Aghion and Howitt, 2006, 2013). Ultimately it may be that the hypothesis we embed in perfect
competition could t the data equally well (or better) in a model predicated on the assumption
of imperfect competition. All that the current study can do is establish whether the particular
model used here, with its high level of abstraction, is ruled out as being the appropriate model
in selected dimensions of interest, or whether it is still in contention.
Here there is no explicit creative destruction mechanism in the growth process. The model
16Note that here the chief purpose is to understand how certain broad types of policy have worked through
the entrepreneurial channel to a¤ect economic growth. The contention is that the model I use here, though
perhaps incapable of capturing complex policy-entrepreneur interactions at the level of its microfoundations,
nevertheless allows us to examine the macroeconomic relationship between policies that we have identied as
entrepreneur-relevant and productivity growth.
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itself is agnostic on how precisely entrepreneurship causes growth, and a positive linear relation-
ship between time spent in entrepreneurial activity and productivity growth in the consumption
good sector is simply assumed, embedded in a perfect competition setup (Eq. 2.53, Ch.2). No
rms literally exit in this stylized model. Equally, the entrepreneur does not set up a new rm
(unlike Acs et al., 2009, 2013), but simply uses his time to generate new productivitywhich
is fully excludable and can be donated to the existing representative rm that the agent owns.
The exogenously existing rm is thus the vehicle for zt to enhance the entrepreneurs income.
But though zt in this highly stylized model does not involve setting up a new rm, it can be
thought of loosely as including such an activity.
Notionally, all barriers to e¤ective operation encountered by the rm over its lifecycle
are expected to hamper the TFP growth mechanism here because of an underlying appeal to
Schumpeterian theory, however that theory may be formalised elsewhere. Obstacles to setting
up a rm deter zt; future costs anticipated while running a rm, in terms of prot taxes,
labour market rigidities, or bureaucratic compliance costs, likewise deter zt; and an anticipated
inability to wind up a commercial venture when it ceases to be protable will likewise raise the
riskiness of entrepreneurship (reducing its expected return) and deter zt. All these deterrents
to zt, insofar as they are captured in  0t, reduce growth in this model, which is consistent
with the predictions of Schumpeterian creative destruction theory, as well as the knowledge
lter hampering the entrepreneurial spillover conduit in KSTE. Again, if the fundamental
assumptions of zero spillovers and perfect competition are importantly wrong, they will lead
this simpler model to be rejected by the test, implying that the complexities added by these
other approaches at the level of microfoundations are unavoidable. If this model can explain the
historical data, on the other hand, it may provide a viable alternative to those more complex
formulations.
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4.4 Review of Empirical Literature: Policy, Entrepreneurship
and Growth
4.4.1 Growth Regressions
This section is introduced with a brief discussion of the Barro growth regressionswidely used
to investigate policy impacts since Barro (1991). These take the form:
gi;t =  ln yi;0 +X
0
i;t + si;t + ei;t
where the dependent variable is GDP growth or productivity growth, and regressors are initial
income (to control for convergence), a matrix of co-variates to control for omitted variable
bias and a policy variable, s. Models of this specication are often estimated in a panel with
observations averaged over 5 year periods to smooth out the impact of the business cycle, which
might otherwise a¤ect both dependent and independent variables, though such averaging could
smooth out informative variation. Barro (1991) uses data on 98 countries between 1960 and
1985.
A cross-section is used in order to obtain counterfactual variation (what would have hap-
pened to growth had the policy experience been di¤erent?), and a larger set of countries may
o¤er a wider variety of policy proles, particularly for reasonably long time series. However,
there is a problem in assuming parameter homogeneity in a large set of countries with very
di¤erent characteristics, many of which will be in the error term; this implies that the sam-
ple may not be random, if more of one typeof country is included than others (Levine and
Zervos, 1993).17 If countries have fundamental di¤erences which a¤ect the response of their
growth rates to policy then they will not provide an appropriate counterfactual for each other
unless these di¤erences are controlled for in the regression. Controlling for di¤erences using a
xed country-specic e¤ect will not resolve this if the omitted factors vary over time. More
regressors can be included to control for observable omitted variables that might be correlated
with policy, causing bias, but the loss of degrees of freedom may be prohibitive if the time series
is short (furthermore, the omitted driving factors may not be easily measurable).
17This sample selection issue boils down to ordinary omitted variable bias (Heckman, 1979).
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Even for more similar countries, many variables have been found to be correlated to growth
(in di¤erent specications) and the temptation is to include them all. However, regressors can be
highly correlated with each other. The more collinearity between regressors, the more di¢ cult
to distinguish their individual e¤ects (Loayza and Soto, 2002; Brock and Durlauf, 2001). A
more parsimonious regression is preferable, but how to choose between the regressors?
Often a regressor that has been signicant in one specication loses its signicance when
included alongside additional or di¤erent regressors (Levine and Renelt, 1992). This problem
is often addressed using extreme bounds analysis (Leamer, 1983). When such analysis is con-
ducted, most correlations with growth are discovered to be fragile; i.e. the signicance and
magnitude of the coe¢ cient of interest is not robust to the addition of other regressors; though
some argue that extreme bounds analysis is not an appropriate test, e.g. Sala-i-Martin (1994).18
Another potential issue is that policy proxies may be inconsistently measured across countries,
undermining parameter homogeneity further; this problem can also be expected to diminish
when regressions focus on groups of OECD countries. Coe¢ cient estimates are also sensitive
to sample outliers.
A separate source of endogeneity in the policy variable (besides omitted variables) is reverse
causality. Regressions of growth on policy will be vulnerable to this if policy responds to growth
rather than (or perhaps as well as) causing it. This ambiguity over the direction of causation
fundamentally undermines the inferred policy conclusions from the estimated coe¢ cients; they
represent statistical correlations at most and, as established above, perhaps not even then due
to fragility. These problems are not limited to regressions in which GDP or productivity growth
is the dependent variable, but may also apply for regressions of other outcomeson policy, such
as entrepreneurship or innovation proxies such as R&D expenditure (the R&D literature is
dealt with in Chapter 6). For instance, if the regulatory environment changes in response to
lobbying by entrepreneurs (rather than driving entrepreneurship), high regulation environments
will simply persist when there are few motivated entrepreneurs around, leading to a negative
correlation between entry and regulation. A simple regression of entry rates on regulation
measures could not then be interpreted as a causal model from policy to entry; moreover, the
18See also Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004) for a Bayesian Model Averaging approach to selecting appropriate
right-hand side variables in growth regression.
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feedback from the dependent to the independentvariable will bias the estimation.
When regressors are endogenous, an instrumental variable strategy is essential. Many more
recent growth regressions take this approach, arguing - with varying levels of success - for in-
struments that are exogenous and strongly correlated with the policy variable. More recent
studies address regressor endogeneity using a dynamic GMM or GMM system approach (Arel-
lano and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998) in which instruments are the lagged levels
or di¤erences of the endogenous regressors themselves. This is viable if their autocorrelation
structure satises certain requirements.
While it may not be entirely fair to conclude that Ultimately this line of research is a
dead end if the aim is to understand what causes growth so that we can improve the situation
(Myles, 2009b, p.16), the literature review which follows is conducted bearing the preceding
discussion rmly in mind.
4.4.2 Entrepreneurship and Growth
Carree et al. (2002) look at the relationship between per capita GDP and business ownership
in a panel of 23 OECD countries for the period 1976 to 1996. Business ownership is the
number of business owners for all sectors (except agriculture) as a proportion of the labour
force, and therefore measures the stock of self-employed businesses rather than new business
creation. However, these may be correlated and they argue that the business ownership rate is
a reasonable, though imperfect, proxy for entrepreneurship.19
Estimating a two-equation error correction model with weighted least squares they nd that
deviations of self-employment around its optimal level, ei;t, incur penalties in the growth rate
of GDP per capita, whether deviations are positive or negative. Entrepreneurship is found to
follow an error correction process, and the convergence rate back to equilibrium is slow, relying
(theoretically) on structural supply side as well as cultural and institutional changes. ei;t itself
is modelled as a quadratic function of per capita GDP. This is motivated by the observation
that self-employment is higher for both poorer and richer countries, while the rm distribution
in middle income countries is more heavily dominated by larger rms; thus there is two-way
19Across countries the denition of business owners di¤ers in breadth (regarding businesses that are not legally
incorporated, for instance), so they adjust the OECD statistics to correct for this. However, they note that issues
remain for comparing these rates across countries.
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causality in the model between entrepreneurship and income. For the determination of ei;t,
they cannot distinguish statistically between an L-shaped and a U-shaped relationship with the
stage of development (cf. Wennekers et al., 2010).
The authors put great emphasis on potential policy implications of the results, drawing the
following quote from Kirzner that government regulation of market activity is likely to obstruct
and frustrate the spontaneous, corrective forces of entrepreneurial adjustments(Kirzner, 1997,
p.81). The suggestion is that free entry and exit free of stigma and nancial burdens are
essential for entrepreneurship rates to be allowed to nd their equilibrium in the face of shocks,
and hence for economic growth to be at potential.
Audretsch and Thurik (2001) look at the same set of 23 OECD countries within the same
setup for 1974-1998. They also nd that any deviation from the equilibrium rate of entrepreneur-
ship reduces growth; this holds when entrepreneurship is measured both by the self-employment
rate and by the share of small rms in economic activity.
Wong and Autio (2005) use Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) data to look at the
macroeconomic impact of entrepreneurship, dened as new rm creation, in a cross-section of 37
countries in 2002. Their aim is to distinguish between the productivity impacts of innovation
and entrepreneurship. Innovators can be large and/or established rms conducting formal
R&D and as such are not entrepreneurs. Their regression model is a CRS Cobb-Douglas
production function, with new rm creation and technological innovation intensity included
as separate inputs to production in addition to capital per worker.20 The dependent variable
is GDP per worker, technological innovation intensity is proxied by the ratio of patents to
GDP between 1997 and 2001, and entrepreneurship by various Total Entrepreneurship Activity
(TEA) measures in turn: high-growth potential TEA, necessity TEA, opportunity TEA and
overall TEA. All these measure the number of adults engaged in the start-up process or actively
owner-managing a business under 42 months old, as a proportion of the working-age population.
Opportunity TEA is entrepreneurship that responds to the existence of potential economic rents,
while Necessity TEA entrepreneurship driven by necessity due to lack of alternative employment
possibilities (a refugeee¤ect; Thurik et al., 2008). High growth potential TEA is a measure
not of observed growth by young rms but of the ambitions and growth expectations of
20They also control for convergence using the starting level of GDP
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entrepreneurs.21
A priori, faster technological innovation rates, higher overall TEA, higher opportunity TEA
and higher growth potential TEA are all expected to raise aggregate growth rates, while neces-
sity TEA is predicted to retard growth on the basis that refugeeshave lower human capital
(Lucas, 1978). However, in their parsimonious regressions the only specication for which
entrepreneurship is at all signicant is for the high growth potential TEA, signicant at the
10% level. Innovation is signicant in all specications. When entrepreneurship and innova-
tion measures are interacted, no signicant e¤ect is found; nding no statistical evidence of
collinearity between the measures, they conclude that innovation and new rm creation do
not extensively overlap in the data: This conrms what is often described anecdotally and
concluded intuitively: that only a very small proportion of entrepreneurs engage in true techno-
logical innovation.(p. 345) This assertion relies on a narrow denition of true technological
innovationas patented innovation, which is questionable. There is evidence that small rms
have a lower propensity to patent than larger rms, and that service sector innovation is less
likely to be patented (Fontana et al. 2013, Hall et al. 2013). The assumption of exogeneity for
the entrepreneurship and innovation variables is dubious, and this is not addressed; they state
in the conclusion that a Granger causality approach would be preferable though impossible
due to data constraints at the time. Furthermore, given the small sample there is little scope
for robustness tests with respect to control variables or model specication. Wong and Autio
acknowledge the absence in their ndings of a signicant relationship between the impact of
entrepreneurship on growth and national income, whereas Wennekers et al. (2005) nd that
the contribution of overall TEA to growth does depend on the level of development. Since the
same dataset is used in both studies, the di¤erent results show that the conclusions are sensitive
to di¤erent model specications. The conclusion that high growth potential rms (gazelles)
have a greater macroeconomic impact than the majority of start-ups contrasts with other work
done on employment rates (see Davidsson and Delmar, 2003).
Erken et al. (2008) use the error correction model approach of Carree et al. (2002) to
derive the deviation of self-employment rates around their optimum, and use this deviation
21To be counted, start-ups must expect high growth potential in 1) employment, 2) market impact, 3) globalised
customer base, 4) use of new technology. Such rms make up less than 5% of new start-ups (p.341).
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variable to represent entrepreneurship in various regressions of TFP growth on potential deter-
minants. When entrepreneurship is included as an additional regressor in ve inuential model
specications from the literature (Coe and Helpman, 1995; Engelbrecht, 1997; Guellec and van
Pottelsberghe, 2004; Gri¢ th et al., 2004; Belorgey et al, 2006), it is found to be signicant
and positively related to TFP growth. The conclusions of the original papers are not a¤ected
by the inclusion of the entrepreneurship variable, with other regressors remaining positive and
signicant factors. They also estimate an all-in-the-familymodel, combining all the driver
variables of interest from the earlier models (human capital and various R&D measures, as
well as catch-up and labour participation rates) with additional controls. The implication is
that entrepreneurship is an additional factor in the productivity process and belongs in the
endogenous growth literature alongside human capital accumulation and R&D-driver theories.
Acs et al. (2012) estimate a Barro-style regression of GDP growth rates on entrepreneurship
(self-employment rates) for 18 OECD countries, using a rst-step regression of entrepreneur-
ship on age (the proportion of the population between 30 and 44), unemployment rates and a
range of controls to purge the regressor of endogeneity. Among the controls in the 2nd stage
regression are R&D intensity, average years of schooling and government expenditure. They
nd entrepreneurship to be positive and signicant in all specications. The estimates for the
impact of entrepreneurship is robust in di¤erent samples: 1981-1998 and 1990-1998. Comparing
feasible generalised least squares estimates to the 2-Stage LS estimates, the impact of entre-
preneurship on growth is ve times as large for the instrumental variable approach, though the
other coe¢ cients are relatively consistent in magnitude.
Hessels and van Stel (2011) investigate whether export-oriented start-ups drive national
economic growth in a panel of 34 countries for 2002-2008, using GEM total early-stage entre-
preneurship activity (TEA) measures. A business included in the TEA measure qualies as
export-oriented if more than 25% of its customers are resident abroad. Following van Stel et
al. (2005) they use a dynamic model, regressing average growth rates of GDP on lagged levels
of TEA and export-oriented TEA, including the lagged growth of GDP per capita as a regres-
sor to capture potential reverse causality, and the lagged GDP level to capture convergence
e¤ects. The general macroeconomic environment is controlled for using the lagged level of the
Global Competitiveness Index. Noting the potential endogeneity of export-oriented TEA, they
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instrument it using various other factors including FDI volume, industry structure, ination
and GDP. Export orientation has a positive and signicant additional impact on growth in
all specications, above the impact found for entrepreneurship in general, but the result only
holds for high income countries. The coe¢ cient on export-oriented entrepreneurship is higher
and more signicant in the instrumental variable specication. TEA is a signicant cause of
growth across all specications and for all levels of income, with the magnitude slightly larger
for less developed countries in the sample. The authors acknowledge the small sample size as a
limitation of the study.
For other empirical work linking entrepreneurship to growth, see the surveys in Carree and
Thurik (2010), van Praag and Versloot (2007) and Karlsson et al. (2004). For evidence at the
regional level, see Audretsch and Fritsch (2002).
4.4.3 Regulation and Growth
Theories of Regulation
Theoretically speaking, why do governments regulate markets? According to the public interest
theory of regulation (Pigou, 1938), markets are subject to failures arising from information
asymmetries, monopoly power or externalities. Governments intervene using regulation to
correct market failures and optimise social welfare. For instance, entry regulation lters out
undesirable producers, protecting consumers by assuring product quality and allowing resources
to ow to their most productive uses. Consequently, higher levels of entry regulation should
be correlated with better outcomes than if regulation was absent. Market failures theoretically
reduce both allocative and productive e¢ ciency and so their removal by government intervention
should allow growth to reach potential.22
According to public choice theory, on the other hand, regulation is ine¢ cient and is an
instrument of a less than socially benign government, used to extract rents. This may be a
result of regulatory capture of the government by interest groups such as industry23 (Stigler,
22On the other hand, Djankov et al. (2002) expect a negative relationship between regulation and growth on
the basis that growing countries have fewer market failures (hence their economic success) and consequently less
need of regulation. This illustrates the ambiguous causality inherent in the regulation-growth relationship.
23 If incumbent rms are in control of regulation, they will raise barriers to entry to keep their position secure;
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1971) or else the politicians and bureaucrats running the government are rent-seekers, using
the compliance process to collect bribes the tollbooththeory (Djankov et al., 2002).24
Djankov et al. (2002) look at the country-level e¤ects of administrative entry costs on
aggregate outcomes for a sample of 85 countries, of all levels of development; their paper
formed the basis for the World Banks Ease of Doing Business dataset. Indicators include the
number of procedures required, the minimum o¢ cial time and the o¢ cial cost as a percentage of
GDP per capita associated with starting a business in 1999.25 They note large variation across
countries in these indicators. Running OLS regressions of various outcome variables on the
regulation indicators, they nd that higher entry requirements are not strongly associated with
better product quality, lower levels of pollution or better health outcomes. However, they are
strongly positively associated with government corruption and the size of the uno¢ cial economy,
and negatively correlated with a survey-based measure of product market competition. They
conclude in favour of the tollbooth theory that regulation exists primarily for government
o¢ cials to distort rents from rms. They acknowledge, however, that these regressions do not
control for unobserved cross-country heterogeneity that may be correlated with regulation and
that this casts doubt on their conclusions.
Rather than emphasising capture or attributing malign motives to regulators, an alternative
theory of regulation is government failure. Under this explanation, regulation is motivated
by the public interest but has negative impacts on market outcomes that are unintentional,
due to awed design (perhaps based on asymmetric information) or unanticipated compliance
or enforcement burdens which counteract intended benets. Equally, regulation may impede
growth if it is designed primarily with other non-economic objectives in mind, such a human
rights protection, wealth redistribution or defence.26 Hence a government failure from the
therefore we would expect higher regulation to be associated with higher rm level prots and higher market
concentration. This view is formulated by e.g. Adam Smith (1776): To widen the market and to narrow the
competition is always the interest of the dealers. . . The proposal of any new law or regulation of commerce which
comes from this order . . . comes from an order of men, whose interest is never exactly the same with that of the
public, who generally have an interest to deceive and even oppress the public, and who accordingly have, upon
many occasions, both deceived and oppressed it.(Book 1, Chapter XI, p. 278).
24Public choice theory is sometimes referred to as private interest theory, since it deals with privately motivated
regulating bodies (e.g. Klapper et al. 2006).
25These are constructed from o¢ cial legal documents and expert consultation and almost surely underestimate
the cost and complexity of entry(p.7).
26 In addition to the motivation of screen[ing] out potential frauds and cheats, Klapper et al. (2006) note
some other potential government motivations underlying detailed bureaucratic requirements attached to start-up:
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perspective of growth might not be a failure when assessed on di¤erent criteria, and depending
on how relevant costs and benets are quantied and combined in a social welfare function.
Though we do not lose sight of this point, the chapter focuses on the growth objective, and it
is in these terms that government failure is dened here.
The costs to businesses generated by regulatory compliance constitute a static cost (the
direct cost of meeting the requirements of the regulation), impacting the level of output, and
additionally may be dynamic and compounding, much like a tax distortion on the intertemporal
margin i.e. they a¤ect the marginal incentive to invest time and money in capital or produc-
tive activities. One unit of such investment foregone represents an increasing opportunity cost
over time. Since too much regulation may distort decision margins and suppress economic ac-
tivities which drive growth, while too little may leave market failures uncorrected, also leading
to reduced ine¢ ciency, there may be a growth sweet spotfor regulation akin to the interior
optimum on a La¤er curve. This would imply a non-linear relationship. Conversely the rela-
tionship may be monotonic, so that more regulation is simply worse for growth, regardless of the
level. The following discussion reviews empirical evidence for the growth impacts of regulation
in product markets and labour markets, since this makes up the body of the literature.27
Product Market Regulation and Growth
The new endogenous growth theory generates an ambiguous prediction for the impact of product
market entry regulation on innovation and growth (see Section 4.3 above).On the one hand, free
entry in a creative destruction model undermines the monopoly rents that attract the innovator
and compensate for his e¤ort (and for the probability that his time as monopolist will be short-
lived); on the other, product market entry regulations discourage potential entrants who drive
innovation in the hope of becoming the next monopolist.
By raising barriers to entry, product market regulation (PMR) lowers the number of rms
and hence the degree of competition in an industry. Competition can act as a disciplining
inuence on incumbent rms which, in the absence of entry threats, can operate ine¢ ciently
the information gathered during the process could be useful for tax collection or censuses, and hence [improve]
the public decision making process(Klapper et al., 2006, p. 592-3). The point is that governments have multiple
objectives, some of which may conict with maximising economic growth.
27For a brief overview of other types of regulation in this context, see Frontier (2012).
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and maintain rents without innovating further. Additionally, principal-agent problems within
the rm tend to increase with PMR, lowering productivity growth, but decrease when the
degree of competition is higher (Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). Competition appears to make
prots more sensitive to manager behaviour (Nickell, 1996).
The empirical consensus for OECD countries is that deregulation of product markets since
the 1980s has stimulated investment and productivity growth in those countries, for both man-
ufacturing and service industries (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). Bourlès et al. (2013) look
at the inuence of competition in intermediate goods sectors on productivity in downstream
sectors, controlling for industry distance from the global technology frontier, in a sample of 15
OECD countries and 20 non-manufacturing sectors for 1984-2007. Competition is proxied by
entry regulations. They nd that higher entry regulation in upstream sectors reduces down-
stream MFP growth in a non-linear fashion, more so for countries and sectors that are close
to the global frontier. Furthermore, the negative e¤ects of regulation appear to a¤ect more
units in the sample over time. Their suggestion is that, as downstream markets have become
increasingly competitive with increasing global integration, the undermining e¤ects of upstream
markups on incentives to invest in MFP improvements downstream have become more intense.
This is in line with the neo-Schumpeterian endogenous growth theory which they appeal to
throughout.
Indeed, in many cases the channel for this PMR-related growth is thought to have been
innovation as measured by R&D or patents (e.g. Gri¢ th et al. 2010). Given that, as Schum-
peter observed in his later work, R&D activity is subject to signicant economies of scale and
is therefore dominated by large rms, these studies are not relevant to the start-up channel
emphasised in this chapter, though we must bear them in mind for the interpretation of results
in Chapter 5. The interest is on tying the growth impact of PMR to an entrepreneurial channel.
Scarpetta et al. (2002) nd, using micro-level data for nine OECD countries between the
late 1980s and mid-1990s, that new entrants make more of a contribution to MFP growth than
incumbents, and that stricter PMR and labour market regulation both reduce the rate of new
rm entry. OECD regulation indicators are used. The negative e¤ect of regulation on MFP
is more intense in industries and countries further from the technology frontier, implying that
it hinders technology adoption as well as overall innovation. They nd that the average rm
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entrant in the US (the least regulated in the sample) is small relative to other countries, but
that rms that survive expand rapidly; in contrast, the average start-up in Europe is larger,
and subsequent rates of expansion are slower. The suggestion is that lower entry costs allow
market experimentation that is impossible in more regulated countries.
Klapper et al. (2006) investigate whether and how entry regulation drives entry at the rm
level, using data on a large cross-section of European rms for 1998-1999. Entry is measured
as the ratio of new rms to the total number of rms in that industry.28 Measures of entry
regulation are taken from Djankov et al. (2002). To deal with potential reverse causality,
they use a cross-industry, cross-country interaction model with industry- and country-specic
xed e¤ects; i.e. the explanatory variable of interest is the interaction between country-level
regulation characteristics and the industrys naturalentry rate, proxied by the US rate. Entry
costs in the US, as measured by Djankov et al. (2002), are 0.5% of GDP per capita as opposed
to the European sample average of 20%, so the US is assumed to provide the counterfactual
of what entry would look like in the absence of regulation. The hypothesis is that industries
in which the entry rate ought to be high will be most a¤ected by barriers. As they note, it is
a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach and therefore cannot provide an estimate of the absolute
impact of entry regulation on entry.
Consistent with their hypothesis, the interaction coe¢ cient is negative and signicant at the
1% level, indicating that industries with naturally high entry rates have relatively lower entry
rates when country-level entry regulation is high. As an illustration, the estimate implies that
entry regulations account for about 10% of the mean di¤erence in entry rates across sample
countries between the retail industry (a high entry rate industry relative to the US) and the
pulp, paper and paper products manufacturing industry (a low entry industry, relative to the
US). This result is robust in various di¤erent samples, to removal of outliers and to alternative
measures of entry and of regulation, as well as to the addition of further controls (e.g. GDP
per capita). They also use a countrys legal origin to instrument regulation, arguing that
it represents the part of regulation which is predetermined and is exogenous to entry. The
signicance and sign of the estimate are robust in the IV model, though the instrument may
28New rms are rms aged 1 or 2 and surviving at least one year.
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still be endogenous. To address this possibility29 they restrict the sample to relatively small
industries which, it is argued, should have little lobbying power to inuence the regulatory
environment themselves. Smallis dened as having an industry share in value added in the
countries lowest tertile. The result is again una¤ected.
Klapper et al. also consider whether bureaucratic entry barriers screen out unscrupulous
potential entrants; if so, and if trustworthiness is a country characteristic, we would expect the
impact of regulation on entry rates to be higher when trust is lower. To investigate this, they
divide the sample into low-income and high-income countries relative to the sample median,
arguing that higher-income countries are less prone to such misbehaviorsince infrastructure
is superior and monitoring more e¤ective; hence if entry regulations are e¤ective at screening
markets for charlatans, they should be more e¤ective in low income countries. They nd no
di¤erence in the estimated coe¢ cient in the two samples.
Other results suggest that entry regulations raise the threshold size of new rms, and that
incumbent rms in naturally high entry industries grow more slowly when regulation is higher.
This seems to support the hypothesis that entry provides an e¤ective growth stimulus to in-
cumbent rms, both because competition provides a disciplining inuence that drives greater
e¢ ciency, and because protectionist barriers to entry allow incumbents to restrict quantities.
Klapper et al. also nd that types of regulation which strengthen intellectual property rights
and broaden access to nance have a positive e¤ect on entry, illustrating that not all regulations
qualify as barriers to entry. This cautions against a blanket assertion that aggregate regulation
is bad for business; qualitatively di¤erent types of regulation operate di¤erently on incentives
and market outcomes.
Policy Trends in Product Market Regulation
So there is empirical evidence for a link between product market entry regulations and entre-
preneurship, or start-up rates; for more on this, see Cincera and Galgau (2005). This literature,
as well as the advent of cross-country rankings through the World Bank Doing Business Indi-
29The possibility that countries with large high natural entryindustries have a strong entrepreneurial culture
and select low entry regulationif legal origin is correlated with strength of entrepreneurial culture as well as
with regulation, the instrumented variable might still be endogenous.
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Figure 4-2: Time Needed to Start a Business, Doing Business Indicators (World Bank)
cators, has stimulated policymakers to reduce such barriers; Djankov (2009) states that every
OECD high-income country but Sweden and the United States. . . [has] made entry regulation
faster and cheaper or administratively simpler since 2003 (p.187). Figure 4.2 illustrates this
downward policy trend, plotting the time required to start a business for selected OECD coun-
tries, including the UK, between 2004 (when the harmonised data becomes available) and 2014;
Table 4.1 shows the downward trend in paid-in minimum capital required, as a percentage of
income per capita (Source, World Bank Doing Business Indicators). As these measures illus-
trate, the UK has been at the lower end of the OECD spectrum for PMR stringency since 2004.
Moreover, it was an early starter, as the OECD indicators show. PMR stringency indicators
for the network industries show the UK reforming as early as 1981 (Figure 4-3).30 Indicators of
regulation in retail and professional services are only available at irregular intervals since 1998,
30This indicator provides gures on the US only for 1998, 2003 and 2009 (1.98, 1.91 and 1.65 respectively).
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Finland France Germany Italy Japan(Tokyo) UK US (NYC)
2004 29.8 29.2 49.1 11.6 74.9 0 0
2005 29.3 0 48.8 11.2 74.9 0 0
2006 28 0 47.6 10.8 75.3 0 0
2007 27.1 0 46.2 10.4 0 0 0
2008 7.7 0 42.8 9.8 0 0 0
2009 7.4 0 42.2 9.7 0 0 0
2010 7.2 0 40.8 9.7 0 0 0
2011 7.9 0 41.9 10.1 0 0 0
2012 7.3 0 40.2 9.9 0 0 0
2013 7 0 39 9.7 0 0 0
2014 7 0 37.8 9.8 0 0 0
Table 4.1: Paid-In Minimum Capital, percentage of income per capita. Doing Business Indica-
tors. Source, World Bank
Finland France Germany Italy Japan UK US
1998 2.862 4.500 3.402 4.350 3.533 3.380 na
2003 2.862 3.757 3.376 3.850 2.313 2.151 2.000
2008 2.886 3.805 2.876 4.064 2.313 2.180 1.760
2013 2.862 2.638 2.710 3.152 2.379 1.793 na
Table 4.2: Indicator of Regulation in the Retail Trade, OECD
but these also show UK amongst the most deregulated of the OECD group and continuing
on the downward trend between 1998 and 2013 (Tables 4.2 and 4.3). Nicoletti and Scarpetta
(2003) point out that the di¤ering pace of reform across OECD countries during the 1980s and
1990s led to a divergence in the regulatory policy landscape between these countries. Crafts
(2012) draws attention to this stylized policy fact as a potential explanation for the reversal of
UK economic decline relative to its continental peer countries, primarily France and Germany;
during the post-war era, UK productivity growth failed to keep pace with growth in these
countries, but since the 1980s this gap has closed.
Finland France Germany Italy Japan UK US
1998 0.495 2.188 4.276 3.906 2.484 1.323 na
2003 0.615 2.198 3.031 3.552 2.255 0.865 1.354
2008 0.714 2.448 2.818 3.021 2.099 0.724 1.354
2013 0.620 2.344 2.651 2.099 2.120 0.724 na
Table 4.3: Indicator of Regulation in Professional Services, OECD
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Figure 4-3: Product Market Regulation Indicator, Network Sectors (Energy, Transport and
Communications). Source, OECD.
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Labour Market Regulation
Following Botero et al. (2004, p. 1339), labour market regulation (LMR) signies laws and
institutions intended to protect the interests of workers. In addition to certain civil rights
protections, it includes employment law, collective relations law, and social security. Such
regulation should theoretically correct labour market failures that lead to the extraction of rents
by employers at the expense of employees, resulting in ine¢ ciency and misallocation of welfare.31
Every OECD country intervenes in the labour market in an attempt to rule out such failures;
their correction should in theory improve welfare and productivity simultaneously. However,
the regulations themselves may introduce frictions, and the focus of this chapter is ultimately
on those and their potential growth e¤ects. The practical impact of LMR on market outcomes
depends also on how legislation, contracts and agreements are interpreted and enforced by the
authorities responsible, as well as how compliance is monitored. This enforcement factor is not
static over time and may itself respond to other determinants. Unfortunately no time series
measures exist of regulatory enforcement quality for OECD countries (certainly not for the
UK over the 1970 to 2009 period) so this dimension of the problem cannot easily be examined
empirically.
Labour market regulation is a complex body of legislation with numerous and diverse po-
tential impacts on incentives at the microeconomic level. Again, the theoretical direction of the
growth e¤ect of labour market regulation is ambiguous. It may be that employment protection
legislation (EPL) increases investment in skills due to increased job tenure, leading to higher
productivity growth via human capital accumulation (Damiani and Pompei 2010; Belot et al.
2007). On the other hand, higher regulation raises the costs of labour adjustment leading to
labour market ine¢ ciency (e.g. Mortensen and Pissarides, 1994; Hopenhayn and Rogerson,
1993), and may pose a barrier to the adoption of new technology requiring new skillsets. LMR
may also reduce productivity by a¤ecting a rms choice of projects by increasing anticipated
costs of labour adjustment, high hiring and ring costs may lead to the selection of lower risk,
lower productivity projects as opposed to more radical innovations with higher associated risk
31For example, employers discriminate against disadvantaged groups, underpay workers who are immobile or
invest in rm-specic capital, re workers who then need to be supported by the state, force employees to work
more than they would wish under the threat of dismissal, fail to insure workers against the risk of death, illness
or disability, and so on.(ibid.)
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(Saint-Paul 2002; Bartelsman et al. 2004).32 Another productivity dampening e¤ect is the
potential for workers to increase absenteeism or reduce work e¤ort due to the lower threat of
dismissal. For more discussion of the theoretical literature on how regulation may a¤ect labour
market outcomes and hence productivity, see Bassanini et al. (2009, pp. 358-361).
In terms of the model in Chapter 2, where productivity growth is modelled as responding
systematically to innovative activity zt, which is in turn discouraged by the penalty variable 
- when  is characterised as regulation and z is thought of as entrepreneurship (which certainly
includes entry), we expect z to be discouraged by the prospect of labour market frictions en-
countered during rm operation; the future returns (at t + i, i > 0) to innovation generated
through zt would be reduced by the costs and uncertainty generated by labour market regu-
lation. This causal mechanism from an increase in regulation to a decrease in productivity
growth  is integral to the model data generating process. Therefore if in fact (i.e. in some
alternative truemodel) LMR increases productivity growth rather than decreasing it, this
model should fail to explain the productivity experience of the UK and should be rejected by
the test in Chapter 5.
In this section some empirical papers looking at the impacts of labour market regulation are
reviewed. Though it examines possible explanations for labour market regulation rather than
focussing on its e¤ects, we start with the study by Botero et al. (2004). Not only is it a seminal
paper in the aggregate quantication of such regulations, but it illustrates the potential for
reverse causality in the country-level regression literature. Here certain variables are claimed
as determinants of regulation (such as national income) which in other studies are thought to
be explained by regulation.
Botero et al. 2004 investigate the determinants of labour market regulation, attempting to
distinguish in the data between three theories of institutional choice that they term e¢ ciency
theory (public interest theory), political power theory (public choice theory), and legal
theory. Legal theory explains regulation as a result of legal tradition: common law countries
favour markets and contracts, while civil law countries favour regulation and state ownership
(Aherling and Deakin, 2007). The authors collect data on labour market regulation for 85
32For cross-country evidence that EPL hampers the adjustment process of productivity and employment after
shocks, see Burgess (2000) and Caballero et al. (2004).
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countries in 1997, creating an overall index of employment law which is the major contribution
of the paper.33 This index is then regressed using OLS on various potential determinants
thought to be independent, including per capita income, average years of schooling, union
density, a measure of political leanings of government averaged over time, and proxy measures
of legal origin, for the cross-section of countries. The test of the e¢ ciency theory hinges on
whether or not a negative, signicant association can be found between income per capita and
labour market regulation: rich countries should regulate less because they have fewer market
failures.34 Since the results show no signicant relationship between income and employment
protection, the authors reject the e¢ ciency theory. This conclusion is not straightforward,
however; various hypotheses are consistent with the nding of a limited statistical relationship
between GNP per capita and LMR. In general the study su¤ers from a lack of identication,
as well as many of the criticisms noted for cross-country growth regressions in Section 4.4.1.
The authors acknowledge that the e¢ ciency theory is too broad to have strong implications
for the extent and consequences of regulation, and as such is di¢ cult to reject.(p.1343)
Other results suggest that labour regulation is negatively associated with lower workforce
participation and youth unemployment, which is most consistent with the political view that
the privileged and older incumbents support more stringent labor laws (p.1378), in support
of e.g. Blanchower and Freeman (2000). They point to an inconsistency with the e¢ ciency
theory here which ought to predict better labour market outcomes as a result of labour mar-
ket regulation. Again, these are not the only conclusions one could draw from their results,
particularly as there is no time series dimension. The idea that the dependent variables are
consequencesof the regulation of labour is not demonstrated. They attempt to instrument
labour market regulation in these regressions using legal origins.35 However, legal origins (as
observed by Klapper et al., 2006) may be correlated with omitted variables in the rst step
regression making the instrument endogenous in the second step. If legal origins is associated
some third unobservable factor (like cultural attitudes to entrepreneurship, for instance) that
33The index reects the incremental cost to the employer of deviating from a hypothetical rigid contract, in
which the conditions of a job are specied and a worker cannot be red(p.?)
34The logic of this is dubious, particularly in a cross-section with no time variation. A positive correlation due
to an e¤ective use of past regulation to neutralise market failures, providing a well-functioning market place and
hence leading to better economic outcomes, is also consistent with e¢ ciency theory.
35They nd a statistical association between legal tradition and labour market regulation, with common law
tradition associated with a less regulated labour market than civil law.
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is correlated with both regulation and the dependent variable, then the regression is still poor
(Bassanini et al. 2009).
In general the empirical literature does not o¤er a rm consensus one way or another on the
direction of impact of LMR on economic growth or on employment (Frontier, 2012). DeFreitas
and Marshall (1998) conduct an industry-level study (manufacturing only) for a sample of Latin
American and Asian countries, nding that increasing the stringency of EPL reduces labour
productivity growth. However, studies of OECD countries by Nickell and Layard (1999) and
Koeniger (2005) point to a weak but positive e¤ect of raising the stringency of EPL on both
TFP growth and R&D intensity.
Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005) examine the impact of survey-based indices of hiring and
ring regulations on labour market outcomes for 21 OECD countries between 1984 and 1990.
The regulatory indicators are based on the Global Competitiveness Report (World Economic
Forum), which surveys groups of business managers on the labour market conditions they
face. Estimating a dynamic panel with xed time and country e¤ects, they nd that higher
labour market exibility is positively associated with the employment rate and labour force
participation. Their estimates suggest that the di¤erence in employment rates between France
and the US would decrease by 14% if France were to reduce regulatory strictness in the labour
market to the US level. These results are in line with the earlier conclusions of Lazear (1990),
who found in a panel of 22 developed countries that severance pay and required notice periods
were positively related to unemployment rates. The implication is that the strictness of such
regulations (or perceptions of it) do a¤ect the hiring and ring decisions of rms.
Bassanini et al. (2009) use country-level data on EPL and industry-level productivity data
for 11 OECD countries and 19 industries, 1982-2003, arguing that the impact of EPL (xed
at the country level) is likely to vary for di¤erent industries within the same country.36 The
premise for their di¤erence-in-di¤erence approach is as follows: If reforms of dismissal regu-
lations have an impact on productivity, it will be greater in industries where, in the absence
of regulations, rms rely on layo¤s to make sta¢ ng changes, rather than in industries where
36The data used for industry-level TFP are taken from Inklaar et al. (2008), and indicators of EPL are the
OECD indicators (OECD, 2004): index of dismissal for regular employment, index for temporary contracts, and
index on additional legislation for concerning collective dismissals. The majority of their paper focuses on the
results for the index of dismissal for regular employment.
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internal labour markets or voluntary turnover are more important.(p.352) The distinction is
between industries for which EPL is binding, and those for which it is has no practical teeth.
The latter is the control group. The approach assumes that the di¤erences in TFP growth
between EPL-binding industries and other industries is a function of the level of (or the change
in) the index of EPL. Di¤erencing removes xed e¤ects common to both groups from the analy-
sis. Additional control variables include the productivity of the industry productivity leader
and the distance from frontier. Their estimates suggest that mandatory dismissal regulations
in OECD countries reduce TFP growth in industries with a high natural rate of dismissal
(as proxied by the US rate), to a disproportionate degree. This result is robust to sensitivity
analysis surrounding the indicators and control variables.
However, they note various political economy arguments predicting causality from TFP to
regulations. There may be political pressure to protect jobs during a downturn, leading to
a negative impact of economic circumstances on the level of EPL; conversely, some suggest
that liberalisation reforms are more frequently and easily implemented during economic crises
(Drazen and Easterly, 2001), implying a positive relationship. Either case could imply endo-
geneity bias. They claim to have controlled fully for this using country-by-time dummies, which
will capture aggregate e¤ects common to both control and treatmentgroups (supposing that
both groups experience these aggregate e¤ects in the same way). A more serious potential
problem is that EPL is actually caused by prots, since prots (or market power) are positively
correlated with lobbying power. In this case, the relationship between growth and EPL might
just be picking up a correlation between growth and lobbying power (perhaps highly correlated
with the level of EPL). They therefore instrument EPL in the regression. Instead of simply
using legal origin and dictatorship variables as instruments, which might either have a relation-
ship with alternative institutional drivers of TFP aside from EPL or be long-term drivers of
TPF in their own right, they interact these variables with the industry-level layo¤ propensity
variable.37 An additional time-varying instrument is the interaction of a political orientation
variable (measuring a cabinets distance from the political left) with the layo¤ propensity vari-
37In fact, these interacted variables appear to qualify as valid instruments to the extent that we cannot
think of any economic mechanism inducing an e¤ect of legal systems or dictatorship spells on productivity that
varies across industries as a function of layo¤ propensity without occurring through their e¤ect on dismissal
regulations. Obviously, the validity of our instrumental variable strategy crucially hinges on the validity of this
latter statement.(p.380)
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able.
The results of the instrumental variable estimation suggest that endogeneity is not a prob-
lem. Likewise when the lagged relative TFP variable is excluded from the right-hand side, the
magnitude of the estimates is reduced but the same broad conclusions remain. Similar con-
clusions apply when labour productivity growth and aggregate TFP growth are the dependent
variable, rather than industry-level TFP. In conclusion, this seems reasonably robust evidence of
an impact of EPL on productivity. Their estimates imply that a one percentage point reduction
in stringency of EPL for regular contracts will raise aggregate labour productivity growth by
0.14 percentage points. No similar e¤ect is found from EPL surrounding temporary contracts,
however, and they nd no evidence for the idea that EPL reduces catch-up to frontier.
While Bassanini et al. (2009) look at the productivity e¤ects of EPL, they do not distinguish
between new and incumbent or small and larger rms. Millan et al. (2013) look at the impact
of EPL on the smallest rm in a micro-econometric study of individual-level data for the EU-15
countries, 1994-2001, using a random e¤ect binary logit model. EPL is measured using the
OECD macro-level indicator. In this setup they nd that EPL stringency negatively a¤ects the
hiring and ring decisions of rms with 1-4 employees (i.e. the probabilities of employing new
workers and dismissing current workers are both reduced), reducing labour exibility for this
class of rm. They emphasize the scale disadvantage applying to small rms in complying with
EPL, since hiring and ring costs constitute a bigger proportion of overall labour costs, and
there is less potential to redirect underperforming workers into di¤erent roles within the rm.
Van Stel et al. (2007) look at the impact of regulation on nascent entrepreneurship (the
proportion of the adult population actively involved in starting a new venture) and at
the conversion of nascent entrepreneurship into young entrepreneurship (the proportion of
owner/managers of a business under 42 months old) using GEM data, in an unbalanced panel
of 39 countries for 2002-2005. Regulatory indicators are the World Bank Doing Business Indi-
cators. They nd that the rigidity of hours index and the rigidity of employment index have a
negative and signicant impact on nascent entrepreneurship rates (both opportunityand ne-
cessityentrepreneurship). Of these, the rigidity of employment index has a signicant negative
impact on the young business rate. They do not nd a strong e¤ect of entry regulations on
nascent or young entrepreneurship rates, however, except in the case of the minimum capital
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Finland France Germany Italy Japan UK US
1970 5.4 6.6 6.7 6.3 2.1 3.4 5.7
1975 5.9 6.0 6.7 6.2 2.1 3.2 2.2
1980 5.9 6.1 6.7 5.9 2.0 3.3 2.3
1985 6.2 6.2 6.7 5.9 1.9 3.2 2.3
1990 6.3 6.2 6.5 5.8 2.8 2.8 2.3
1995 6.5 6.6 6.4 6.5 2.5 2.8 2.5
2000 6.7 5.0 7.1 6.5 3.5 3.1 2.8
2005 5.2 4.5 6.1 3.5 1.5 1.5 0.9
2010 4.4 4.1 4.6 3.5 1.7 1.7 0.9
Table 4.4: Fraser Institute Labour Market Score, Inverted. Higher score signies higher regu-
lation
Finland France Germany Italy Japan UK US
1985 2.786 2.591 2.583 2.762 1.702 1.032 0.257
1990 2.786 2.341 2.583 2.762 1.702 1.032 0.257
1995 2.452 2.341 2.679 2.762 1.702 1.032 0.257
2000 2.310 2.341 2.679 2.762 1.702 1.198 0.257
2005 2.167 2.468 2.869 2.762 1.702 1.198 0.257
2010 2.167 2.385 2.869 2.762 1.369 1.198 0.257
Table 4.5: Employment Protection Legislation Indicator, Strictness of Regulation over Individ-
ual Dismissals, Regular Contracts. OECD
requirement.
Policy Trends in Labour Market Regulation
Labour Market Regulation (LMR) has not displayed such a strong downward trend across the
OECD, but the level in the UK as proxied by the Fraser Institute Overall Labour Market Score
has fallen over the period, being already low relative to its European counterparts (Table 4.4;
this table shows the inverted Labour Market Freedomscore, so that higher numbers indicate
more regulation). The fall in this composite index for the UK is mainly driven by the reduction
in frictions arising from centralised collective bargaining, hours regulations, and mandated cost
of hiring workers. Other components of the overall indicator (ring costs and mandated cost
of worker dismissal) have remained relatively stable over the period or even increased. This is
clear from the OECD EPL time series measures; these focus on regulation around dismissals
only, which seems to have moved little in the UK since 1985 (Table 4.5).
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Aggregated Measures of Regulation and Growth
For a panel of 135 countries in varying stages of development between 1993 and 2002, Djankov
et al. (2006) regress annual percentage growth in GDP per capita on indicators of business reg-
ulation and a set of controls and the initial level of income. Business regulations are measured
by the World Bank Doing Business Indicators, which are averaged together to obtain an overall
[0,1] score.38 Finding a negative correlation between the strictness of business regulations and
growth, they note that this could support three contrasting causal mechanisms: i) less burden-
some regulation increases growth, ii) more growth frees up income to dispose on improving the
regulatory environment, or iii) this is a spurious link due to the correlation of both regressand
and regressor with a separate omitted variable. They therefore instrument regulation with a
countrys legal origin and various other country characteristics relating to geography and cul-
ture. The positive correlation of business regulation with growth remains in this formulation,
and they test the instrumentsexogeneity using over-identication tests, though the argument
for the strength of the instrument is purely intuitive. They nd further that moving from the
highest quartile to the lowest in terms of regulatory burden increases average annual growth
by 2.3%. The paper is vulnerable to many of the criticisms listed in Section 4.4.1; the most
serious issue for our purposes is the lack of identication in the regression model, which the IV
strategy does not resolve.
Gorgens et al. (2005) also investigate the relationship between an aggregate regulation
measure and growth in an unbalanced panel of 123 countries for 1970-2000. In a non-linear
xed e¤ects model with controls, growth rates are regressed on regulation as proxied by the
Fraser Institute Economic Freedom index using system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998), where
regressors are instrumented with their lags to control for endogeneity. The nding is that for
high income countries, the level of regulation is negatively related to growth, but deregulation
is most growth-enhancing for middle-income countries with a middle stock of regulation. For
38These indicators calculate (based on objective analysis of legislation and on interviews with experts) the
relative burden imposed by regulation in seven areas: starting a business, hiring and ring workers, registering
property, access to bank credit, protection of equity investors, legal enforcement of contracts, and closing a
business. Thus both product market entry regulation and labour market regulation are covered, as well as
capital market dimensions (outside the scope of this thesis). The country rankings in each of these areas are
averaged by the authors and normalised to a zero-one interval to give an overall indicator of regulatory burden
at the country level, where higher scores indicate lower burden.
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low income countries, deregulation has little e¤ect on growth.
One objection to the use of the overall EF score to proxy regulation is that, as a measure of
economic freedom, it includes indices of size of government, of monetary policy predictability,
of stability of property rights or the legal system many distinct factors, some of which may be
reasonably stable for the UK and other little regulated or high income countries over the sample
period, or which may have time series proles contrasting with the regulatory components of
the index. The overall economic freedom score is perhaps too highly aggregated for the impact
of regulation on growth to be distinguished from other policy trends; certain components of
the index may o¤set or reinforce each other, perhaps reducing or magnifying the net e¤ect.
Certainly economic freedom and regulatory burden are not an identical concepts, though they
may be related.
Structural Modelling Approach, Regulation and Growth
This section deals briey with the macroeconomics literature in which the quantitative implica-
tions of policy reforms are investigated within a calibrated structural model. By structuralis
meant sets of simultaneous relationships between macroeconomic variables derived from micro-
foundations, which are then solved to obtain general equilibrium behaviour of the endogenous
variables as a function of exogenous variables only (generally speaking these are the shock
processes); i.e. DSGE models. These models often treat product market and labour market
regulation together.
An inuential paper on the macroeconomic e¤ects of regulation is Blanchard and Giavazzi
(2003). They derive a model in which both product market regulation and labour market
regulation a¤ect the number of rms in the goods market, as well as employment and the real
wage, with interaction e¤ects between the two types of regulation. Work in a similar vein is
Everaert and Schule (2008), who use the IMF Global Model calibrated to the EU to examine
the impact of synchronising structural reforms, both across product and labour markets and
across countries within the EU. Likewise, Gomes et al. (2011) use the Euro Area and Global
Economy model (EAGLE), a multi-country New Keynesian DSGE model, to analyse the impact
of structural reforms on macroeconomic aggregates in EU countries. In these models, regulatory
reforms are treated as reductions in price and wage mark-ups in labour and product markets.
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Cacciatore et al. (2012) examine the short- and longer-run macroeconomic impacts of labour
and product market reforms in a similar New Keynesian DSGE model of a small open economy,
calibrated to the Euro Area as of 2007. The addition of search and matching frictions in the
labour market allow hiring and ring costs to be modelled in a less reduced-form fashion. In
practice the reform exercise abstracts from the stochastic features of the model, simulating
the transition from one steady state to the post-reform steady state. None of these models
puts explicit focus on the role of regulation in the innovation process; macroeconomic gains
occur in general through reductions in markups which lower product and labour market slack,
stimulating employment and investment.
Poschke (2010) looks at the impact of administrative entry costs on aggregate productivity
in a DSGE model with heterogeneous rms, an extension of Hopenhyan (1992). On entry, rms
have a choice between more and less advanced technology; in the model, entry costs reduce
the marginal incentive to invest in more advanced technology since they reduce competition.
Firms optimise with respect to a parameter on entry (corresponding to the type of technology)
on which their stochastic productivity experience subsequently depends, subject to the entry
cost they face. The sunk cost of entry increases with the expected productivity of their chosen
technology. This, together with the endogenous exit of underperforming rms, leads to a
stationary productivity distribution for rms, in spite of turnover among rms themselves.
These rms are intermediate goods producers in a monopolistically competitive environment; as
in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003), the substitutability of intermediate goods in nal production
increases with the number of rms producing them. The model is calibrated to the US and used
to simulate the new static equilibrium of TFP in response to policy experiments (the calibration
is based on 1997 data). The paper investigates whether changes in entry costs, with all other
US parameters held constant, can account for part of the TFP di¤erential between the US and
several European countries. Data on entry costs are taken from Djankov et al. (2002) and TFP
is calculated following Inklaar and Timmer (2008).
When entry costs are raised from the US to the German level (c. 30% of GDP per capita),
the di¤erence between US and German TFP is reduced by about one third; this is a large
impact, though it is about one third of the impact in Barseghyan (2008). In the model this
occurs because fewer rms enter in general equilibrium, which reduces the substitution elasticity
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among di¤erentiated goods; i.e. this captures a reduction in competition. This increases mark-
ups while decreasing the market share of high productivity rms, since low productivity rms
survive for longer under increased product di¤erentiation. The incentive to invest in high
productivity is therefore eroded. Since the equilibrium wage is also reduced (otherwise the
increase in administrative costs would make entry unprotable), this also reduces the exit
threshold for ine¢ cient rms. Thus the average productivity for the marginal rm is lower.
The models performance is judged on whether it can generate similar features to those
found in the data (i.e. a matching methodology); while the model generally produces statistics
that appear closeto the target stylized facts when tabulated, there is no attempt to test the
model formally against the data. Of course there is no time series component to the analysis and
no claims are made about the models ability to tthe historical data econometrically indeed
there may be little interest in doing so. This is a quantitative investigation of the implications
of a set of hypotheses formalised in a DSGE model, using a calibrationistapproach (Canova,
1994; see Chapter 3). The implications are interesting for policy and it is enough that they do
not seem (impressionistically) at odds with observed features of the data.
4.4.4 Tax and Growth
There is a large body of normative work on welfare-optimal tax rates, following Ramsey (1927).
Since the emphasis in this thesis is positivist, this literature is given only a summary treatment.
For a survey, see Golosov et al. (2007). The central result in a Ramsey-style model, a neoclassi-
cal exogenous growth model in which the savings rate is optimally chosen (Ramsey, 1928; Cass,
1965; Koopmans, 1965), is that the optimal capital tax rate is zero, with all revenue raised on
the labour margin (Chamley, 1986; Judd, 1985). This is a second best welfare scenario, when
revenue cannot be raised solely by non-distortive lumpsum taxation. Capital taxes reduce the
rate of return to investment, distorting the intertemporal margin, whereas the decision to al-
locate time between labour and leisure is an intratemporal margin. The e¤ects of a distortion
to the intertemporal allocation of resources accumulate over time, with a compounding e¤ect
on the capital stock, while the taxation of the labour margin has a static e¤ect.39 This result
39Another way to see this is that the tax on capital causes the price of consumption in a future period T in
terms of todays consumption to increase exponentially as T becomes large.
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also holds in some endogenous growth setups (e.g. Lucas, 1990). Distortions to intertemporal
margins may therefore carry a large penalty for growth and welfare. Note, however, more recent
work by e.g. Kocherlakota (2010) ~ where information asymmetries lead to di¤erent results
~and Aghion et al. (2013a) who show that a zero capital tax is sub-optimal in a creative de-
struction model. Again we require some empirical basis on which to choose between normative
analyses conducted within competing theoretical models.
Many theoretical models exist in which long run growth rates respond endogenously to tax
policy reforms; again I do not spend long on these. See Myles (2009a) for an overview of this
theoretical literature. In general, any spillover model in which diminishing returns to some
type of knowledge capital investment at the rm level are overcome, via externalities, at the
social level will imply higher long run growth when such investment is subsidised, provided that
subsidies are nanced by non-distortive taxes. This includes human capital externality models
like Lucas (1988) and Romer (1990). Equally, tax rates that penalise research incentives by
a¤ecting the expected returns to an innovation (i.e. prot taxes) will lower the innovation rate
ceteris paribus (e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1992), though as emphasized in Section 4.3 there may
also be opposing e¤ects (tax rates may protect incumbents, raising innovation by reducing the
business stealing e¤ect; Acemoglu, 2008); these models can be constructed so that there is some
ambiguity over the impact of taxes on growth.
When subsidies must be funded by other distorting tax instruments rather than a lumpsum
tax, the net growth e¤ect becomes more complicated. Some positivist simulation exercises in
human capital-driven models yield di¤erent growth impacts for revenue-neutral capital and
labour tax reforms. Lucas (1990) nds that setting capital taxes to zero and raising labour
taxes correspondingly has little impact on long run growth, though the level of output responds
signicantly. However, Jones et al. (1993) nd large e¤ects on both the level and the growth
rate from the same reform, as do King and Rebelo (1990) in response to a 10 percentage
point increase in capital tax rates. The di¤erent results are due to di¤erences in the model
composition and calibration; in both cases human capital production is modelled with a physical
capital input, whereas in Lucas (1990) the function only uses existing human capital and a time
input. Thus the impact of taxation on growth depends crucially on the modelling of human
capital formation  on the assumed inputs to that process and their tax treatment. Stokey
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and Rebelo (1995) analyse these models, also demonstrating that the calibration of certain
parameters determine the extent of growth e¤ects from tax reforms.40
Barro (1990) introduces another factor, modelling government spending as an input to
production, nanced by taxation. This input corresponds to government-provided public goods
such as infrastructure. The reduction in the rate of return on private sector capital due to
distorting taxation is overcome by gains from raising the public capital input. Zagler and
Durnecker (2003) integrate this approach into a spillover model with a range of tax instruments
on labour and intermediate inputs to nal production, on the prots and R&D expenditures
of monopolistically competitive intermediate goods producers (whose innovation activities are
subsidised from savings), as well as on income and savings. The innovation rate depends on
human capital. Taxes nance a public input to nal production. The long run growth rate is a
function of all these tax rates; the increased public good raises growth while taxes on R&D and
savings reduce innovation and capital accumulation, respectively, while the impact of other tax
rates is ambiguous. This positive e¤ect of government-nanced goods muddles the relationship
between tax and growth in the data, complicating aggregate-level empirical work in this area.
In general, any endogenous growth model in which long run equilibrium growth rates re-
spond to marginal investment decisions will imply certain policies surrounding the tax treatment
of this margin. Taxes can distort important trade-o¤s, though the calibration of the model and
functional forms assumed will determine the extent of the growth impact. These models often
predict rather large e¤ects of tax changes on growth which have generally seemed inconsistent
with post-war growth experience of OECD countries (cf. Jones, 1995a). Many cite the appar-
ent lack of correlation between steadily rising average tax rates and the unchanging long-run
economic growth rate in the post-war OECD experience (Slemrod, 1995). Of course, such
time-series correlations do not tell us anything about counterfactuals or causality.
To reiterate, in Chapter 2 the policy variable is modelled as stationary; tax policy is not
assumed to a¤ect the long run balanced growth path of productivity, which is modelled as an
exogenous drift term. We do not look at changing the stationary long run level of taxes, but at
how fairly persistent changes around the long-run level can have lasting e¤ects on the level of
40They nd the growth e¤ect of reforms highly sensitive to factor shares, depreciation rates, the elasticity of
intertemporal substitution and the elasticity of labour supply, but not so sensitive to the elasticities of substitution
in production.
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productivity, producing transitional growth episodes. Therefore it is really a semi-endogenous
growth model in the style of Jones (1995b).
Empirically it is di¢ cult to disentangle the historical relationships between di¤erent tax
instruments and growth, as they are often mutually o¤setting; regressions with tax instruments
on the right hand side and growth on the left are usually vulnerable to criticisms of endogeneity
and are certainly not identied. Therefore while they may provide evidence of association, little
can be concluded as to causality (see Section 4.4.1). See Myles (2009b,c) for comprehensive
surveys of empirical work on the tax-growth relationship using aggregate and disaggregate data,
respectively. Some country-level studies on tax and growth are discussed below, primarily for
their relevance to data choice in Chapter 5. However, following Myles (2007), the stance taken
on this literature is that Ultimately it can only be concluded that these growth regressions have
provided little in the way of insight into the sources of economic growth or the link between
taxation and growth. (p.3) Therefore it is not used to calibrate the parameters b1 or c1 in
Chapter 5.
Many cross-country growth regressions include the overall share of tax revenue in GDP as
an explanatory variable.41 This measures the national average tax rate. While theory suggests
that marginal tax rates distort individual incentives so as to reduce investment and other
important variables, implying a negative impact on growth, the overall e¤ect of tax revenue on
growth is ambiguous. Endogenous growth models with public goods as productive inputs imply
that tax revenue (correlated through the government budget constraint with the public goods
that it nances) may indirectly imply a positive relationship between average tax rates and
growth. The force of this positive tax-growth mechanism will not be monotonic if there is an
underlying La¤er curve such that tax rates above or below the optimum reduce overall revenues
and hence public spending. Therefore theory cannot unambiguously identify the coe¢ cient in
this relationship between average tax rates and growth (it will depend on where tax rates are
relative to their optimum).
More to the point, negative growth e¤ects arise in theory not from the average tax rate but
from the marginal tax rate, i.e. the proportion of income earned through an additional unit
of some activity or investment that will be conscated. Generally for OECD economies the
41Much of this discussion follows Myles (2009b).
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average and marginal tax rates are not the same, due to progressivity in the tax schedule; for
a progressive tax system, the marginal tax rate is above the average rate at every income level.
Since the marginal rate changes at the threshold between di¤erent income brackets, calculating
the appropriate national level of the marginal rate for personal income taxes is di¢ cult, made
more so by exemptions or special rates for di¤erent types of income. For corporation tax,
the picture is further complicated by accelerated depreciation allowances for di¤erent types of
capital spending and other tax breaks, such as the R&D tax credit discussed in Chapter 6.
Some studies (Koester and Kormendi, 1989; Easterly and Rebelo, 1993) attempt to calculate
an e¤ectivemarginal tax rate at the economy level, but whether these capture cross-country
di¤erences in tax design consistently is usually controversial. At any rate, due to the inherent
di¢ culties in measuring marginal tax rates the average tax rate is still widely included as a
regressor.
Many earlier studies in the tax-growth literature do not account for endogeneity bias in their
estimates (Engen and Skinner, 1996). Tax is a highly politicised area and rates certainly respond
to political pressures, which in turn can be caused by the state of the economy. Slemrod (1995)
notes that government expenditure responds to country-level political preferences, and that
the income elasticity of demand for public goods is above one (Wagners Law) i.e., demand
for public goods increases with development  implying reverse causality in the average tax
growth relationship. These regressions lack structural underpinnings, depriving their estimates
of a clear interpretation (there are no identifying restrictions). Overall, Myles (2009b) concludes
that This is an area of research in which no progress appears to have been made.(p.33) In light
of these issues, I restrict the following brief review to more recent studies in which endogeneity
is addressed and marginal rates are employed, and focus on empirical work establishing a link
between tax rates and entrepreneurship.
Linking Tax to Entrepreneurship
There is some empirical evidence for the hypothesis that taxation reduces entrepreneurship
through incentive e¤ects, though other studies reject it. Theoretically, the impact of marginal
tax rates on the aggregate level of entrepreneurship is ambiguous, depending on the risk at-
titudes of potential entrepreneurs (Gentry and Hubbard, 2000). Risk averse individuals will
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be more inclined to undertake uncertain entrepreneurial ventures when tax schedules are more
progressive (i.e. when the marginal tax rate is higher relative to the average rate), since a
more redistributive tax regime acts as insurance against failure; this would imply a positive
relationship between marginal tax rates (or tax progressivity) and entrepreneurship (Domar
and Musgrave, 1944). Progressive taxes on income or prots have been termed success taxes,
since the entrepreneur will face higher rates when successful than if he fails. However, for a risk
neutral entrepreneur when loss o¤sets are imperfect, success taxes will reduce entry (Gentry
and Hubbard, 2000).42
Another channel through which tax rates on businesses (or the interaction between these
and other tax rates) might lead to higher entrepreneurship as measured by self-employment
is tax avoidance if tax rates on business prots are lower than on wage income, individuals
will move into self-employment. Some studies look at how di¤erent tax instruments a¤ect
entrepreneurship levels through their e¤ects on risk-taking (for references, see Baliamoune-
Lutz and Garello, 2014, p. 171). Tax instruments may also a¤ect access to nance for start-
ups (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Bruce and Mohsin, 2006); the empirical consensus is that
venture capital funding is negatively related to tax rates. Asoni and Sanandaji (2009) propose
a theoretical model in which progressive taxes reduce the average quality of the rm, though
entrepreneurial entry rates increase.
In summary, the theoretical channels through which tax rates might a¤ect entrepreneurship
rates are as numerous and complex as the regulatory channels; again the issue of which theory
should be preferred is an empirical one, and again distinguishing between di¤erent theories
in the data is di¢ cult. Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello (2014) provide a table summarising the
samples, tax regressors and qualitative results of recent empirical work on entrepreneurship and
taxes for OECD countries (2014, Table 1, p. 169); the take-away point is that the sign and
magnitude of the estimated e¤ects di¤ers broadly both across countries and within countries
or groups of countries for di¤erent studies.43 Two time series studies for the UK illustrate this:
Parker (1996) nds a positive impact of marginal tax rates on growth, while Robson (1998)
nds no e¤ect.
42Perfect loss o¤sets allow all losses to be deducted from future tax liabilities.
43This suggests that assuming homogeneous coe¢ cients in a panel estimation would be inappropriate.
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Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello nd that tax progressivity for above-average income brack-
ets reduces GEM measures of nascent entrepreneurship in aggregate panel data for 15 OECD
countries between 2000 and 2008. They regress nascent entrepreneurship on tax rates, tax
progressivity and a range of controls. Observing the potential for two-way causality between
entrepreneurship and the tax variables, since tax reforms may be a policy response to poor
observed entrepreneurship outcomes, they use the Arellano-Bond (1991) dynamic GMM esti-
mator. The instruments pass exogeneity tests (tests ruling out second order autocorrelation
and tests of overidentication restrictions).
They then derive two progressivity variables: progressivity_1 is the di¤erence between the
marginal tax rate applying at 100% of average earnings and the marginal rate applying at
67%, and progressivity_2 is the di¤erence between the marginal rates at 167% and 100% of
average earnings. Progressivity_2 is signicantly negatively related to entrepreneurship, while
progressivity_1 is not.44 Hence, consistent with Gentry and Hubbards micro-analysis on US
data (2000, 2004), their results show that tax progressivity decreases nascent entrepreneurship
for those who start with higher incomes, while it increases it for those with low to average
incomes. They nd no robust impact from average or marginal tax rates alone. The policy
implication is that reducing tax progressivity for the income bracket between 100% and 167%
of average earnings stimulates nascent entrepreneurship, while increasing it at the lower end of
the income distribution does the same.
They note that the impact of this reform depends in practice on reforms to other factors
in the entrepreneurship decision, such as regulatory costs. The entrepreneur responds to the
tax schedule in its entirety (their italics) and deriving the e¤ective tax rate is extremely
challenging. In their concluding remarks they speculate that it is not clear that governments
should take the opposite direction and engage in positive discrimination in favour of start-ups
or new businesses. It is possible that the best strategy would involve more scal neutrality.
Low progressivity, or even a at tax, might be part of such a strategy but it is also important
to reduce the global scal burden and start-up costs.(p.185).
Corporation taxes have also been linked to entrepreneurial incentives in empirical studies.
44This result is robust to the use of average rather than marginal rates in calculating the progressivity
indicators.
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Djankov et al. (2010) derive comparable e¤ective corporate tax rates for 85 countries of di¤er-
ent income levels in 2004, regressing investment and entrepreneurship on these tax rates for the
cross-section. Entrepreneurship is measured by cross-country indicators of business density and
formal entry, developed from the World Banks Entrepreneurship Survey which gathers data on
business registration.45 They recognise that these measures exclude informal entrepreneurship,
while including incorporation for administrative rather than start-up purposes. They attempt
to rule out spurious correlations by adding controls: lagged per capita GDP, tax evasion, insti-
tutional quality, entry and labour market regulation, ination, seignorage and trade openness.
Across a variety of specications they nd a signicant, negative e¤ect of corporate tax rates
for the top income band on both business density and entry rates, as well as on xed capital
formation in manufacturing (though not in services) and foreign direct investment: in these
new data, corporate taxes matter a lot, and in ways consistent with basic economic theory.
(p.59)
Da Rin et al. (2011) look at the impact of lagged average e¤ective corporate tax rates
for 17 EU countries, 1997-2004, on formal incorporation rates at the country-industry level,
in a panel regression with xed country and time e¤ects for various non-linear specications.
Acknowledging potential endogeneity of tax rates in the regression due to political economy
arguments, taxes are instrumented with indicators of government ideology, individuals with
veto power in government, the degree of government fragmentation, government stability and
election dates; also, a pro-business policy indicator is included as a control in all specications.46
They conclude that corporate tax rates reduce entry rates, though only when tax rates are below
a threshold level. This holds across di¤erent specications and for di¤erent measures of e¤ective
tax rates, and for both OLS and GMM-IV estimation.
45Business density is the total number of registered limited liability corporations per 100 members of working
population in 2004, and the rate of new business registration is new registrations as a proportion of total
registrations, averaged between 2000 and 2004. The data excludes sole proprietorships, i.e. 15.1 million businesses
in the US as of the time of publishing; however, their tax regime is di¤erent so their inclusion would inappropriate.
46Our approach to identication is based on the idea that structural and behavioral characteristics of the
political system are likely to a¤ect rmsentry rates only indirectly, that is through corporate taxation, once
other policies to business creation are appropriately controlled for.p.1056.
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Dynamic Scoring
Before proceeding to empirical work in Chapter 5, further motivation for the approach taken
in this study is provided by the UK governments recent exercises in dynamic scoring (HMRC,
2013; 2014).47 These papers represent the rst e¤orts of a UK government to model the dy-
namic macroeconomic impacts of proposed tax reforms using a calibrated computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model. CGE models of this type are used by the US Congressional Budget
O¢ ce to analysis the e¤ects of tax cuts (e.g. Foertsch, 2004; Gravelle, 2010). The UK corpo-
ration tax exercise (HMRC, 2013) is based on the premise that, while reducing corporation tax
rates represents a static cost to the exchequer in lost revenues, it implies dynamic gains through
the stimulation of business investment via the reduction in the cost of capital, and transitional
productivity growth which, by raising taxable prots, allow much of that cost to be recovered.
This exemplies the stance of the coalition government elected in 2010 that growth is a key
policy objective: Corporation tax reductions [. . . ] are central to the Governments drive to
stimulate growth and investment through supply side reforms(HMRC, 2013, p.5). It is also
interesting in terms of the controversy it has generated, and for good reason. For a detailed
discussion of the di¢ culties inherent in dynamic scoring exercises, see Adam and Bozio (2009)
who point out that dynamic scoring requires making numerous modelling assumptions and
essentially guessing the parameters for which no hard empirical evidence is available. [. . . ]
This opens the door to large controversies if these guesses are made or perceived to be made
 in a politically biased way. (p.20, my italics). They go on to say that: Proponents of
tax cuts often argue that the economic e¤ects are large. As noted earlier, health and safety
regulations might be costly for businesses to implement, reducing prots, employment and tax
revenue; or they might lead to a healthier and more productive workforce, with the opposite
result. The nature and magnitude of these e¤ects is likely to be exactly what proponents and
opponents of regulations dispute. A body responsible for dynamic scoring is in e¤ect asked
to pass judgement. (ibid.) Of course sensitivity tests can be conducted around important
parameters, but this amounts to an admission that the range of potential e¤ects could be
extremely large. Always the results depend on the causal assumptions of the model and its
47For an outline of dynamic scoring, see Mankiw and Weinzierl (2006).
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calibration, the reliability of which is generally based on separate empirical work which, as we
have seen, is often awed in its methodology or interpretation.
The contribution of Chapter 5 is therefore to test a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium
model in which certain tax rates and indicators of regulatory burden cause productivity growth,
a¤ecting it in a particular direction and with a particular magnitude, for the UK experience
between 1970 and 2009. The magnitude of that e¤ect is then estimated using indirect inference
methodology, together with other coe¢ cients in the model for which priors are not strong. The
relationship between tax and growth in the model is fully identied and the output generated
by this model, when bootstrapped, provides a distribution of counterfactual policy and growth
experiences for the UK. Using the unrestricted auxiliary model outlined in Chapter 3 Section
3.2, the average of these model simulations can be compared to the historical data for closeness
through the indirect inference Wald statistic. In this way, we see whether a model in which
causality unambiguously runs from tax to growth is rejected as the data generating process for
the UK experience.
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has provided some motivation for the empirical work conducted in Chapter 5,
locating the contribution within the broader academic literature. As a logical preface to the
choice of data for the policy variable  0t in the next chapter, a notional denition for zt was
outlined following Wennekers and Thurik (1999). Thus entrepreneurship involves implementing
new ideas in markets. If policy creates large frictions in this process then a proportion of
innovative ideas will fail to be translated into productivity growth. Further, for entrepreneurship
to drive productivity growth, markets must be competitive; an uncompetitive market o¤ers
little reward for entrants to implement new ideas or to exploit perceived opportunities, so
entrepreneurship and competition go hand in hand. Finally, the rewards from implementing
ideas in the market must be to a large extent appropriable by the entrepreneur or his household;
taxes and compliance costs distort the marginal decision to engage in entrepreneurship.
In the context of the new endogenous growth literature we discussed theories in which entre-
preneurs play a prominent role, particularly the knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship,
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which characterises the entrepreneur as the conduitfor spillovers from established rm R&D
to economy-wide productivity. This theory recommends the removal of policy-induced barriers
to entrepreneurship, including regulatory obstacles, excessive bureaucracy, taxes and labour
market rigidities, all of which increase operation costs and uncertainty for the entrepreneur.
Beyond this the growth policy recommendations depend on the calibration of various spillover
parameters in the model; assigning magnitudes to these parameters is not straightforward. Ul-
timately the specic growth and welfare policy recommendations remain obscure in the absence
of empirical estimation of these models.
The DSGE model presented in Chapter 2 is a testing vehicle for the prediction shared by
several theories that policy barriers to entrepreneurship have important macroeconomic e¤ects;
in its relative simplicity it bypasses many of the operational issues which have prevented many
other theoretical models from being taken to the data in a convincing way. In this chapter we
argued for a focus on the models implications for macroeconomic aggregates rather than on the
literal accuracy of its microfoundations, so disavowing the homeomorphic modelling approach
according to which a model should aim to be realisticin every particular.
We also emphasized the theoretical ambiguity of the e¤ects of many tax and regulatory
policies on both entrepreneurship and on productivity growth, concluding in each case that
the question is ultimately empirical. If the hypothesis embedded in the model states that
regulation reduces short-run productivity growth, while the opposite holds in the truemodel
that produced the observed data, the false model will be rejected as the process underpinning
the UK productivity experience when it is tested by Indirect Inference, since the power of that
test to reject a false null is high (see Chapter 3). Importantly, the model is identied, ensuring
that we are not testing a theory in which growth causes policy. As this review has shown, much
existing empirical work cannot make the same claim.
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Chapter 5
Testing and Estimating a Model of
UK Growth Driven by
Entrepreneurial (Dis)Incentives
In this chapter the model in Chapter 2 is set up to test the hypothesis that entrepreneurial
activities drive productivity growth. More specically, the model assumes that a temporary
(though persistent) change in the policy environment surrounding entrepreneurial activities
results in a permanent change in the level of productivity, implying a short run change in the
growth rate. We see whether such a data generating process can accommodate the behaviour
of productivity and output in the UK between 1970 and 2009. Though a shorter sample would
o¤er a richer set of potential indicators of the policy environment faced by entrepreneurs, a
longer time series dataset captures greater variation in policy behaviour within the UK. The
1970s reect a policy regime in the UK in sharp contrast to the supply side reforms of the 1980s
and 1990s, and its inclusion adds signicantly to the variation in the sample data.
In Section 5.1 I describe the data used to identify the growth channel; Section 5.2.1 gives
the test results for the calibration described in Chapter 2 as a benchmark; and Section 5.2.2
presents the results of the indirect inference estimation for this model.
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5.1 The Policy Variable
The discussion in this section revolves around the choice of data for the policy variable  0t.
First I reiterate what tau signies in the theoretical hypothesis that we would like to test; then
the data used for  0 in this chapter is described. To some extent this choice is dictated by
constraints on data availability.
According to the model, the policy variable is a systematic driver of the level of productivity
via the activities (zt) which it either stimulates or discourages. Equation 2.53 derived in Chapter
2 is repeated here for convenience:
D lnAt = b0 + b1
0
t 1 + eA;t (5.1)
The data ascribed to  0t identies the growth channel, since zt itself is not included in simulations
of the model; hence it drives the interpretation of the empirical results that follow in Section
5.2. Indeed, it determines which precise theory is being tested there.
Here we suppose that b1 < 0, i.e. that  0t penalises the growth driving activity zt. Therefore
the variable  0t should reect policies dincentivising the entrepreneurial activities ascribed con-
ceptually to zt in Chapter 4. It could in theory embrace any policy-related factor that reduces
the expected return to those activities, or (equivalently) that raises the uncertainty attached to
returns.  0t stands for the extent to which the returns from higher productivity resulting from
zt are not appropriated by the entrepreneur responsible for generating them.
In Chapter 4 we discussed some theoretical motivation for the choice of certain framework
policy drivers of entrepreneurship, noting some ambiguity over the predicted direction of impact.
Whether (or which of) these theories hold in the data is an empirical matter, and existing
empirical work investigating them was also reviewed in the preceding chapter. We also discussed
some empirical literature linking certain policies to productivity growth directly. Here the aim
is to focus on policies which might target productivity via our conception of entrepreneurship;
I limit the scope to tax and regulatory policies.1
1Since the possibility that our chosen policies target channels other than entrepreneurshipcannot be ruled
out, other policies are investigated in Chapter 7 which are more easily tied to the R&D channel (and not to
entrepreneurship), so as to provide an additional and complementary perspective. This is discussed further in
the Conclusions, Chapter 8.
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To reiterate, entrepreneurship is loosely dened here following the synthesis of the entre-
preneurship literature in Wennekers and Thurik (1999) as the "ability and willingness [...] to
perceive and create new economic opportunities [...] and to introduce their ideas in the market,
in the face of uncertainty and other obstacles [...] it implies participation in the competitive
process" (p. 46-47). Clearly this embraces diverse activities for which the policy-related incen-
tives are numerous, interacting in complex ways at the micro level. Our aim is to nd a time
series that is long enough and frequent enough for the sample period, while being an appropriate
proxy at the macro level to the policy environment in which entrepreneurs must exist.
Rich time series data on business environments, such as the World Banks Doing Business
indicators, have only been systematically collected in recent years; where pre-1990s data exist
on the regulatory burdens surrounding business activities, they are patchy. The need to cap-
ture only aspects of the policy environment which lead to innovative business activity relates to
Baumols distinction between productive and unproductive entrepreneurship (Baumol, 1990).
Excessive regulatory or tax burdens can lead to unproductive entrepreneurship as individuals
divert energy to avoidance or evasion, or to lobbying for their removal. Hence their removal
should stimulate productivity growth. On the other hand, the removal of regulatory disincen-
tives or the introduction of subsidy programmes (i.e. negative burdens) explicitly designed to
incentivise entrepreneurship may lead to business start-ups that are un-innovative and make
no contribution to productivity growth, though they may reduce unemployment. For this rea-
son, measures of new business creation or self-employment rates could be poor proxies for zt,
grouping both innovative and uninnovative start-ups or small businesses together, while only a
subset of these generate productivity growth.
If zt is productive entrepreneurship alone,  0t will ideally reect incentives to productive
entrepreneurship only, excluding any policies that incentivise the unproductive type. Some
examples of what we would not want to capture in  0t would be the incentive, noted by Crawford
and Freedman (2010), for an employee to become self-employed or for a self-employed person to
incorporate purely for tax arbitrage purposes - since the activity undertaken is unchanged, there
is no impact on productivity from changes in the incentives around its formal categorisation.
In practice, policy measures which enhance productive entrepreneurship in some individuals
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may simultaneously encourage unproductive entrepreneurship in others.2 At the aggregate level
the focus is on the net impact of such policies on growth. If the net e¤ect of cuts in the regulatory
and tax burdens identied as  0t is to persuade people into entrepreneurial activities which are
less innovative or more risky (hence more likely to fail and result in wasted time and resources),
the negative relationship between  0t and productivity growth that drives the model will be a
awed representation of the data generating process in operation. The proposed theory would
be false and we would expect the model to be strongly rejected when it is tested. In other
words, the issue is again empirical.
5.1.1 Data for the Policy Variable
A less aggregated measure of  0 is preferable. This minimizes the risk of di¤erent component
indices o¤setting one another within the overall index and so obscuring the policy conclusions.
Therefore I have been parsimonious in selecting components to combine into the single policy
index.
The UK index created for  0t falls into two parts: regulation and tax. On regulation, the
focus (due to data range and availability) is on the labour market. I have selected two com-
ponents from the labour market sub-section of the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW)
indicators compiled by the Fraser Institute: the Centralized Collective Bargaining (CCB) index
and Mandated Cost of Hiring (MCH) index. Of the labour market measures, these two compo-
nents span the longest time frame. Each are measured every ve years between 1970 and 2000,
and annually thereafter until 2009. The original data source for the CCB index is the World
Economic Forums Global Competitiveness Report (various issues), where survey participants
answer to the following question: "Wages in your country are set by a centralized bargaining
process (= 1) or up to each individual company (= 7)."3 The Fraser Institute converts these
scores onto a [0,10] interval.
The MCH index is based on data from the World Banks Doing Business project, and
reects "the cost of all social security and payroll taxes and the cost of other mandated benets
2Perhaps morally suspect rms (cowboys) enter the market, where before regulation screened them out;
these businesses should not last long as consumers learn quickly to avoid them, but they increase uncertainty
and asymmetry of information in the market place and so undermine the e¢ ciency of the allocation process.
3The precise wording of this question has di¤ered slightly for di¤erent years.
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CCB MCH
MCH 0.797 1.000
TUM (inverted 0.899 0.764
Table 5.1: Correlation coe¢ cients between Fraser Institute Labour Market Indicators CCB
(Centralised Collective Bargaining) and MCH (Marginal Cost of Hiring) and Trade Union
Membership as a Proportion of Total Working Population, inverted (TUM inverted).
including those for retirement, sickness, health care, maternity leave, family allowance, and paid
vacations and holidays associated with hiring an employee" (Fraser Institute, 2009). These costs
are also converted to a [0,10] interval, where zero represents a hiring process with negligible
regulatory burden.4 Thus labour market exibility increases with both indices in their raw
form. These [0,10] scores are scaled to a [0,1] interval in this chapter before being interpolated
as follows.
Data on UK trade union membership (TUM) is available at an annual frequency from
the late 19th century. Here TUM data for 1970 to 2009 is made quarterly using a quadratic
three-point interpolation (estimated values average to annual values), and then divided by total
employment (16+) to give a quarterly union membership rate on a [0,1] scale. The series is then
inverted and used to interpolate both the CCB and MCH series via the Denton proportionate
variant adjustment method (Denton, 1971).5 It seems reasonable to use the unionisation rate
to interpolate CCB and MCH as they should be highly correlated on theoretical grounds; we
expect union membership to be greater when the bargaining power of unions to a¤ect worker
conditions is higher. Equally, increased protection of worker benets should be correlated with
a strong worker voice, usually represented by unions.6 The correlations in the data bear this
out; see Table 5.1.
The Denton method is applied to each of these series in conjunction with the inverted union
membership rate. The method minimises a quadratic loss function subject to the constraint
4"The formula used to calculate the zero-to-10 ratings was: (Vmax - Vi) / (Vmax - Vmin) multiplied by 10.
Vi represents the hiring cost (measured as a percentage of salary). The values for Vmax and Vmin were set at
33% (1.5 standard deviations above average) and 0%, respectively. Countries with values outside of the Vmax
and Vmin range received ratings of either zero or 10, accordingly." (Fraser Institute, 2009).
5The series is inverted by subtracting it from one. Thus where before it represented the proportion of the
working population belonging to a trade union, now a value closer to one implies a lower trade unionisation rate.
6Of course there are alternative theories predicting a negative correlation between MCH and union membership
(the idea that unions are only needed when the government fails to represent the interests of workers directly)
but the data indicate a positive correlation does indeed hold (see table X).
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that interpolated values between existing data points of the low frequency series should average
to those points. The interpolation is carried out for both level and rst di¤erences of y/x,
where y is the low frequency series and x the higher frequency series (the union membership
rate); the resulting series are very similar but rst di¤erences are smoother. I use the rst
di¤erence output. The resulting quarterly series for CCB and MCH incorporate information
from the unionisation rate. These interpolated series are inverted so as to represent a penalty
rate, where a higher value indicates a more hostile business environment from the perspective
of small businesses.7 They are plotted below in Figures 5-1 and 5-2 against the scatter of
low frequency data points (scaled to [0,1] and inverted (subtracted from one)). As the gures
illustrate, neither interpolated series strays far from the original Fraser Institute score.
The interpolated and inverted CCB and MCH indicators are equally weighted together to
give an indicator of labour market ine¢ ciency; we label this the Labour Market Regulation
indicator (LMR) in what follows.8 (See Figure 5-3)
Other types of regulation are not incorporated into  0t in this study. Not only are good
quality measures largely unavailable spanning the full period under analysis but, as stated
earlier, the inclusion of too many distinct series within  0t makes the policy interpretations
of the test less clear. However, it is interesting to note the high positive correlation between
the Fraser Institute measures of CCB and MCH and the OECD indicator of Product Market
Regulation (PMR). These correlations are presented in Table 5.2.9 This suggests that the LMR
indicator may not be a bad proxy for product market entry regulation in the UK. We should
not overstate the power of the LMR indicator to represent the regulatory landscape as a whole;
environmental regulation and planning regulations are excluded, as is the impact of regulatory
enforcement. Planning regulations in particular are thought to pose a serious barrier to UK
7Again, the inversion involves subtracting the existing values from one, so that where before a higher value
indicated more freedomfrom regulation, the value after inversion measures the burdenof regulation.
8A full measure of regulatory burden in labour markets would also reect all areas of employment protec-
tion legislation including costs from ring (see e.g. Botero et al., 2004), but data availability is a constraint.
Correlations of our LMR indicators with OECD measures of EPL from 1985 for the UK are actually negative;
our indicators do not fully capture the increases in dismissal regulation over the period and thus may slightly
overstate the extent to which the UK labour market is deregulated; however, the strong decline of collective
bargaining and union power over the period represents the removal of signicant labour market friction.
9These correlations are between the raw EFW measures and the inverted OECD measure for all measures a
higher value indicates less regulation; of course had we inverted the EFW measures and left the OECD measure
uninverted, the correlations would be the same.
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Figure 5-1: Inverted Fraser Institute Centralized Collective Bargaining (CCB) Score; Original
Points and Interpolated Series.
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Figure 5-2: Inverted Fraser Institute Marginal Cost of Hiring Score; Original Points and Inter-
polated Series.
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OECD PMR (inv)
CCB 0.947
MCH 0.800
TUM(inv) 0.962
Table 5.2: Correlations between OECD Product Market Regulation Indicator (Network Indus-
tries), Fraser Institute Indicators of CCB and MCH, and Trade Union Membership
businesses and one that was not reduced over the sample period (Crafts, 2006; Frontier, 2012).
Nevertheless, this regulatory indicator captures the general trend in UK policy which has been
to lower some important regulatory barriers to entrepreneurship relative to their 1970 level.
The second part of the index for  0t reects the tax environment faced by the would-be
entrepreneur. This environment is highly complex at the microeconomic level, depending on
the interrelationships between numerous individual tax (and subsidy) instruments, many of
which were not in force throughout the full sample period. In the absence of a comprehensive
measure of the e¤ective tax rate on the entrepreneur for the period 1970-2009, I use the
top marginal income tax rate to proxy the extent to which the proceeds of an entrepreneurial
endeavour are not appropriable by the individual entrepreneur. This approach is taken by
others, e.g. Lee and Gordon (2005). The top marginal rate is measured as the tax rate incurred
on an additional unit of income at the threshold of the top band, however the top band is
dened in each period.10 This is not to say that every entrepreneur gets into the top income
tax bracket; many entrepreneurial ventures fail or make little prot, and the expected return to
entrepreneurship is generally small. This top marginal tax rate is intended as a proxy for the
prot-motive that is central to the notion of entrepreneurship, as we have dened it. Empirical
work suggests that this is appropriate.11
There may be an argument for including the SME rate of corporation tax in the index, on the
basis that reductions in this rate have lowered the costs of running a new business. An argument
against assuming that lower corporation tax might enhance productive entrepreneurship is that,
as mentioned above, reducing corporation tax relative to other forms of taxation (employee or
self-employed labour income) distorts incentives to incorporate at the small end of the business
10Since the level of progressivity in the income tax schedule changes considerably over the sample period, the
denition of the top band varies and that variation is not captured in our measure.
11Note the result in Baliamoune-Lutz and Garello (2014) that a reduction in marginal tax rates at the top of
the income distribution relative to the marginal tax rate at average earnings increases entrepreneurship.
128
CCB MCH
Top Marginal Income Tax Rates 0.786 0.623
Corporate Tax (SME rate) 0.868 0.700
Table 5.3: Correlation Coe¢ cients for Tax and Regulatory Components of Composite Index.
Correlations are with the inverted, interpolated Fraser Index scores for CCB and MCH (i.e.
higher score indicates higher regulation).
size distribution in way that has nothing to do with productivity growth. This seems to have
happened in the UK when the SME corporation tax rate and starting rate on prots under
£ 10,000 were repeatedly cut between 1997 and 2002 (Crawford and Freedman, 2010). For these
reasons the corporation tax rate has not been included in the main  0t index. However, an
alternative policy variable constructed from the labour market indicator and the corporation
tax rate (in place of the top marginal income tax rate) has been used in robustness tests to
check the best t set of coe¢ cients.
The top marginal income tax rate is measured annually. Between measurement points it
is constant until policy changes it from one day to the next; it is a step function. Therefore
the series is interpolated to a quarterly frequency on the assumption that missing quarterly
values equal the annual values. Note that the series falls consistently over the sample period
until 2009 with the introduction of the 50p tax rate on income over £ 150,000. Components of
the indices (1) and (2) are plotted in Figure5-3. The top marginal income tax rate and the
labour market regulation index are combined into a single measure by a simple average, with
each series given equal weight (Figure 5-4).
The correlations between top marginal income tax rate, the corporation tax rate and the
labour market regulation indicators are shown in Table 5.3. The high positive correlation
between the series support the decision to combine the LMR indicator and the top marginal
income tax rate in a simple average. This equally weighted combination is the main index
proxying barriers to entrepreneurship in the empirical work below; it is referred to in the next
section as (1), while (2) is an equally weighted average of LMR and the small companies
corporate tax rate. The main index (1) is plotted in Figure 5-4.
The index (1) falls over the sample period, though not in a regular way due to the steps
in the marginal income tax rate. On visual inspection, the series could be a random walk with
drift or a trend stationary process (perhaps with a structural break around 2002). A KPSS
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Figure 5-3: Top Marginal Income Tax Rate, Labour Market Regulation Indicator, and Corpo-
ration Tax (SME rate)
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Figure 5-4: Evenly weighted combination of top marginal income tax rates and the labour
market regulation indicator, (1)
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test for the trend and intercept specication does not reject the null of stationarity, even at the
10% signicance level, though an ADF test with trend and intercept does not reject the null of
a unit root. Given the ambiguity and the low power of these tests, it is reasonable to treat the
series as trend stationary.12
Before solving the model, a linear trend term is estimated and removed and the detrended
 0t rate is modelled exogenously as a stationary stochastic series with high persistence (see
Chapter 2). The detrended (1) series is plotted against the changes in the Solow residual
(in natural logs) for the original sample data in Figure 5-5. As this shows, there are some
signicant movements around trend in the policy variable and the interest is in whether such
movements cause the behaviour of productivity. This is judged not through a reduced form
regression on the historical data sample alone but through the Indirect Inference procedure
described in Chapter 3; i.e. by seeing if, when the model is simulated many times for random
sets of identied policy shocks, the average model-generated behaviour is close to the original
sample data behaviour, when both are approximately described by a VARX(1).
5.2 Empirical work
The entrepreneur-driven model is tested for the starting calibration given in Chapter 2, and
results presented in Section 5.2.1 below. The model is then re-estimated using the indirect in-
ference estimation procedure, with results presented in Section 5.2.2. The calibration discussed
in Chapter 2 is repeated in Tables 5.6 and 5.7 below; Table 5.6 shows parameters held constant
throughout the analysis, while Table 5.7 shows parameters that are re-estimated in Section
5.2.2.
Results are presented for three di¤erent measures of  0 (see Table 5.4). The focus is on
results for (1), while the other series are used in robustness tests.
5.2.1 Indirect Inference Test Results (Baseline Calibration)
Table 5.5 provides a key to parameter symbols. Parameters followed by # are estimated by
Indirect Inference in the next section. Table 5.6 summarises the parameters that are xed
12Note that if  0t was I(1) then according to the model relationships productivity would be I(2), which the data
does not seem to support.
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Figure 5-5: Linearly Detrended Policy Variable (1) and D lnA
 (1) Equally weighted average: LMR and top marginal tax rate on personal income
 (2) Equally weighted average: LMR and small company tax rate on corporate prots
 (3) LMR alone
Table 5.4: Key to Policy Variables Used in Chapter 5
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throughout the analysis, and Table 5.7 gives the starting calibration.
There is some freedom around the parameters b1 and c1 here, as discussed for the subsidy-
driven model in Chapter 2. First of all, a wide variety of estimates have been found in the
literature for the impact of tax and/or regulatory measures on entrepreneurial activities (c1),
for the impact of entrepreneurial activities on TFP growth (a1), and for the directimpact of
policy determinants on TFP growth (b1). As discussed in Chapter 4, the range of estimates
for these has been found for di¤erent regression models and estimators, for di¤erent samples
(in terms of both cross-section and time) and for di¤erent proxy measures of entrepreneurship
(self-employment rates, new business rates or Global Entrepreneurship Monitor survey survey-
based measures) or of the policy environment (marginal or average tax rates, tax progressivity,
aggregate measures of regulationversus disaggregate measures, subjective self-assessment by
business versus objective measures based on o¢ cial legislation - the latter may seem preferable
but misses out dimensions of regulation as it is experienced by businesses, such as the burden
imposed by enforcement). It was also argued in the preceding chapter that these empirical
estimates are fragile, rarely being robust to changes in the model specication or to the removal
of sample outliers and, most importantly, the regressions often su¤er from endogeneity. Taking
a value from the literature and applying it to this particular model would therefore be as
arbitrary as picking a value for b1 at random, particularly since there is limited specicity here
about what variable zt actually is in the data. With this justication, we take a starting value
for b1 at  0:11 and proceed to search around this value. A variance decomposition is then
conducted using the model, in which the shocks to  0 and the shocks to the AR(1) productivity
error term are bootstrapped independently, to see how much of the variation in the simulated
D lnA series is accounted for by  0, and how much by the independent productivity shock eA.
This variance decomposition is an important diagnostic, as it will show whether the value of b1
is su¢ ciently large for the policy variable to play a role in determining productivity growth, or
whether it is e¤ectively negligible in that process. In the latter case the exercise reverts to a
test of an exogenous growth model, which is not interesting in this study of growth policy. To
emphasize, the primary objective here is not to nd the magnitude of the e¤ect of policy on
growth in the UK sample, but to see whether a set of parameters can be found for an identied
UK DSGE model in which policy plays a signicant role, such that that model is not rejected.
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Parameter Role
 Labour share in output
 Quarterly discount factor
 Quarterly depreciation rate (capital)
1;# CRRA coe¢ cient on consumption
2;# CRRA coe¢ cient on leisure
0;# Preference weight on consumption in utility function
!;# Home bias in consumption
!F ;# Foreign equivalent of !
;# Import demand elasticity
F ;# Elasticity of substitution, domestic and imported consumption good
1;# Impact of lagged capital stock on current capital demand (natural logs)
2;# Impact of expected capital on current capital
3;# Impact of output on current capital
4;# Impact of the current real interest rate on current capital
c1;# @zt=@
0
t
b1;# @[d lnAt]=/@ 0t
g; Long run quarterly growth rate of output and capital
Table 5.5: Parameter Key
 0:7 EXC 0:361
 0:97 GC 0:442
 0:0125 EXY 0:208
K
C 0:196
IM
Y 0:213
Y
C 1:732
Y
K 0:333
IM
C 0:369 g 0:004
Table 5.6: Parameters and Long-Run Ratios Held Fixed Throughout Investigation
1 1:0 F 0:7
0 0:5 1 0:51
c1  0:06 2 0:47
2 1:2 3 0:02
! 0:7 4 0:25
 1:0 !F 0:7
b1  0:11
Table 5.7: Starting Calibration, Other Parameters
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er 0:871 eM 0:967
eA 0:215 e 0:938
eN 0:898 eCF 0:967
eK 0:940 erF 0:935
ewh 0:957 eG 0:959
eX 0:941
Table 5.8: AR(1) Coe¢ cients of Structural Shocks to Variables Indicated by Subscript, Given
Starting Calibration. Tau, C(F), r(F) and G are Modelled as Exogenous Stationary AR(1)
processes
Variance in: D(A)
Total variance in D(A) 0:00012
Due to eA 0:00010
Proportion of total generated by eA 84%
Due to  0 0:00002
Proportion of total generated by  0 16%
Table 5.9: Variance Decomposition, Starting Calibration; Tau(1) Model
The starting calibration implies the AR(1) coe¢ cients for the structural shock processes in
the model listed in Table 5.8. Evidently these shocks, though stationary once detrended, are
still for the most part highly persistent. With this calibration, the Directed Wald test implies
a strong rejection of the model at the 5% signicance level for the VARX(1) auxiliary model
described in Chapter 3, with endogenous variables Yt and At and exogenous variables  0t 1 and
bft 1. The normalised Mahalanobis Distance measure implies a test statistic of 2.465, or a Wald
percentile of 100.
A variance decomposition for the log di¤erence of productivity generated by this model
shows that 16% of its total variance is due to the shock to tau, with the other 84% generated
by the independent productivity shock (Table 5.9). Hence this model is comfortably distinct
from an exogenous growth model.
5.2.2 Indirect Inference Estimation Results
The best t set of coe¢ cients discovered for this model with (1) as the policy variable driving
productivity is given in Table 5.10. The search was limited to 30% either side of the starting set
of coe¢ cients. The test statistic implies a Wald percentile of 72, so this model is not rejected
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1 0 c1 2 !  F
0:9712 0:5267  0:0568 1:5198 0:5431 0:7676 0:8819
!F 1 2 3 4 b1 Wald%
0:8819 0:6359 0:3349 0:0240 0:2365  0:1209 72:23
Table 5.10: Wald Minimising Coe¢ cient Values for Tau(1) Model
at the 5% signicance level; indeed, the Wald statistic is well within the non-rejection area of
the bootstrap distribution. Impulse response functions for this calibration have been checked
and are logically sound for each shock, not deviating qualitatively from the baseline calibration
IRFs. The implied AR(1) coe¢ cients for the exogenous stochastic processes are reported in
Table 5.11.
Many of these coe¢ cients have moved some way from their starting values. Exceptions are
the CRRA coe¢ cient in the utility function for consumption, which has decreased by less than
3%; also the preference weight on consumption, 0, has increased by only 5%, as has c1. The
coe¢ cient of relative risk aversion for leisure (2), is 27% higher than its starting value of 1:2;
the domestic preference for domestic goods (!) has decreased by 22%; and the elasticity of
imports has decreased by 23%, while the elasticity of exports (F! ) has increased to 1:62. One
important constraint on the model is the Marshall-Lerner condition, stating that the sum of the
elasticities of imports and exports with respect to a change in their relative price (the variable
Q here) must be greater than or equal to one. According to these estimates, the elasticities sum
to 2:391 and the condition is satised. The long run constraint on the capital equation that
3 = 1 1 2 is also approximately satised. The estimates of the capital equation coe¢ cients
imply that the past value of capital exerts a strong pull (0:636) on the current value, indicating
high adjustment costs. The lower estimate of the coe¢ cient on the forward expectation of
capital, 2, at 0:3349 implies a fairly large discount rate for the rm, far higher than that of
the consumer. This captures the e¤ects of idiosyncratic risks faced by the price-taking rm,
e.g. the risk that the general price level will move once his own price is set in his industry. I
assume that idiosyncratic risks to the rms prots cannot be insured and that managers are
incentivised by these. We can also think of there being a (constant) equity premium on shares
~though this, being constant, does not enter the simulation model.
Given these parameter values, a variance decomposition is calculated for D lnA (for which
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er 0:873 eM 0:951
eA 0:237 e 0:968
eN 0:898 eCF 0:918
eK 0:990 erF 0:967
ewh 0:959 eG 0:935
eX 0:959
Table 5.11: AR(1) Coe¢ cients of Structural Shocks to Variables Indicated by Subscript, Given
Estimated Coe¢ cients
only the  0 innovation and the independent productivity innovation are relevant), and also for
the other endogenous variables. In the system there are eleven (mostly highly persistent) sta-
tionary shocks, some of which a¤ect net foreign assets (a unit root endogenous variable), and
two of which enter the non-stationary productivity process. Therefore some non-stationarity is
introduced into the system even by the stationary shocks, and the non-stationarity induced by
the shocks to tau and to productivity also engender signicant non-stationarity in the simula-
tions, but we can be condent that variances taken over the nite sample period of 30 years are
bounded. Over the simulation period we can calculate the variation induced in the endogenous
variables by each of these shocks separately, and see which are relatively more important in
creating volatility in the model. This should give us some insight into the historical data from
1970-2009 given the non-rejection of the model, though note that the model has so far only been
tested on the behaviour of output and productivity, given the policy variable and net foreign
assets. It would certainly be rejected on the joint behaviour of all the endogenous variables (as
we know from work using the indirect inference test on fuller auxiliary models, for which the
power of the test rises very quickly). The variance decomposition is obtained by bootstrapping
the model and calculating the variance in each simulated endogenous variable for each shock
separately, and reported in Table 5.12.
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Auxiliary model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Endogenous Y, A Y, A, r Y, A, Q Y, A, K
Exog (included in test)  0t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1
Exog (excluded from test) trend, const trend, const trend, const trend, const
Wald percentile 72:226 82:3718 90:1622 92:9304
Auxiliary model (5) (6) (7) (8)
Endogenous Y, A, N Y, A, C Y, A, r, Q Y, A, N, C
Exog (included)  0t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1
Exog (excluded from test) trend, const trend, const trend, const trend, const
Wald percentile 94:4128 95:0495 89:4747 94:0382
Auxiliary model (9) (10) (11) (12)
Endogenous Y, A, r, K Y, A, r, N Y, A, Q, N Y, A, K, C
Exog (included)  0t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1
Exog (excluded from test) trend, const trend, const trend, const trend, const
Wald percentile 94.8023 94.9153 95.1192 94.2632
Table 5.13: Indirect Inference Wald Test Results, Alternative Auxiliary Vector Error Correction
Models
The variance decomposition illustrates that the policy variable plays a signicant part in
generating variation in the level of output and consumption, as well as labour supply (and hence
the unit cost of labour to the producer) and the real exchange rate. It is also responsible for
generating over 10% of the variation in the quarterly growth rate of productivity. Therefore we
can be sure this is distinct from an exogenous growth model; policy has an important e¤ect on
the economy in this model.
The model with this set of coe¢ cients was also tested using some alternative auxiliary
models, in which more endogenous variables are included. This should provide a more stringent
test of its macroeconomic performance. Results are reported in Table 5.13.
For the second model, adding the real interest rate as an endogenous variable actually
improves the Wald relative to the two endogenous variable case. The model can also comfortably
withstand the addition of the real exchange rate and capital to the auxiliary VECM without
the test statistic falling in the rejection region at the 5% signicance level. The addition of
labour as an endogenous variable worsens the models performance against the data; though
the test statistic is still within the non-rejection region, it is close to the border. This may
be due to measurement error in the labour supply variable, which includes some activity that
we would prefer to class as entrepreneurship, or perhaps some misspecication around c1 in
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the labour supply equation. Likewise the model is borderline rejected at 5% signicance when
consumption is added as an endogenous variable. Consumption is badly measured in aggregate
data, due to the presence of durable goods which rightly belong in physical capital investment
data.
The model can accommodate r and Q in addition to Y and A in auxiliary model (7),
passing the test comfortably at 5% signicance. The real exchange rate is the key relative
price variable in an open economy model and capturing its behaviour adequately is a strong
point in this models favour. The fact that it is captured jointly with the real interest rate is
also encouraging, as the real uncovered interest parity identity relates these variables tightly.
Auxiliary model (8) is interesting from a welfare point of view, since both consumption and
labour supply enter the utility function. These variables together with Y and A are captured
well jointly by the model; in fact the joint performance of N and C implies a non-rejection at
the 5% level, and a lower Wald percentile than when either C or N is tested without the other.
This illustrates the important statistical di¤erence between joint moment-matching and single
moment-matching.
In summary, the UK model performs well for the endogenous variables that are key for
policymakers: output and productivity on the real side, real interest rates and real exchange
rates on the relative price side, and consumption and labour supply for welfare purposes.
5.2.3 Robustness
Both the baseline calibration and the Wald-minimising set of coe¢ cients discovered for the
(1) series were also tested on the baseline auxiliary model (VECM 1) using (2), the equally
weighted simple average of the LMR indicator with the tax rate on corporate prots (small
business rate). For the baseline calibration in Table 5.7, the normalised Mahalanobis Distance
statistic is very similar to that obtained for (1), at 2:33. This implies a Wald percentile of 100,
i.e. a rejection of the model. When the Wald-minimising calibration in Table 5.10 is used with
the (2) series, the normalised Mahalanobis Distance statistic is 1:0230. This is larger than the
statistic obtained for (1), corresponding to a Wald percentile of roughly 85, but it is still well
inside the non-rejection region at 5% signicance.
The same tests were carried out for (3), the labour market regulation indicator alone. For
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the baseline calibration the model is again strongly rejected, with a normalised Mahalanobic
Distance statistic of 3:429. For the Wald-minimising coe¢ cient set in Table 5.10 the model
driven by (3) is also not rejected at the 5% signicance level, yielding a normalised Mahalanobis
Distance statistic of 1:568 corresponding to a Wald percentile of 94:41.
These robustness checks show that the non-rejection of the model for these coe¢ cients is
not sensitive to the composition of the policy index. The model passes the test for a policy
driver reecting labour market exibility alone, as well as when tax indicators are added to the
picture. We note that the inclusion of the top marginal income tax rate, with its large step
changes, yields a lower Wald percentile for the model.
Robustness was also carried out around the interpolation technique of (1). The results
do not change when the Denton method is applied in levels rather than di¤erences for the
labour market indicators. Where components have been interpolated to a quarterly frequency,
robustness checks around the interpolation technique show the conclusions are una¤ected.13
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, the model in Chapter 2 has been set up on the assumption that temporary
movements in tax and regulatory policy around its long run trend drive short-run productivity
growth via marginal incentive e¤ects on innovative entrepreneurialactivity. The model has
been tested at the level of its simulated macroeconomic behaviour for its appropriateness to
the UK experience between 1970 and 2009. The tax and regulatory policy environment for
this period is proxied by an equally weighted combination of the top marginal rate of personal
income tax and a labour market regulation indicator; the latter is in turn a combination of a
survey-based centralised collective bargaining indicator and an index of the marginal cost of
hiring calculated by the World Bank. The work done in this chapter shows that these proxies
for barriers to entrepreneurshipdo have an e¤ect on growth.
The model has been estimated using the Indirect Inference procedure and the Directed
Wald-minimising set of coe¢ cients implies a comfortable non-rejection of the model for this
UK sample at the 5% signicance level. The non-rejection is robust to adjustments around the
13 I checked constant match interpolation against quadratic interpolation.
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policy variable; it holds when the small companies rate of corporate tax is used in place of the
top marginal income tax rate, and when tax rates are excluded altogether. Moreover, the model
performs well when a variety of endogenous variables are added to the auxiliary VARX(1), ex-
plaining the real interest rate and real exchange rate behaviour, as well as physical capital,
labour supply and consumption in various combinations. A variance decomposition for the es-
timated model shows that the policy variable is responsible for much of the simulated variance
in the endogenous variables, due to its permanent e¤ects on non-stationary productivity. The
estimated marginal impact of the policy variable on the change in productivity is  0:12, im-
plying that a 1% reduction in this entrepreneurship penalty rate increases productivity growth
in the short run by 0:12 percent per quarter. This is not a statement about long-run growth
rates, which are outside the scope of this study.
Interpreting the policy variable as a proxy of barriers to entrepreneurshipimplies that it
targets a specic entrepreneurial growth channel, but here this channel has not been formally
distinguished from R&D or indeed any other channel; the interpretation relies instead on ex-
isting empirical work suggesting direct policy-entrepreneurship links (this work is discussed in
Chapter 4). The precise innovation activities through which the policy  (1) translates into
productivity e¤ects are left open. The next part of this thesis is concerned with policy drivers
that more obviously isolate the R&D channel, a¤ecting the marginal cost of formal R&D in-
vestment. If such a policy is rejected as a productivity driver, then the growth e¤ects of our
tax and regulatory policy variable can be more condently attributed to an entrepreneurial
channel; a channel more closely related to business start-up activity than to formal expendi-
ture on R&D. However, a non-rejection of R&D policy-driven productivity growth will blur the
interpretation of the channel through which  (1) operates, making a more general barriers to
business label more appropriate than barriers to entrepreneurship, or else requiring a very
broad understanding of entrepreneurship.
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Chapter 6
Policy-Driven Growth via Business
R&D: Motivation and Literature
Review
6.1 Introduction
Since Schultz (1953) and Griliches (1958) there has been a thriving and inuential theoretical
and empirical literature linking R&D activity to economic growth, and the R&D growth channel
is now taken as given by many.1 For instance, Warda (2005) states simply that Innovation is
the engine of growth in a knowledge economy, and Research and Development (R&D) is the key
ingredient of the innovation process, going on to say that Government has a major supporting
role in this area by providing a favourable business environment, including appropriate and
competitive incentive programs for R&D.(p.2)
1OECD R&D denition: Research and experimental development (R&D comprise creative work undertaken
on a systematic basis in order to increase the stock of knowledge, including knowledge of man, culture and society,
and the use of this stock of knowledge to devise new applications. (Frascati Manual, 6th Ed., 2002; paragraph
63). The denition covers basic research, applied research, and experimental development. Basic research
is . . . conducted without any particular application or use in view, whereas applied research is directed
towards a specic practical aim or objective. Experimental development is systematic work. . . directed to
producing new materials, products or devices, to installing new processes, systems and services, or to improving
substantially those already produced or installed.(section 64). OECD gures between 2002 and 2012 show that
R&D performed by the UK private sector generally consists of applied research or experimental development
which are more near marketactivities than basic research.
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In this chapter I propose a model in which that endogenous growth hypothesis is embedded.
The question of interest is whether government policy intervention has incentivised the private
sector in the pursuit of prot-motivated R&D activity, and so enhanced innovation and pro-
ductivity growth in the UK over the sample period. The model is tested and estimated using
Indirect Inference methodology.
Why is the question still worth testing? In spite of the body of literature addressing it,
there is still reason to investigate the ability of R&D-specic policies to generate signicant
extra innovative activity and productivity growth (and so welfare). R&D expenditures and
new patent numbers are convenient measurables and often used as proxies for innovation out-
puts in empirical studies, but we might question the extent to which they capture innovation.
Formal business R&D is certainly not the only source of innovation, which also occurs through
informal learning by doing, non-R&D expenditures on knowledge-enhancing activities and the
commercialisation of new ideas via start-up. Moreover, these proxies may be more closely cor-
related with non-innovative activities; rms may patent as a signal to capital markets, or to
earn through licensing revenues, for instance. Subsidies directed towards formal private sector
R&D may then not be the most e¢ cient use of the public nances when the real objective is
productivity growth, rather than patents or R&D expenditure for their own sake.
Analysis of trends in R&D intensity and changes in productivity growth across OECD coun-
tries does not indicate a clear, strong association between them. Indeed, in several countries
increasing stocks of business R&D and patent numbers are associated with declining productiv-
ity growth (Braunerhjelm et al. (2010); Westmore, 2013). Of course, if these are poor proxies
for true innovative capital then this is not informative of the general validity of policies target-
ing the innovation process; and such eye-balling of general trends does not amount to much. A
rigorous investigation must control adequately for the counterfactual.
Finally, most OECD governments feel considerable budgetary pressure in 2014, the UK
being no exception, and this is leading the drive for e¢ ciency improvements in public spending
of scarce resources. Ex post evaluation of past government policies is desirable to gauge public
spending e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency, and R&D policy programmes represent a considerable
outlay of public money. The continued subsidisation of business R&D must be formally justied,
like every other area of spending.
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To motivate the R&D-driven growth model tested in Chapter 7, this chapter provides a
review of some existing literature on this question, as well as some background on UK R&D
and policies designed to target it. Rather than focusing on policies targeted at a more micro
level, i.e. at particular sectors, industries or types of rm, which lend themselves more to event
studies or micro-evaluation approaches, I look at aggregated policy variables and their impacts
at the macroeconomic level.
6.2 Literature Review
6.2.1 R&D Spillovers: Theory and Evidence
There is a sizeable microeconometric literature estimating the rates of return on R&D invest-
ment at the private level and at the social level. For surveys see e.g. Griliches (1998, Chapters
5 and 11), Hall et al. (2010), and Becker (2013). Though the results fall into a reasonably large
range, the consensus is that both returns are positive and signicant, and that social returns
are higher by a factor of two to four (Gri¢ th, 2000, p.9), signifying large spillovers from private
innovation to the aggregate.
Such spillovers overcome diminishing returns to accumulable factors in the aggregate pro-
duction function, generating sustained economic growth; but they also undermine private in-
centives to innovate since the innovator cannot appropriate the full return from his investment
(e.g. Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Romer, 1990). The theoretical endogenous growth literature on
spillovers was discussed in some depth in Chapter 4, so a brief recap of the policy implications
will su¢ ce here. The equilibrium innovation rate in such models generally depends on the
interaction of various e¤ects, some of which work in di¤erent directions: appropriability and
spillover e¤ects drive a wedge between the private and social returns to research, undermining
the incentives of the researcher and suppressing the market rate of innovation below the social
optimum, while the business stealing e¤ect (the incentive for a competitor rm to enter and
acquire the market, destroying the rents of the incumbent monopolist) can push innovation
above the socially optimal rate, also a welfare-inferior outcome. Arrows replacement e¤ect
(Arrow, 1962) implies that the incumbent monopolist has low incentives to innovate further, so
that technological progress rests with competitors; a model featuring this e¤ect may lead to a
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low innovation equilibrium when barriers to entry are high.
The broad avour of the policy recommendations coming from such models, supposing the
downward incentive e¤ect to dominate, is that research activities should be subsidised directly
(or indirectly through scal incentives) in order to bring private returns into line with the
social rate, and that protection of intellectual property rights should be increased, enabling the
innovator to appropriate a larger portion of the returns to his investment in spite of the non-rival
nature of knowledge outputs. The underlying structure of the environment can also play a role,
depending on the particular model; competition policy and the reduction of barriers to entry and
other market frictions may increase the innovation rate, though this is theoretically ambiguous
(as discussed in Chapter 4). Policymakers may also be able to increase the innovation through
the R&D channel by subsidising human capital accumulation, exploiting complementarities
between the two activities that arise through the use of highly skilled workers as an input to
the R&D process (e.g. Varga and t Veld, 2011). However, this is not the focus in the current
paper.
Other spillover channels have been posited in the R&D literature. Grossman and Helpman
(1991a) look at international spillovers in two models. If these pass perfectly across borders
there is no role for domestic subsidies to R&D in aiding catch-up to the technology frontier
(Chapter 7); but if spillovers are geographically bounded (as in the model in Chapter 8) then
initial cross-country di¤erentials in innovation stocks will lead to a widening of productivity
gaps over time. In that case countries with lower initial levels should subsidise R&D in order to
facilitate catch-up. Microeconometric studies nding that technology spills over faster within
countries than across borders include Branstetter (1996) and Eaton and Kortum (1994). Gri¢ th
et al. (2003, 2004) note the role of R&D in enhancing the capacity for the domestic economy to
absorb international spillovers and nd evidence for this channel as a productivity determinant
at the industrial level in a panel of OECD countries, so reinforcing the argument for domestic
subsidies to R&D.
On the other hand, the idea that absorptive capacity enables spillovers (particularly spillovers
within industries or countries) may somewhat undermine the rationale for subsidies. If spillovers
from private investment to other rms or industries are costless (and there are no counteracting
e¤ects), then subsidies seem the obvious policy choice to raise investment incentives to the point
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where marginal private and social benets are equal, generating the socially optimal level of
innovation. If, however, knowledge does not di¤use costlessly, but requires rms to do their
own R&D in order to absorb spillovers from the R&D of others, this adds an upward absorp-
tionincentive to R&D into the mix, since returns to own R&D are increasing with the overall
spillover pool (see e.g. Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Geroski 1993, 1995). These complementar-
ities between own and othersR&D may mean that the market equilibrium level of investment
in R&D is not seriously below the social optimum (or at least, the extent is again unclear),
leaving less of a role for subsidies. Such complementarities feature in industries where there are
simultaneously high spillovers and high R&D investment, like aircraft, semi-conductors, com-
puters, electronic components and communications equipment (Spence, 1984; Levin, 1988), and
these industries tend to be a focal point for innovation policies. If incentives to invest in R&D
are not undermined by spillovers, but on the contrary are pushed up by rivalry and strategic
interaction, then additional policy intervention may even push R&D investment beyond the
social optimum (Klette et al., 2000).
Equally, the presence of feedback between own and external R&D introduces the possibility
of multiple equilibria for R&D at the industry or even economy level (Matsuyama, 1995). If
there is low R&D to begin with, a low innovation equilibrium results, but if R&D can be
stimulated by government intervention in the early stages of a new industry (where government
subsidies are often targeted) then a virtuous cycle of spillover complementarities can lead to a
high innovation equilibrium. This kind of thinking motivates infant industrypolicies. Klette
and Moen (1999) show the failure of this type of policy intervention for IT-related manufacturing
R&D in Norway, which they put down to informational frictions. They conclude that although
a simple game theoretic construct might make policy intervention a clear choice, in practice,
in a non-frontier economy when the technology frontier is progressing rapidly, policymakers
and bureaucrats often lack the information needed to improve on the market solution. (p.
73) Having said this, Klette et al. (2000) point out that a downward selection bias may be
operating on their estimate of the subsidy programme impact (on which more below).
Other literature has looked at complementarities between di¤erent types of domestic R&D,
such as spillovers from R&D conducted in higher education institutions to the private sector (e.g.
Khan et al., 2010). It is not within the scope of the present chapter to discuss every potential
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spillover mechanism that may lead to enhanced aggregate productivity growth through the R&D
channel. The reader is referred to the survey in Khan et al. (2010). This discussion should
serve to emphasise that theoretically the interaction of some or all of these e¤ects, as well as
any other potential e¤ects that have not had attention, might lead to excessive innovation or
too little at the aggregate level, depending on their relative sizes. The question of whether the
market economy generates a sub-optimal level of innovation in the absence of subsidies is an
empirical one.
6.2.2 R&D Policy Trends
Before proceeding to the empirical literature on the policy determinants of R&D and growth,
a brief overview of R&D policy trends in the UK and across the OECD is useful to set this
literature in context. In summary, three signicant policy shifts have emerged since the 1980s.
The proportion of Business Enterprise R&D (BERD) nanced by government fell sharply, then
levelled o¤ from the late 1990s; there has been a strong movement towards indirect government
support for R&D in the form of tax credits; and there has been interest in increased patent
protection, though for the UK this is less signicant.
The early 1980s saw a strong downward trend in direct government funding for private
sector R&D expenditure, as supply side policy gained popularity across the OECD and many
industries were privatised. In 1981 the UK level was high and far above the OECD average;
the percentage subsequently plunged across the area (see Figure 6.1). However there has been
a notable levelling out since the late 1990s. This halting of the downward trend seems to have
been a response to the R&D-focused innovation literature, at least in part.
Another increasingly important aspect of the R&D policy mix is the trend towards scal
incentives, adopted by the majority of OECD countries over the last decade. Tax credits consti-
tute indirect government nancial support; they reduce the marginal cost of R&D investment
for the rm and do not require government to screen the projects that rms choose to under-
take. Figure 6.2 shows the OECD tax subsidy rate, constructed as one minus the B-Index
(Warda, 2001). The B-Index measures the income required before tax in order to break even on
one unit of R&D spending (in USD); it is lower when the tax credit is higher. Thus the subsidy
rate proxies the generosity of the tax schedule towards business R&D. A number lower than
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Figure 6-1: % BERD Financed by Government (Source, OECD)
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zero for the subsidy rate indicates that the tax code penalises R&D, while a number greater
than zero indicates tax preference towards R&D. For the UK this measure includes the large
company R&D expenditure credit introduced in 2002, but it excludes the more generous SME
R&D tax credit introduced in 2000, as well as accelerated depreciation schemes. The SME tax
credit is also excluded from the aggregate measures of BERD funded directly by government,
so this element of government policy is generally missing altogether from cross-country com-
parisons. Given the di¤erences in design of tax credit schemes, which may be volume-based (as
in the UK) or incremental (applying only to increases in expenditure above some threshold)
and comprise various additional allowances, the comparability of the tax subsidy rate across
countries may be limited. Note that the SME and the large company R&D tax credit became
more generous in the UK as of 2013, when the complementary Patent Box scheme was also
introduced, a credit on prots arising from patents (HM Treasury, 2010a). The patent box
alone was predicted to cost £ 1.1bn per year in the June 2010 Budget (HM Treasury, 2010b,
Table 2.4, footnote 3); these are expensive policies, at least in the short run.
The last major trend in OECD policy emerging from the innovation literature surveyed
in this chapter is the general increase in patent protection; see Figure 6.3.. According to the
Ginarte-Park Index (Park, 2008) the UK, Belgium and the US had the highest levels of patent
protection amongst this group of OECD countries in 1985. Between 1985 and 2008 the UK
level of patent protection increased, but many others increased by more and overtook; however,
the di¤erence in the level between the 2008 leader (the US) and the UK is very small. Given
the lack of variation in this index over the time period, we would not expect the addition of
this dimension to a composite R&D policy indicator to add much information.2
6.2.3 Evaluating R&D Policy E¤ectiveness
The trends discussed above reect the traction gained in policy circles by spillover-based ar-
guments for government support to R&D, both direct (subsidies) and indirect (tax incentives
and broader frameworkpolicies to modify the choice architecture of the R&D decision envi-
2 Intellectual property rights protection is classied as a framework policy in the literature (e.g. Westmore,
2013), and other framework policies sometimes looked at in the context of R&D incentives include labour market
and product market regulation. This is another opportunity to underline that in Chapter 5, the R&D growth
channel is not necessarily excluded by our choice of policy variable (1).
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Figure 6-2: Indirect Subsidy Rates (1-B-Index), UK and OECD. Source, OECD.
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Figure 6-3: Ginarte-Park Index of Patent Protection. Figure Reproduced fromWestmore (2013,
p. 13, Figure 6).
ronment). The idea is that governments subsidise projects that have large expected returns to
society but which would not be picked by private investors. Of course, there is a large empirical
literature evaluating whether government programmes achieve what they set out to do. The
risk is that, rather than encouraging additional private spending on R&D, subsidies go towards
funding projects that the private sector would have funded anyway in their absence. David et al.
(2000) survey 35 years of econometric analysis of this question, concluding that The ndings
overall are ambivalent(abstract). Klette et al. (2000) review some microeconometric studies
evaluating the impacts of government subsidy programmes designed to stimulate private sector
R&D in the manufacturing sector, and their paper raises several important issues with this lit-
erature that merit discussion. Of the papers discussed there, Irwin and Klenow (1996), Lerner
(1998), Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) and Griliches and Regev (1998) all nd evidence
that participation in the government subsidy programme is associated with signicant benets.
Klette and Moen (1999), on the other hand, nd that Norwegian government subsidies, though
large, had no positive impact relative to those not subsidised; this result holds at the rm level
and at the industry level, when supported industries are compared both to other Norwegian
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industries and separately to similar OECD industries.
However, Klette et al. (2000) note various selection biases in the samples. Selection bias
implies problems with the control group in the quasi-experiments. In Irwin and Klenow
(1996), Lerner (1998) and Klette and Moen (1999), the proposed counterfactual is the group
of non-supported rms. They use a di¤erence-in-di¤erences setup with a rm-specic xed
e¤ect, which ought to capture any underlying rm heterogeneity correlated with programme
participation, provided that those characteristics are constant throughout the sample. The
process then contrasts the change in performance of the treatedgroup (those who received a
subsidy) before and after treatment, with that of the untreated. The question is whether these
non-supported rms capture what the treated rmsexperience would have been in the absence
of the treatment. Klette et al. (2000) point out that the rm-specic xed e¤ect does not
control for selection bias when there are temporary shocks which correlate with the probability
of selection for the subsidy programme. This is the so-called Ashenfelter-dip, where temporary
bad performance a¤ects the probability of being selected for a treatment; when programmes
pick winners, good performance will increase the probability of selection. The point is that
the direction of the bias depends on the particular circumstances and characteristics of the
programme or sample being analysed.
Furthermore, the presence of spillovers from subsidised to unsubsidised rms, which is gen-
erally the rationale behind government intervention in the R&D process, would make the un-
treated rms a poor control group. If the e¤ects of subsidised private R&D spill over to other
similar rms then we would expect all rms of that type to show a similar (better) performance,
regardless of whether they received the subsidy; and the result in this framework would not
be observably di¤erent if the subsidy had no impact on performance for the treated group.
Branstetter and Sakakibara (1998) note the potential for spillovers in their sample and inves-
tigate further. They nd that consortium-membership raises the rms propensity to patent,
and when they include a spillover variable as a regressor the interaction of this variable with
consortium-membership is positive and signicant in a random e¤ects model, signifying that
consortium-membership enhances the impact of other rmsR&D on own-rm patenting. The
spillover variable is constructed as a weighted sum of other rmsR&D, where weights are higher
for more technologically similar rms. Therefore the weighting mechanism used to capture the
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increased likelihood of spillovers between rms based on their similarities is closely related to
the matching procedure in Blundell and Dias (2000, Section 4.4), which matches treatedand
untreatedrms with similar characteristics in order to estimate the additional e¤ect of the
treatment. The point is that matching rms between treated and untreated groups in order to
satisfy usual matching criteria (which ought to signify an appropriate control; see Heckman et
al. 1998) makes the presence of spillovers more likely, so invalidating the control group. Studies
evaluating the impact of policies on business R&D at the rm and industry level must address
these issues for their ndings to be reliable.
More recent microeconometric studies evaluating the e¤ectiveness of subsidy programmes
include Einio (2014), Takalo et al. (2013), both of which look at Finland, and Overman and
Einio (2012) for disadvantaged areas in England. These authors take identication of the
causality from R&D subsidies to rm performance more seriously. Bronzini et al. (2010) use a
regression discontinuity approach to look at the impact of R&D subsidies on Italian rms.
Criscuolo et al. (2012) conduct a UK specic micro-econometric study of the impact Re-
gional Selective Assistancesubsidy programme on rms, using a matching approach. Instru-
mental variables are constructed using exogenous changes in European state-aid regulations (cf.
Einio, 2014). Their results indicate treatment e¤ects of the subsidy programme on employment,
investment and net entry rates, though these e¤ects are only present for small rms (rms with
fewer than 150 employees). They nd no e¤ect of subsidies on TFP.
Foreman-Peck (2013) uses propensity score matching to estimate the e¤ectiveness of UK
innovation policies in stimulating innovation and growth for SMEs in both manufacturing and
service sectors between 2002 and 2004. Self-reported innovation from the Fourth Community
Innovation Survey (DTI, 2006) is preferred as a measure of innovation output to R&D expendi-
ture gures which markedly under-report research activity and innovativenessamong SMEs
(p.56). He nds signicant, positive impacts of policy on supported rmsself-reported inno-
vation outcomes and enterprise turnover growth relative to unsupported rms. Since omitted
spillover impacts between the groups would imply a downward bias on these estimates, they are
interpreted as a lower bound to the gains from policy; though if there is selection bias in the
award of subsidies to rms that would anyway have been the most innovative (picking winners),
this could imply an upward bias. There could also be an upward bias in the self-reported innova-
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tiveness measure. The gains relative to government outlays are also investigated, the conclusion
being that SME innovation policy between 2002 and 2004 was e¢ cient. The policy recommen-
dation is therefore to continue such direct and indirect funding of innovation, though the R&D
tax credit does not impact innovation signicantly di¤erently to direct subsidies according to
these estimates.
For a recent survey of the empirical literature on the e¤ectiveness of R&D tax credits,
much of it looking at the rm or industry level, see Lokshin and Mohnen (2010) and HMRC
(2010). The impact of tax credits on R&D spending is generally thought to be positive, though
whether it is cost e¤ective is controversial. Table 2 in the HMRC report (p. 16) illustrates
the wide range of estimates for short and long- run elasticities of R&D spending with respect
to its user cost or price, or estimated benet-costs ratios; of course this range of estimates is
obtained for varying samples of countries and time periods, and using di¤erent methodologies.
An inuential country-level study is Bloom et al. (2002). The impact of tax incentives on
R&D intensity between 1979 and 1997 is estimated in a panel of nine OECD countries with
xed e¤ects. Their estimate suggests that a 10% reduction in the user cost of R&D increases
R&D intensity by 1% in the short run and around 10% in the long run. Contrasting rm-
level evidence is provided by Bravo-Biosca et al. (2013), who nd that tax incentives to R&D
signicantly reduce MFP growth using a di¤erence-in-di¤erences approach.
The UK R&D tax credit is very costly and evidence for its e¤ectiveness on aggregate pro-
ductivity growth is of great interest. See e.g. Rassenfosse and van Pottelsberghe (2009), Bouis
et al. (2011) and Hall (2013) for evidence on the policy determinants of patenting and produc-
tivity growth. However, since the UK R&D tax credit has not spanned even half the sample
period analysed in this thesis, we do not investigate this aspect of the R&D policy mix. Like-
wise, though policy surrounding patenting activity continues to receive much attention, this is
beyond our scope here; therefore this evidence is only touched on briey in what follows.
6.2.4 The Impact of R&D subsidies on Business R&D: Country-level Studies
Given the macroeconomic focus of the present study, we concentrate on the macro-econometric
literature. There have been various country-level studies investigating the extent to which
policies in support of R&D have stimulated innovation and productivity growth. We consider
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rst some empirical evidence for a link between innovation policies and private sector R&D,
with particular focus on direct subsidies.
Jaumotte and Pain (2005) look at a panel of 20 OECD countries from 1982-2001. Their
model follows Hall and van Reenen (2000) in treating the aggregate R&D stock as an input
to the aggregate production function and accumulating it from real expenditures in a manner
analogous to the capital stock. This makes R&D demand a function of the real user cost of R&D;
the user cost formula is based on the Hall-Jorgenson formula for the real user cost of xed capital
(see Hall and van Reenen, 2000, Appendix A) and is equivalent to the OECD B-Index, multiplied
by the real interest rate plus the R&D depreciation rate (since the deator used for R&D is
the GDP deator). They calibrate depreciation (the rate at which the R&D stock becomes
obsolescent) at 11% from other literature, though robustness checks using 16% and 6% show the
estimation results are not sensitive to this. Augmenting the R&D demand equation with various
potential macroeconomic and policy factors, they estimate a dynamic error correction model
with xed time and country e¤ects. The dynamic approach, including the lagged dependent
variable, is common in the literature since Guellec and Van Pottelsberghe (2000) due to the
high adjustment costs that characterise R&D activity. The approach distinguishes long-run
from short-run e¤ects.
Their results suggest that direct subsidies to business R&D as a proportion of GDP have a
signicant negative impact on business R&D intensity, though the e¤ect of R&D subsidies as
a share of corporate prots is positive. Intellectual property rights measured by the Ginarte-
Park index do not a¤ect business R&D stocks, though they increase patenting. The most
important factors positively determininginnovativeness in the study are the supply of high-
skilled researchers, public sector research, links between business and universities, the degree of
product market competition, the level of nancial development and access to foreign inventions.
A reduction in the user cost of R&D does raise business R&D, but the full e¤ect takes many
years to appear and its coe¢ cient is sensitive to the model specication. A re-estimation of their
main model using lagged variables at (t-2) to instrument current dated regressors potentially
su¤ering from endogeneity has little impact on their estimates, leading them to conclude that
bias is negligible.
Westmore (2013) is in part an extension of Jaumotte and Pain (2005) including more recent
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data. Thus the policy determinants of business R&D and patenting are investigated in a
dynamic panel of 19 OECD countries spanning the mid-1980s to 2008 with xed e¤ects, again
restricting the coe¢ cients to be homogeneous across countries. Using accumulated real R&D
expenditure and the number of new patents to proxy private sector innovation activity, he nds
that tax incentives proxied by the OECD tax subsidy rate, direct subsidies to R&D and patent
protection rights proxied by the Ginarte-Park index all have a positive and signicant impact
on these dependent variables in an error correction framework. Interestingly, the signicance
of real publicly funded business R&D in the business R&D regression seems to depend on
the post-2001 data, as when the specication is re-estimated for the 1982-2001 sample (as in
Jaumotte and Pain, 2005) the impact is no longer signicant. The suggested explanation is that
the context for direct subsidies has changed over time; formerly, OECD governments tended
to subsidise projects for which they contracted to buy the output, so that subsidised private
R&D would have substituted for/crowded out privately funded R&D, while more recent subsidy
schemes have switched to a grant-matching format. The latter obliges the supported rm to
increase its own R&D investment by an amount matching the size of grant received, in an
attempt to ensure input additionality.
However, some earlier empirical work did nd in favour of subsidy e¤ectiveness on pre-2000
samples. Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000) nd in a dynamic panel of 17 OECD countries
between 1983 and 1996 that direct subsidies to business R&D generate additional business-
nanced R&D, as do tax incentives; that direct subsidies and tax incentives to business R&D
are policy substitutes in terms of their impact on business R&D; and that more frequent changes
in direct support and tax incentive programmes reduces their e¤ectiveness in raising privately
funded business R&D. They also nd that there is a threshold for government subsidies beyond
which the impact on business R&D becomes negative so a non-linear relationship though
Westmore (2013) nds no evidence for a threshold of this nature.
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2000) note that although the presence of spillovers between
treated and non-treated rms or industries makes it di¢ cult to examine the impact of govern-
ment policies on R&D in micro datasets, at the macroeconomic level this is not such a problem.
They suggest that we can reasonably assume government policy to be exogenous to private sec-
tor R&D at this level (David et al., 2000), though they acknowledge potential latent variables 
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i.e. a common unobservable driving both government spending on R&D and business spending
on R&D in the business cycle (which they control for by adding GDP growth as a regressor)
and the cost of R&D. The latter was emphasized by Goolsbee (1998), who shows that prices of
R&D inputs like skilled labour could go up in response to a government subsidy increase, due
to restricted supply of these inputs; this would lead to an increase in business R&D expenditure
in nominal terms only. They therefore attempt to correct for potential bias in their estimates
arising from the response of R&D prices to demand changes, using Gooslbees estimates. A
three-stage least squares approach is adopted in which the rst two stages are an instrumental
variables procedure to account for the presence of the lagged dependent variable amongst the
regressors, and the third stage addresses the possibility of cross-country correlations between
same-dated residuals (a problem that OLS su¤ers from in this case). The reader is referred to
their Annex 2 for country-level studies of the e¤ects of subsidies on private R&D conducted
prior to 2000 (there are not many); I only mention Levy (1990) whose results using a Box-Cox
procedure suggest that e¤ects vary across the 9 OECD countries he looks at, with a signicant
negative impact for the UK and the Netherlands in the 1963-84 sample, a positive impact in
four other countries, and an insignicant result for the other two.
Falk (2006) investigates a dynamic panel model in which private sector R&D intensity
depends on policy determinants including the generosity of tax incentives (represented by the
B-Index), and direct subsidies to private R&D as a percentage of GDP, in addition to a matrix of
controls. The sample comprises 21 OECD countries from 1975-2002, using 5 year averages, and
the model is estimated using system GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998), addressing endogeneity in
the regressors by instrumenting them with their own lagged levels (di¤erences) in a regression in
di¤erences (levels), though results from other estimators are also reported for comparison. The
nding that tax incentives a¤ect business R&D intensity signicantly and positively is robust
to variation in the model specication and estimation technique. However, direct subsidies are
only signicant using the rst di¤erenced GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). This is
not the preferred method for this context owing to the high persistence in the individual time
series which leads to a loss of e¢ ciency in estimation (Blundell and Bond, 1998);3 business
3High persistence in the level of the variables means that lagged levels are weak instruments for rst di¤erences
of the variables.
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R&D intensity in particular is shown to be highly persistent, indicating its slow adjustment
to changes in determinants. High tech exports as a proportion of total exports, likewise, is a
signicant, positive determinant of business R&D intensity only for the one-step rst di¤erenced
GMM estimator. Intellectual property rights, represented by the Ginarte-Park index of patent
rights, are not found to be signicant in the dynamic panel model, though a signicant e¤ect is
present in the static xed e¤ects model (again, this model is not preferred since the estimator
is not consistent).
Cincera et al. 2009 take a di¤erent methodological approach, looking at the e¢ ciency
of public R&D expenditure in stimulating aggregate R&D in a group of 21 OECD countries
with Data Envelopment Analysis and Stochastic Frontier Analysis. These methods require the
construction of e¢ ciency scores from input-output ratios; selected inputs include government
subsidies to business R&D, while outputs include total private R&D expenditure. Their results
are somewhat sensitive to the choice of estimation method, but general conclusions are that gov-
ernment subsidies to business R&D have successfully stimulated private R&D expenditure, and
that e¢ ciency scores depend positively on deregulation of labour and product markets, intellec-
tual property rights, and the share of high-tech manufacturing, amongst other macroeconomic
factors.
6.2.5 Aggregate Impacts of R&D, and R&D Policies, on Economic growth
The relationship between R&D and growth
Here I look rst at the empirical evidence for a relationship between productivity and R&D,
before turning to the growth impact of policies designed to stimulate R&D.
At the country level, estimates of the marginal e¤ect of R&D on productivity will capture
both the direct rate of return to R&D captured by the rm and the externalities generated for
other rms as a result of spillovers in innovation outputs. Coe and Helpman (1995) and Park
(1995) are early examples of a panel approach applied to large samples in both the country and
times series dimensions. Both look at the question of whether private sector-conducted R&D
a¤ects returns at the aggregate level, Coe and Helpman for 22 developed countries between 1970
and 1990, and Park for 10 OECD countries between 1970 and 1987. Both nd a positive and
signicant impact of R&D at the country level, though neither rigorously tests for cointegration
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as techniques were not fully developed at the time. If time series processes in the regression
are non-stationary, the absence of a cointegrated relationship between them suggests spurious
estimates.
Khan et al. (2010) estimate the impact of R&D stocks on total factor productivity in
a cointegrated panel of 16 OECD countries, including human capital and a range of other
potential non-R&D productivity determinants in order to test the robustness of the R&D-
productivity relationship. Controls include ICT, high tech export and import ratios, inward
and outward FDI stock ratios, the relative size of the services sector, public infrastructure,
measures of nancial development and a business cycle proxy (unemployment). Accumulating
R&D stock variables for business, public sector and foreign R&D, they nd all are positive and
signicant, a result that is robust to changes in model specication, to the measure of total
factor productivity , and to the depreciation rates employed in the R&D stock calculations. The
estimated point elasticity of TFP with respect to business R&D is between 0.017 and 0.174,
lower than both public and foreign R&D elasticities, which are in the ranges 0.071-0.284 and
0.010-0.057 respectively. All non-R&D determinants are also found to be positive and signicant
when their joint e¤ect is represented by the weighted principal component variable. They nd
cross-country heterogeneity in parameters by interacting variables with country-level average
stocks of R&D; a higher stock of existing R&D raises the R&D elasticity for that country, and
they nd the same for human capital stocks. The three types of R&D stock also exhibit small
complementarities when they are interacted together.
A Moving Block Bootstrap resampling procedure reveals the small-sample validity of their
estimators. Their cointegration tests show all time series variables they use are non-stationary
and that all their model specications are cointegrated. Since their ndings agree qualitatively
with earlier studies where cointegration was not rigorously tested for, we might conclude that
these relationships were cointegrated as well.
Erken et al. (2008) nd in a dynamic panel for 20 OECD countries between 1971 and 2002
that the impact of private sector R&D on TFP growth is positive and signicant, and robust in
various specications taken from the growth literature, and to the addition of alternative growth
drivers including human capital. Their ndings are of particular interest for this research,
in that the estimated impact of business R&D is stable in magnitude and signicance when
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entrepreneurship is added as a regressor (this is a measure of distance from equilibrium self-
employment rates, constructed following Carree et al., 2002; see Chapter 4, Section 4.4.2). This
result should emphasize that the hypotheses tested in Chapter 5 and 7 are not competing, but
are di¤erent aspects within a systemic theory of growth. Both R&D and self-employment rates
are signicantly correlated with growth, and they appear to measure di¤erent channels to some
extent.
Bravo-Ortega and Garcia Marin (2011) look at the direction of causation between R&D and
productivity in a panel of 65 countries for 1965-2005. They note the failure of many studies of
R&D and growth to take potential simultaneity and reverse causality into account. Given that
R&D is strongly procyclical, R&D expenditure and productivity could both be responding to
the same demand shocks. Equally, if R&D spending decisions are made on the basis of expected
changes in output, this would imply reverse causality. Using a system GMM approach, they
nd that real per capita R&D expenditure Granger causesTFP in the sense of statistical
precedence in time (Granger, 1969), while the reverse does not hold. However, Granger causality
results are inconclusive for the relationship between other measures of R&D expenditure and
TFP; these other measures include R&D in constant PPP US dollars, and R&D as a proportion
of GDP (all measures are in logs). All three R&D measures are found to be weakly exogenous
in the sense of Engle, Hendry and Richard (1983) but, as they note, this is not su¢ cient to rule
out feedback from the endogenous to the weakly exogenous regressor; only R&D expenditure
per capita is concluded to be strongly exogenous to productivity by means of the Granger
causality results. Subsequent system GMM regression of TFP on per capita R&D expenditure
and controls shows a positive and signicant e¤ect from R&D to TFP (level). They conclude
that increasing expenditure in R&D per capita in the future will therefore increase TFP at the
country level. This involves an explicit assumption that their regression model is invulnerable
to the Lucas critique (Lucas, 1976); that is, that the underlying relationship between R&D and
TFP in the historical data is not liable to change in response to a future policy change. They
argue that R&D and TFP are linked by a technical relationship that cannot be characterized as
a decision policy function, so that the Lucas critique does not apply here and strong exogeneity
is a su¢ cient condition for their policy recommendation (p.1093).
Other work in this vein is Guloglu and Tekin (2012), who examine the direction of causality
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between R&D, innovation and growth in a multivariate panel VAR for 13 high income OECD
countries, 1991-2007. Their broad conclusions are that R&D activity (measured by R&D in-
tensity) and technological change (proxied by the rate of patenting) Granger cause economic
growth together, while economic growth and R&D investment together Granger cause eco-
nomic growth. This implies support for both the science-push theory of growth (e.g. Aghion
and Howitt, 1992) and the demand-pull hypothesis of Schmookler (1966) that technology is
driven by the needs of consumers (and hence by income). Concerns about endogeneity in sim-
ple regressions of growth on measures of innovation or innovation policy would therefore seem
to be justied.
Direct impacts of R&D policy on growth
Some early evidence on the aggregate impacts of R&D by source of funding is Lichtenberg (1992)
who nds the elasticity of GNP with respect to government funded R&D is large, negative
and signicant, in a non-linear least squares estimation of a constant returns Cobb-Douglas
aggregate production function. On the other hand, the elasticity of output with respect to
privately funded R&D capital is positive, signicant and around 7% (roughly one third of the
return to the physical capital stock), and the social rate of return to private R&D investment is
about seven times larger than the return to investment in buildings and equipment. Lichtenberg
notes that endogeneity in the investment rates would render these results suspect. Also, since
the results do not break down government funded R&D by sector of performance, there is no
estimate of the impact of direct subsidies to business R&D. Much government-funded R&D
is carried out with public good objectives that may not be well captured in GNP, such as
health and defence; this type of publicly-funded R&D is more usually carried out by public
sector institutions . Indeed many forms of government-funded R&D, such as government basic
research and higher education R&D, have been found empirically to have near zero returns (e.g.
Westmore, 2013). This is why we focus on government funding of business-performed R&D in
the empirical work in Chapter 7.
Guellec and van Pottelsberghe (2004) regress total factor productivity growth on R&D
capital by sector of performance (private sector, public sector and foreign rms) for a panel
of 16 OECD countries between 1980 and 1998 in an error correction model. They nd all
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three to be signicant positive determinants of productivity growth in the long run. Their
estimate of the long-run elasticity of TFP with respect to business R&D is 0.13, making the
social returnto business R&D much higher than the normal private return(p. 366). The
estimated long run elasticity with respect to foreign R&D is higher, at 0.45, giving a large
role to absorptive capacity for international spillovers. Interacting the types of R&D by sector
of performance with a time trend, they nd that business R&D has grown in its impact on
productivity during the sample, while public R&D has decreased in impact, conrming the
impression given by business reporting that R&D is an increasingly important activity for
rms in a knowledge-based economy. They further analyse additional factors a¤ecting the
e¤ectiveness of these types of R&D in causing productivity growth, nding that the source of
funding matters for the e¤ectiveness of private sector R&D in stimulating productivity. They
nd a negative impact on productivity growth of business R&D funded by government, though
when this is decomposed by government objective this negative result seems to be driven by
defence-related R&D subsidies; subsidies aimed at civilian R&D are weakly positively related
to productivity growth.
Returning to Westmore (2013), he nds in a dynamic panel of 19 OECD countries that
intellectual property rights, direct R&D subsidies and scal incentives to R&D are statistically
signicant determinants of R&D activity and patenting (as previously discussed), and those
activities are found to be statistically signicant determinants of Multi-Factor Productivity
(MFP) growth in turn. However, when MFP growth is regressed on policy determinants directly
they are insignicant, even when the channelling variables (R&D expenditure and patenting)
are excluded from the specication. This is a strange result; we would expect an indirect e¤ect of
policy via the omitted growth driveractivities to show up in the estimates. Westmore suggests
various explanations for this, including the possibility that these policies encourage sub-types
of the broader innovativeactivity measures that are actually not productive. For instance, tax
incentives may stimulate types of project with a low marginal value. The same may be true of
direct subsidies; this would be more surprising given that subsidies are thought to be targeted
at R&D activities with high social worth, but may highlight the information asymmetries that
are often seen as a reason against such government intervention(p.31). Likewise, intellectual
property rights may simply increase the propensity to patent, rather than increasing productive
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innovation.
Alternatively, the policies may stimulate genuinely innovative activities but the productive
impact of these activities may simultaneously be neutralised by other productivity-dampening
e¤ects. The most obvious suggestion in this context is for intellectual property rights which,
while potentially enhancing incentives to innovate, endow incumbents with market power, so
reducing competition. Bravo-Biosca et al. (2013) nd a similar entry barrier e¤ect arising from
R&D tax incentives.
The evidence from cross-country growth regressions has been duly represented here but, as
discussed in Chapter 4, there are those who question its value. Mankiw wrote in 1995 that
[p]olicymakers who want to promote growth would not go far wrong ignoring most of the
vast literature reporting growth regressions. Basic theory, shrewd observation, and common
sense are surely more reliable guides for policy(1995, pp. 307-308). We may wonder whether
the methodology has moved on by now to the point where this remark is no longer justied.
It seems that a certain number of important objections to this literature remain, in spite of
attempts to address them. Temple (1999), Durlauf et al. (2005) and Easterly (2005) between
them point out potential biases or lack of robustness due to parameter heterogeneity, outliers,
omitted variables, model uncertainty, measurement error in regressors and, nally, regressor
endogeneity. In the policy-growth literature the regressor we suspect of endogeneity is the policy
variable, since policies are frequently a response to economic conditions. Such endogeneity will
bias the estimated impact of the regressor, also undermining identication as we cannot know
the causal relationship underlying the results.
Rodrik (2012) gives a rigorous example of how the endogeneity inherent in regressions of
growth on policy variables renders them uninformative for the policy questions that motivate
them. Using the example of La Porta et al. (2002), he shows that the reduced form regression
model they estimate of productivity growth on government ownership of banks could be derived
from several distinct structural models (or underlying theories), making the interpretation of
their results ambiguous. In other words, their regression model is not identied. The argument
is as follows. La Porta et al. contrast two hypotheses which they call developmental and
political, respectively. According to the former, state ownership is a response to market failures
and is a catch-up strategy; the latter holds that state ownership is a mechanism for political
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favours to pass between government and vested interest groups. Finding a negative correlation
between ownership (the regressor of interest) and productivity growth, they infer that the
political perspective is upheld by the data, rejecting the developmental explanation for state
ownership. Rodrik points out that the independentvariable, government bank ownership, has
di¤erent drivers depending on the hypothesis, each of which would be unobservable. Under the
developmental hypothesis, state ownership is driven by the extent of the market failure, while
under the political hypothesis it is driven by the governments level of corruption. Since in either
case the regressor is correlated with an unobservable factor, the omitted variable bias cannot
be corrected by adding another observable co-variate to the right hand side, nor will splitting
the sample address the problem (both strategies used by the authors). Moreover, since we do
not have the counterfactual (what would have been the growth outcome had the government
not intervened?), we cannot accurately evaluate the impact of the policy. A benign government
will observe a market failure and intervene more extensively using policy; if the market failure
is reduced to some extent as a result, but not removed entirely, we will still observe a relatively
poor economic performance in conjunction with the policy. Consider another country which
does not su¤er from market failures and therefore does not use the policy intervention; this
country performs well economically on average throughout the sample period (the regression is
conducted for averaged growth rates only) so again there is a negative relationship, as healthy
growth is associated with less policy intervention. Thus the developmental hypothesis is equally
well borne out by the estimation results, if policy intervention is itself driven by market failure
(which also drives poor performance).
Though the faults of growth regressions are widely recognised, they are often defended on
the grounds that they help us update our priors about the impact of certain types of policies
(Rodrik, 2012, p. 141) and that even simple or partial correlations can restrict the range of
possible causal statements that can be made(Wacziarg, 2002, p. 909). However, when models
are not identied it is not at all clear that this is defensible. Rodrik writes that there has been
relatively little discussion of the consequences of policy endogeneity in the aggregate growth
regression literature, even amongst its critics, which he nds surprising given the attention paid
to the issue in microeconometric studies. While selection bias in policy evaluation studies at the
micro level can be addressed using instrumental variables or randomised trials, he argues that
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neither of these strategies is readily applicable at the country level. Evidently nations cannot
submit to random policy experiments and nding credible instruments which are relevant (re-
lated to policy), exogenous (uncorrelated with the unobservable determinants of the dependent
variable) and do not belong in the second stage of the regression is genuinely hard in this
context (p. 148; cf. also Durlauf et al. 2005).
The next step is, he says, to take the theories that motivate our empirical analyses more
seriously. Our failure to undertake meaningful tests often derives from a failure to fully specify
the theoretical model(s) being put to the test(p.148). We must specify a model that embeds
the null hypothesis we are testing, come clean about what we assume is and is not observable,
and inquire whether the empirical implications of such a model are consistent with the data
(p. 148). This is where the DSGE model approach used in the present study has something to
o¤er. The Indirect Inference Wald test does precisely what Rodrik advocates: the simulated
data generated using the bootstrapped model (which embeds the policy-driven productivity
growth hypothesis) are formally compared to the historical data through the auxiliary VECM,
the closeness being summarised in the Wald statistic.
6.2.6 Simulation-Based Analysis
There are other studies using a DSGE simulation approach to analyse the macroeconomic
impact of R&D policies. One example is McMorrow and Roeger (2009), who look at the
relationship between R&D policies and economic growth in a global DSGE model calibrated
to the EU and to the US. They use the European Commissions QUEST III model (Ratto et
al. 2009) embellished with the semi-endogenous growth mechanism in Jones (1995b), which
adapts the Romer (1990) product-variety model by assuming diminishing returns to the R&D
stock input in the knowledge production function where Romer assumes constant returns. The
semi-endogenous growth assumption is thought to be more consistent with the stylized facts
of long-run growth than pure endogenous growth, which would have predicted large long-run
growth responses to changes in policy trends over time in contrast with the stable growth rates
that have been observed (Jones, 1995a). As such, in this model policy reforms can only generate
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a permanent change in the level of GDP rather than in the long-run growth rate.4
QUEST III is a New Keynesian DSGE model, much like the IMFs Global Economy Model
(Bayoumi et al. 2004) and the European Central Banks New Area-Wide Model (Christo¤el
et al. 2008), featuring real, nominal and nancial frictions which help to generate behaviour
consistent with the data (cf. Smets and Wouters, 2003). In this extension of QUEST III,
the R&D sector uses the existing R&D stock and highly skilled labour to generate patents
for new varieties of intermediate goods; these patents are licensed and used in production
by intermediate goods rms; intermediate goods are in turn used in production in nal goods
sector, with productive e¢ ciency increasing with the number of input varieties. Since the model
setup implies externalities due to monopolistic competition in nal goods and intermediate
goods sectors, and spillovers from existing knowledge stocks, there is insu¢ cient investment in
knowledge in a market outcome. So there is a role for policy intervention built into the model
due to market failure the study is a quantitative comparison of di¤erent policy reforms relative
to the baseline. Barriers to start-up act as a structural friction in the innovation process, while
tax credits to R&D reduce the sunk cost incurred by the intermediate goods producer licensing a
newly generated idea for production. They also assume a distribution of skills in the workforce,
with only high-skilled labour able to move between production and research sectors. The EU
rate of return to R&D is calibrated at 0.3 since this is the mid-point of the studies that they
review, slightly above returns to other corporate investments.
Thus McMorrow and Roeger start with a stylized fact of a signicant under-investment
in knowledge capital in the EU, and then, using a model in which this hypothesis is embed-
ded, examine the responses of macroeconomic aggregates to certain policy reforms thought to
stimulate R&D. The reforms looked at are: a direct subsidy (or tax credit) to R&D spending;
a reduction in barriers to entry (i.e. an indirect policy measure) in the form of lower admin-
istrative costs and increased access to nance for start-up rms; and policies to increase the
supply of high-skilled workers in the research sector. They nd that increasing the EU R&D
tax credit to the US level raises R&D spending by about 0.1% of GDP after 20 years. In other
words, direct subsidies to R&D can make only a modestcontribution to productivity growth
4The semi-endogenous growth assumption is frequently adopted in this sort of Central Bank model because
of its greater ability to t the stylized facts in the data.
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(p.113). This is because the supply of high-skilled workers is constrained, meaning that much
of the impact of the subsidy to R&D spending is absorbed by an increase in the researcher wage
(cf. Goolsbee, 1998); and also because of the declining marginal e¢ ciency of skilled labour in
the knowledge production function, due to the semi-endogenous growth assumption. In the
short run there is reallocation of high-skilled labour from the production sectors to the research
sector, which has a dampening e¤ect on output in the periods directly following the reform
(this is the case in the model proposed in this paper as well).
The other two policies investigated  the reduction of entry barriers and human capital
improvements both have a more stimulating e¤ect on R&D intensity and hence growth than
the scal stimulus, though measures would have to be substantial(p.113); setting EU entry
costs at US levels according to the estimates of Djankov et al. (2002) only closes 20% of
the productivity gap in the long run. Of course, though the paper does not investigate it,
combinations of these policies might generate complementarities. For instance, human capital
policies in conjunction with the tax credit would reduce the crowding out e¤ect that dampens
the scal policy impact, by increasing the pool of high-skilled workers and so enhancing the tax
credits e¤ectiveness. These ndings are borne out in Roeger et al. (2009, 2010) using a similar
model setup.
Other macro-simulation studies follow a similar procedure, investigating the quantitative
impacts of various policy reforms relative to a baseline when the qualitative responses of the
model are essentially xed by the setup and the calibration. However, there are few (if any)
studies in which the DSGE models performance is compared to the historical data in a formal
frequentist test. Hence these studies merely illustrate the modellersassumptions, with no test
of their accuracy.
Note on the Model in Chapter 2 as a Testing Vehicle for Policy Incentives Sur-
rounding R&D
In Chapter 7, the model presented in Chapter 2 is set up with subsidy variable s0t as a systematic
driver of next periods productivity level. This relationship is derived through the representative
agents utility optimisation with respect to zt, a measure of the time spent in some innovative
activity which is directly incentivised by government, whereas in the empirical work that follows,
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the policy variable is represented in the data by subsidies to private rm expenditure in R&D;
this is therefore strictly an incentive to R&D as a rm-level choice. R&D is generally modelled
as the choice variable of the rm, but not here the theoretical distinction between rm and
supplier of inputs to production is an abstraction necessary to maintain the assumption of
perfect competition in this model. Thus zt is perhaps more analogous to the agents decision
to supply skilled labour to the rm for research. It could be argued that subsidies to rm R&D
expenditure lead the rm to raise wages to skilled workers, so incentivising the agent to spend
more time in research. However, zt is notionally conducted outside the rm in the world of the
model.
There is no suggestion that the model in Chapter 2 is an ideal microeconomic representation
of the R&D process.5 Rather than equating time spent in zt literally with R&D activity as
that is dened in the data, this variable should be viewed as a conceit allowing us to derive a
reduced form relationship between R&D policy and productivity growth. The model is designed
to isolate policy drivers and their macroeconomic e¤ects. Thus the emphasis is on the aggregate
relationships derived from the microfoundations, between the policy variable incentivising what
we loosely call R&Dand the productivity growth rate.
6.3 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed some theoretical and empirical literature on the policy determinants
of private sector R&D, on R&D determinants of productivity growth, and on direct relation-
ships between R&D policy and productivity growth, focusing mostly on direct subsidies. The
theoretical literature gives diverse policy recommendations and to choose between these an
empirical consensus would be helpful; however, a reliable consensus has not really emerged.
The empirical literature is interesting but has serious aws, mainly due to lack of identica-
tion. Once again, micro-level studies do better at overcoming this issue than macroeconometric
studies, but they are not informative on the macro-level phenomena we are interested in. The
macroeconometric growth literature is still largely vulnerable to Mankiws pronouncement that
"Policymakers who want to promote growth would not go far wrong ignoring most of the vast
5 It may indeed be rather inappropriate for the study of R&D incentives at a granular level - but then this is
a criticism levelled at DSGE models in many dimensions; nevertheless, we do not discard them.
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literature reporting growth regressions. Basic theory, shrewd observation, and common sense
are surely more reliable guides for policy" (1995, pp. 307-308). Rather than abandoning all
hope of a legitimate empirical understanding of the issues, another approach is desirable. We
therefore set up an identied, if abstract, model designed to test the e¢ cacy of R&D subsidies
at stimulating growth in the UK between 1981 and 2010. This model is tested and estimated
by Indirect Inference in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7
Testing and Estimating a Model of
UK Growth Driven by R&D
Subsidies
7.1 Data for the Policy Variable
Data constraints require us to focus on the post-1981 period only for the R&D channel. The
policy variable used in this chapter is the ratio of business-performed R&D expenditure (BERD)
nanced directly by government, to the total level of BERD (all sources of funding)1. This is
referred to below as the subsidy rate. Aggregate data on BERD is available annually between
1981 and 2010, with missing values at 1982 and 1984. Each missing value has been interpolated
as the arithmetic average of the two contiguous values. Robustness checks have been conducted
around the interpolation of these missing values and are reported below. The ratio obtained
at annual frequency is interpolated to a quarterly frequency using a constant average match
interpolation. The ratio is plotted in Figure 7.1 for the constant average and quadratic average
interpolations.Here, the policy examined is a subsidy to the presumed growth driving activity
(business-conducted formal R&D), and the hypothesis is that the impacts of policy on zt and
of policy on D lnA are both positive: c1 > 0 and b1 > 0. The subsidy variable, with a linear
1Source: OECD (2014).
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Figure 7-1: Business R&D Subsidy Variable. Ratio of Government Funded BERD to Total
BERD. Source, OECD
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trend and constant removed, is plotted against the log di¤erence of the Solow residual in Figure
7.2. It is interesting to contrast this plot with the relevant part of Figure in Chapter 5; the
time series behaviour of this policy variable is quite di¤erent to  (1) during the period from
1981. Also, the variance of the productivity growth series in this shorter sample is much lower.
Due to the attention paid in the literature to adjustment inertia in the response of R&D to
policy determinants (Guellec and van Pottelsberghe, 2000; Westmore, 2013), I have also tested
and estimated the model with a 4 quarter lag in the subsidy rate, whereas the baseline model
assumes a 1 quarter lag. This reduces the sample size further, relative to the analysis in Chapter
5. Results are therefore reported in this Chapter for two models, both using the subsidy rate
as the policy driver.
1. SUBS Model 1: The model in Chapter 2, with productivity process lnAt = lnAt 1+ b0+
b1s
0
t 1 + eA;t
2. SUBS Model 2: The model in Chapter 2, with productivity described as lnAt = lnAt 1+
b0 + b1st 4 + eA;t.
The choice of starting value for b1 in the R&D subsidy-driven model was already discussed in
the calibration section of Chapter 2. There it was concluded that the empirical literature allows
for considerable freedom around this choice, and around the choice of c1. Starting values chosen
for these are 0:1 and 0:06 respectively Note that the Indirect Inference Estimation procedure in
Section 7.2.2 below should indicate if this starting point is far wrong. The estimation proceeds
by searching across the parameter space for the set of coe¢ cient values that minimises the Wald
percentile. A preliminary to the search is the setting of bounds on that parameter space, and
these have been set at 30% either side of the baseline calibration. If the starting value of b1 is
inappropriate, the estimation process will move towards one of the initial bounds, indicating
that the search bounds should be shifted.
Since the R&D subsidy variable does not include scal incentives to R&D, which have
increased in the UK since 2000, it is only a partial proxy for the policy incentives to R&D.
However, scal incentives as measured by the OECD B-Index may a¤ect R&D and productivity
growth di¤erently to direct subsidies (e.g. Foreman-Peck, 2013), so it is not immediately clear
that we should combine them into a single index. Likewise, no indicator of policy surrounding
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Figure 7-2: Linearly Detrended Subsidy Variable and D lnA
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1 0 c1 2 !  F !F 1 2 3 4 b1
1:0 0:5 0:06 1:2 0:7 1:0 0:7 0:7 0:51 0:47 0:02 0:25 0:1
Table 7.1: Starting Parameter Values
er 0:860 eM 0:848
eA 0:589 es 0:974
eN 0:897 eCF 0:939
eK 0:765 erF 0:851
ewh 0:879 eG 0:972
eX 0:939
Table 7.2: AR(1) Coe¢ cients for Structural Shocks to Variables Indicated by Subscript. Subsidy
Model 1, Starting Calibration
intellectual property rights has been discovered spanning a long enough time frame for this
investigation, and the little time series variation within a single country makes such an indicator
uninformative. We could resort to patent counts to proxy innovation policy, but a) these are an
outcome and may not be a good proxy for policy and b) they respond in a way that may have
nothing to do with productivity (there is a large literature on the appropriateness of patents
as a measure of innovation, see e.g. van Pottelsberghe, 2011). For these reasons, the subsidy
variable employed here is preferred.
7.2 Empirical Work
In this chapter we investigate whether direct subsidies to business-performed R&D also play a
role in causing productivity growth, in addition to the other drivers of productivity wrapped
into the error, including barriers to entrepreneurial entry examined in Chapter 5. All xed
parameters in the calibration in this section are the same as Chapter 5, Table 5.6.
7.2.1 Indirect Inference Test Results (Baseline Calibration)
The baseline calibration for the structural coe¢ cients are given in Table 7.1. The implied AR(1)
coe¢ cients in the stochastic processes are given in Table 7.2.
The test results for this calibration are given for both subsidy models in Table 7.3, based
on the auxiliary VECM with output and productivity as endogenous variables (see Chapter 3,
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Model Normalised Mahalanobis Distance;VECM1
SUBSModel1 3:6293
SUBSModel2(lagged) 4:1358
Table 7.3: Wald Test Results, Baseline Calibration
1 0 c1 2 !  F
0:9712 0:5267 0:0632 1:5198 0:5431 0:7676 0:8522
!F 1 2 3 4 b1 Wald%
0:8819 0:6359 0:3349 0:0240 0:2360 0:0901 77:04
Table 7.4: Wald Minimising Coe¢ cient Values, Subsidy Model 1
Section 2). The normalised transformed Mahalanobis Distance statistic is 3.6293, indicating
that the model is strongly rejected. The statistic falls in the 100th percentile of the Wald
distribution. The test similarly rejects the second model, with a test statistic of 4.1358. Lagging
the policy variable by four quarters in the productivity process appears to worsen the models
performance, when it is evaluated on output and productivity according to the baseline auxiliary
model.
7.2.2 Indirect Inference Estimation Results
The structural coe¢ cients are estimated by Indirect Inference; the simulated annealing algo-
rithm searches within 30% either side of the starting coe¢ cient values in Table 7.1. For Subsidy
Model 1, the Wald percentile was minimised for the coe¢ cient set shown in Table 7.4; the im-
plied AR(1) coe¢ cients for the shock processes are given in Table 7.5. Assessed on output and
productivity, the normalised transformed Mahalanobis Distance statistic is 0.7358; the statistic
falls in the 77th percentile of the Wald distribution. Therefore the model is comfortably not
er 0:858 eM 0:832
eA 0:577 es 0:974
eN 0:897 eCF 0:939
eK 0:951 erF 0:851
ewh 0:837 eG 0:972
eX 0:939
Table 7.5: AR(1) Coe¢ cients of Structural Shocks, Subsidy Model 1, Given Estimated Coe¢ -
cients
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rejected on this auxiliary model (VECM 1). As in Chapter 5, some coe¢ cients have moved
some way from their starting values. Indeed, when the model is assessed on output and pro-
ductivity alone, the Wald-minimising coe¢ cients are very close to the set found for the  (1)
model in which productivity is driven by labour market regulation and top marginal income
tax rates. Only b1 and c1 are di¤erent in absolute magnitude, as we might expect given the
di¤erent policy variable driving the model here. This implies that the same structural model
can accommodate the policy drivers in Chapter 5 as in Chapter 7.
A variance decomposition for the model with this coe¢ cient set is reported in Table 7.6.
As in Chapter 5, we can clearly distinguish this model from an exogenous productivity growth
model; the endogenous variables respond considerably to the identied subsidy shock, not just
to the separate productivity shock.
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Aux. Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Endog Y, A Y, A, r Y, A, Q Y, A, K
Exog (included in test)  0t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1
Exog (excluded from test) trend, const trend, const trend, const trend, const
Wald percentile 77:04 100 100 96:63
Aux. Model (5) (6) (7) (8)
Endog Y, A, N Y, A, C Y, A, r, Q Y, A, N, C
Exog (included)  0t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1 
0
t 1, b
f
t 1
Exog (excluded) trend, const trend, const trend, const trend, const
Wald percentile 100 100 100 100
Table 7.7: Wald Test Results, Alternative Auxiliary Vector Error Correction Models
As we would expect, the shocks entering non-stationary productivity process are generating
most of the variance for each of the endogenous variables in this nite sample. However, the
policy shock is less dominant than in Chapter 5, Table 5.12. The subsidy shock accounts for
less of the change in the Solow residual than (1) did: 9.8% here, against 18.5% for (1).
This is of course a result of the lower b1 estimate found in the search process for this model;
0:09 here, while in Chapter 5 b1 was estimated at 0:12. A direct comparison of these magnitudes
is perhaps not justied, since (1) is composed partly of indices while the subsidy variable is
a ratio of expenditures. However, the labour market indices are interpolated using the trade
union membership rate, and they are also combined with the top marginal tax rate in (1).
Therefore both (1) and the subsidy variable have the dimension of rates. Moreover, their
descriptive statistics show that the linearly detrended series do not di¤er much in terms of
their minimum, maximum and standard deviation (Table 9.2, Appendix 2). Direct comparison
may therefore be appropriate. Here we nd that a 1 percentage point increase in the ratio
of government funded BERD to total BERD this quarter would increase productivity growth
between this quarter and the next by 0.09 percentage points. As such an increase would be
highly persistent within the policy variable, the growth e¤ect would continue for some time in
the future, though it would not be permanent. The level e¤ect would of course be permanent
(see Impulse Response Functions, Chapter 2, Figures 2.1 to 2.3).
Table 7.7 compares the Wald percentiles obtained for the baseline auxiliary VECM (VECM
1) to various other auxiliary VECMs, to examine the models ability to capture the behaviour
of other key endogenous variables.
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Comparison of these results to those in Table 5.13, Chapter 5, shows that the model driven
by the subsidy to business R&D performs as well as the model driven by the (1) series when
examined on output and productivity alone. When the auxiliary model is expanded to include
other endogenous variables, the model is rejected at the 5% signicance level in all cases.
The R&D subsidy-driven models performance is less convincing when assessed on these extra
dimensions.2
This does not necessarily reect the shortcomings of the hypothesis that R&D policy drives
non-stationary productivity and hence economic aggregates. We mentioned previously that
the models microfoundations may be less appropriate for the incentives surrounding the R&D
process than for entrepreneurialincentives. Hence the focus on VECM 1, which isolates the
macroeconomic impact of the direct R&D subsidy on output and productivity alone; it is
perhaps not fair to demand too much of this as an R&D model. Furthermore, we cannot rule
out the possibility that  (1) impacts business R&D incentives as well as what we have termed
entrepreneurialactivities; the model setup cannot distinguish between these two channels, if
indeed it is appropriate to think of them as di¤erent channels at all given their extensive overlap
in practice. This is particularly the case when we consider a broader denition of research as e.g.
Aghion and Howitts (1998),3 which would not exclude the research activities of innovative start-
ups to the extent of formal BERD statistics; R&D expenditure gures signicantly under-report
innovation in the services industries and among SMEs (Foreman-Peck, 2013). We also referred
earlier to studies such as Gri¢ th and Harrison (2004) and Aghion et al. (2009) which have
linked product and labour market regulation to manufacturing productivity growth empirically
through the R&D channel. Therefore the tests carried out here do not imply a dichotomy
between entrepreneurship and R&D as drivers of growth.
These are not competing hypotheses but are di¤erent pieces of the same puzzle, as suggested
in other theoretical and empirical work. Miccelachi (2003) proposes a model in which both en-
trepreneurship and R&D are necessary for innovation; whether innovation is at its optimal rate
depends on deployment of skilled labour between these two sectors in the correct proportions.
2Other 4 variable combinations were also tested, but are not reported here, since for all the Wald test statistic
fell in the 100th percentile.
3"when we refer to researchor to R&D,what we have in mind is the whole range of inputs to innovation,
not just the small part that is actually captured in formal R&D statistics." (Aghion and Howitt, 1998, p. 8)
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1 0 c1 2 !  F
0:7156 0:5657 0:0480 1:0674 0:7988 0:9380 0:5009
!F 1 2 3 4 b1 Wald%
0:7344 0:6191 0:3502 0:0198 0:1981 0:0969 94:48
Table 7.8: Wald Minimising Coe¢ cient Values, Subsidy Model 2
A conducive environment for start-up may also be conducive to R&D, for businesses of any
size; alternatively, R&D from large rms may spill over more e¤ectively via start-up activ-
ity when the policy environment has fewer regulatory and tax-related disincentives, as in the
knowledge spillover theory of entrepreneurship (Acs et al. 2009). Erken et al. (2008) nd both
entrepreneurship and R&D investments are signicant determinants of TFP growth.
The results in this study as a whole indicate that both framework policies, such as the
reduction of labour market frictions (due principally to trade unionism) and the reduction of
marginal tax rates on personal income at the top of the distribution, and direct government
subsidies to business performed R&D are signicant drivers of output and the productivity level.
We nd that the model driven by framework policies is able to account for more dimensions
of the observed UK experience jointly than the R&D subsidy-driven model, though the R&D
analysis is based on a shorter sample and so the results are not directly comparable. Indeed, the
results reported in this chapter for the subsidy-driven model constitute much weaker evidence
than the results reported in Chapter 5 for the model driven by barriers to entrepreneurship.
The R&D subsidy model performs well only when judged on the most parsimonious auxiliary
model, and is rejected for all endogenous variables besides output and productivity. Thus while
the conclusion is not to discard the R&D subsidy-driven growth hypothesis, it seems that this
hypothesis when embedded in the Chapter 2 model is less convincing than the other. Future
work will focus on testing this policy determinant when R&D incentives are modelled with more
appropriate microfoundations.
We also nd little evidence of lags in the impact of R&D subsidies on productivity growth.
The best tcoe¢ cient set for the lagged model is reported in Table 7.8. The transformed
Mahalanobis Distance statistic is 1.633, falling in the 94th percentile of the bootstrapped Wald
distribution. This implies a borderline non-rejection of the model at the 5% signicance level.
Note that the coe¢ cient estimate on the policy variable b1 is very similar to the estimate in
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Subsidy Model 1, though the other coe¢ cient estimates di¤er quite substantially.4 When this
model is assessed on additional endogenous variables, it is strongly rejected across the board.
These results suggest that the assumption of a 4-quarter lag between a change in the subsidy
policy and its impact on the change in productivity is not appropriate for this UK sample. It
may be that a lag length other than 4-quarters would be better, and this could be something
to look at in further work.
Robustness checks showed the results for Subsidy Model 1 to be invariant to the interpolation
technique (quadratic versus constant) and to the way in which missing values were supplied for
years 1982 and 1984.5
7.3 Summary
In this chapter, the Chapter 2 DSGE model of the UK has been tested and estimated using
Indirect Inference when productivity is driven endogenously by direct subsidies to private sector
R&D, for the period 1981  2010:
After Indirect Inference estimation, the model is comfortably not rejected by the Indirect
Inference Directed Wald test for the basic auxiliary model, including output and productivity
as endogenous variables. The estimated impact of current direct subsidies to private R&D on
total factor productivity growth one-quarter ahead is 0:09, signifying that in this sample a 1
percentage point increase in the ratio of government funded BERD to total BERD raises short
term growth in productivity by 0:09 percent per quarter, with permanent e¤ects on the level.
This provides additional information on the impact of policy on growth in the UK since the
1980s. Since the policy variable consists of government-funded formal R&D activity, there is
little doubt that this policy works on growth through the channel of formal R&D undertaken
by rms, the majority of which are large and established, though this proportion has fallen
over the sample period. Taken together with the ndings in Chapter 5, the conclusion is that
government policy has had an impact on the UK productivity experience, both through direct
43 is somewhat lower than the constraint 3 = 1   1   2 would indicate (0:019 as opposed to c. 0:03),
though not by much.
5Missing values were calculated as i) the average of two contiguous values, ii) equal to previous value, iii)
equal to following value. The Wald test result was similar for all three.
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subsidies to R&D, and more indirectly by reforming the policy environment in which rms
(both new and established) make decisions.
We should note that, though this hypothesis passes for the most parsimonious auxiliary
model, it is strongly rejected when the list of endogenous variables increases, unlike the model
tested in Chapter 5. Therefore the hypothesis that subsidies to R&D drive productivity survives
this work only weakly. A di¤erent and more elaborate model of the R&D channel could perhaps
do better, but this must be for future research.
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Chapter 8
Welfare Implications of Policy
Reform
This chapter presents the aggregate welfare implications of a one-o¤ policy reform in the model
for both policy setups, using the models utility function. This shows the extent to which the
growth gains illustrated in the impulse responses (Chapter 2) translate into the consumption
and leisure possibilities of the representative agent.
The time t utility function (Eqn. 2.2, Chapter 2) is ut = 0(1  1) 1C1 1t + (1  0)(1 
2)
 1x1 2t , where preference shocks to consumption and leisure have been removed. To eval-
uate the impact of a policy shock on welfare, we calculate the impulse response functions for
a one-o¤ 1% reduction in (1). This exercise yields consumption and the real consumer wage
over time in terms of log deviation from the base run. Leisure is obtained using the loglinearised
intratemporal condition
d lnxt =
1
2
(1d lnCt   d lnwt) (8.1)
To nd the rise in utility due to a proportional rise in Ct and xt, take a Taylor expansion of
u(:) around some steady state values of C and x.
dut =

@ut
@C
:C

d lnCt +

@ut
@x
:x

d lnxt (8.2)
= 0C
1 1d lnCt + (1  0)x1 2d lnxt
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This utility change is in terms of extra consumption and extra leisure; it is converted into its
equivalent in terms of consumption alone by scaling it by the marginal utility of consumption.
dut = 0C
1 1d lnCt (8.3)
d lnCt =
dut
0C1 1
Thus the extra utility resulting in time t after the policy shock, in terms of its equivalent in
extra units of consumption, is as follows.
d lnCt = d lnCt +
(1  0)x1 2
0C1 1
d lnxt (8.4)
To nd the increase in permanent consumption resulting from the policy shock - call this d^ lnCt
- we require the overall wealth e¤ect of the policy shock to be converted into a per period ow
(allow T to approach 1 )
dU0 =
TX
t=0
td lnCt =
1
1   :d^ lnCt (8.5)
d^ lnCt = (1  )
TX
t=0
td lnCt
This calculation requires a calibration of the steady state values of C and x in the initial Taylor
expansion. Using the intratemporal condition, we know that
@ut
@x
@ut
@C
 (1  0)x
 2
0C 1
= w (8.6)
so that  
@ut
@x :x
 
@ut
@C :C
 = (1  0)x1 2
0C1 1
= w:
x
C
(8.7)
Assume the agent spends half his time in leisure in steady state and the rest in productive
activity that earns the real wage, w. That productive time, (1   x), translates into (1   x)w
consumption units, implying x = 0:5 and C = w(1   x) = 0:5w.1 Substituting these values
1 i.e. income from net foreign assets is assumed to be zero in steady state, as is the return on capital. Adding
these would reduce the impact of leisure in the utility function, but this is anyway quite small (an order of ten
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into the equation above shows that w xC = 1. Thus the formula for the increase in permanent
income resulting from a policy shock is
d^ lnCt = (1  )
TX
t=0
t
(
d lnCt +
 
@ut
@x :x
 
@ut
@C :C
d lnxt) (8.8)
= (1  )
TX
t=0
t
n
d lnCt + w
x
C
d lnxt
o
= (1  )
TX
t=0
t fd lnCt + d lnxtg
Applying this formula, we nd that a one-o¤ 1 percentage point reduction in the barriers to
entrepreneurship rate, (1), generates 2:85% extra consumption per period. This is over a
simulation horizon of 70 quarters or 17:5 years, as the above formula assumes T becomes very
large. For the subsidy model with the set of Wald-minimising coe¢ cients obtained in Chapter
7, a one-o¤ 1 percentage point increase in the subsidy variable raises consumption per period
by 3:88% relative to the base run with no shocks.
This simulation exercise demonstrates for both policy-driven models investigated in earlier
chapters that a policy-driven growth episode delivers signicantly in terms of welfare, as proxied
by the utility function. In conjunction with the Directed Wald test results in Chapters 5 and
7, which show that these models pass empirically as the explanatory process for productivity
and output, the suggestion is that UK policy over the sample period had substantial e¤ects on
both economic growth and welfare.
or more lower than the response of consumption in every period).
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Chapter 9
Conclusion
The empirical work carried out in Chapters 5 and 7 shows that government policy has inuenced
the UK productivity experience. Consistent with the argument of Crafts (2012) and Card and
Freeman (2004), the results in Chapter 5 suggest that policy-induced reductions in labour
market friction and signicant cuts in top rates of personal income tax which began in the early
1980s had a positive and lasting e¤ect on the productivity level, and a reasonably long-lasting
e¤ect on the productivity growth rate. An equally weighted combination of corporate tax rate
cuts and labour market regulation was also found to have had a positive impact on TFP over
the period.
These policies can work through many channels, and it has been theorised elsewhere that
the policy incentives ascribed to entrepreneurial activities in Chapters 4 and 5 actually promote
innovation through formal R&D activity. The results found in Chapter 5 for labour market
regulatory reform may therefore say little about start-up rates or entrepreneurship as it is
dened by many, but may work through the R&D channel. We attempted to distinguish
these channels by including the top rate of personal income tax in (1), on the basis that
personal income tax rates are more directly related to the entrepreneurs decision process than
to decisions around R&D.
The subsidy variable investigated in Chapter 7 is focused on government grants to formal
R&D expenditure, dominated by large established rms rather than small start-ups generally
thought of as entrepreneurial. The results in that chapter show that direct R&D subsidies
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also played a positive role in stimulating UK productivity growth between 1981 and 2010.
This indicates that both direct policy interventions such as subsidies to R&D and indirect
framework policiesproviding an environment in which businesses can operate exibly (whether
through start-up or through formal R&D activity) were important elements in the policy mix
underpinning the UK macroeconomic performance in the sample period. Rather than barriers
to entrepreneurship, the framework policies investigated in Chapter 5 can be more neutrally
termed barriers to business.
In Chapters 4 and 6 the existing empirical work on policy determinants of growth was
reviewed and it was concluded that this literature is problematic, the most critical drawback
being that regressions are usually unidentied and so give no information about the direction
of causality or the structural model underlying the reduced form relationship. This has allowed
ambiguity to remain about how precisely correlations between dependent and independent
variables should be explained in theory.
The empirical work in Chapters 5 and 7 does not su¤er from this ambiguity. We have set
up an identied DSGE model in which policy reform causes permanent changes in productivity,
generating short- to medium-run growth episodes. The simulated features of the bootstrapped
model are summarised by an auxiliary model and compared to the features of the UK sample
data, and these features are discovered to be close in a formal statistical sense, through the
Indirect Inference Wald test. When the hypotheses that chosen policy factors cause growth
are embedded in the workhorse DSGE model of Chapter 2, they are not rejected as the data
generating processes for UK productivity and output in the last quarter of the 20th century.
This is evidence that policy had a causal e¤ect on growth over the period, rather than responding
endogenously to the state of the economy or to other forces.
The estimates of the marginal impact of policy reform on short-run productivity growth are
large enough in absolute value to ensure that these models are distinguished from exogenous
growth models, as variance decompositions have shown, but beyond this we do not emphasize
the precise magnitude of the estimates. The focus is instead on their signs. The hypothesis
that the net productivity e¤ect of labour market regulation and marginal tax rates on personal
income is negative is not rejected empirically for the UK data; equally, the test does not
reject the hypothesis that the net productivity e¤ect of direct private sector R&D subsidies
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(government funding of business R&D as a proportion of total BERD) is positive. Since the
Indirect Inference test has strong statistical power to reject a false null, the non-rejections are
conclusive evidence of the direction of impact of these policy instruments.
Caution is of course advisable in extrapolating outside the particular samples. Nevertheless,
concerns that negative growth e¤ects will result from further cuts in direct funding to private
sector R&D appear to be justied based on past experience. The results also suggest that
reversing the cuts in the top marginal income tax rate and the small business corporate tax
rate could impact economic growth negatively. Likewise, labour market regulation as proxied
by centralised collective bargaining and marginal costs of hiring acted as a barrier to growth-
enhancing business activities and governments should be careful about reverse the deregulatory
reforms enacted in the past; the short- to medium-run growth e¤ects could be non-negligible,
with permanent e¤ects on the TFP level.
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A. The non-stationarity of Ct
Yt
It is assumed that, from the perspective of any period t , the expected ratio of consumption
to output is roughly constant for t+ i, on the basis that the consumption-output ratio is non-
stationary and can be approximated as a random walk process without drift. Thus although
in balanced growth CY will be constant, in the presence of shocks the ratio will move in an
unpredictable way (see Meenagh et al. 2007 for further discussion). At any given point in the
sample, the model is not in balanced growth, though it can be expected to be tending to it in
the distant future if no further shocks are expected. Therefore the assumption here does not
rule out the possibility that consumption and output grow at the same rate in the long run
equilibrium.
This appears to be a reasonable assumption for the sample of UK data I use. Taking the
di¤erence between the natural log series of output and consumption and running an Augmented
Dickey Fuller test with a trend and intercept specication leads to a non-rejection of the null
of unit root (the p-value is 0.84); a Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test with null
hypothesis of stationarity for the same trend specication also o¤ers the same conclusion with a
strong rejection of the null (test statistic 1.25, against the critical value of 0.74 for a 1% signif-
icance level). Using an unrestricted VECM to generate estimates of Et lnYt+1 and Et lnCt+1 ,
then taking the di¤erence between them and running the same tests gives similar results.
Moreover, the simulated series generated by the bootstrapped model show random walk
behaviour.Therefore the model output is consistent with the assumption of a random walk at
this stage of the derivation. There may of course be structural breaks in the time series which
lead stationarity to be falsely rejected (e.g. Clemente et al. 1999); however, it is not a priori
clear where these breaks should be and I abstract from this possibility.
B. Solution method with non-stationary data
The loglinearised rational expectations model is solved using a projection method along the lines
of Fair and Taylor (1983).1 This is most easily explained in general terms; dene E(yt+kjIt 1)
as the value in period t + k of variable y expected at time t   1 based on an information set
1This discussion follows Pierse (1999).
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It 1. The linearised model can be written so that each equation is normalised on one of the
endogenous variables, and represented as follows for t = 1; :::; T :
yt = h(yt; t; ~Yt 1; ~Xt; ut; )
where yt is a (n x 1) vector of endogenous variables, t is a vector of expected future endogenous
variables (expected at time t for t+1), ~Yt 1 is a vector of predetermined endogenous variables,
~Xt is a vector of exogenous variables and ut is a vector of exogenous shock processes.  is a
vector of calibrated parameters and h() is a n x 1 vector valued function. Suppose some guessed
initial time vector for the expectations s 1t , t = j; :::; j + k, when s   1 = 0 (s denotes the
iteration number). Then, taking the expectations as xed, solve the system for the endogenous
variables at t = j; :::; j + k
yst = h(y
s
t ; 
s 1
t ;
~Yt 1; ~Xt; ut; )
using some iterative solution procedure (we use Powells hybrid algorithm, a modication of
Newtons method; see Powell (1970)) to nd the time paths over the horizon (1 to k) of the
endogenous variables as a function of current and lagged exogenous variables. Then use the
solution output for yst , t = j + 1; :::; j + k, in place of the assumed expectations 
s
t in the
following iteration for s = 2; :::; S or until convergence is achieved according to the chosen
stopping criterion. This step ensures that the one period ahead expectations are consistent
with the models own predictions.
An additional constraint on the expectations is that they must satisfy the terminal condi-
tions on the model at j + k + 1. These conditions are imposed to ensure that the simulated
paths for the endogenous variables converge at some terminaldate to a long run level consis-
tent with the models own long run implications (see Minford et al. 1979). Since the model
is not solved using stationarised data and so does not converge to a static steady state, these
long run levels will depend on the behaviour of the non-stationary driving variables as they
have evolved stochastically over the simulation period (deterministic trend behaviour is re-
moved). The relevant variables in the model are At and b
f
t 1, both of which are functions of
all previous shocks in the model through their unit roots. Setting the terminal conditions on
the expectations here involves solving the equilibrium system at some notional future date J ,
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when shocks have ceased, stationary variables have reached their long run constant values and
trended variables are growing at constant rates. An additional equilibrium assumption is that
the transversality condition holds, so that the level of net foreign assets bfJ is stable and there is
no long run growth in net international debt. Solving for the endogenous variables as a function
of the non-stationary variables under these assumptions implies the terminal conditions on their
expectations.
Once a dynamic rational expectations solution is found for the window t = j; :::; j + k, the
algorithm repeats for the window t = j+1; :::; j+1+k, using the previously calculated solution
values (based on the time j set of shocks) as lagged data in the j+1 solution procedure. These
steps are repeated for the sample t = m; :::; T (where m is the number of initial conditions).
For each simulation window of length k, only the rst period of the solution is retained in the
nal path for the full sample period t = m; :::; T ; i.e. the nal solution is built up from the
T  m overlaid simulations of length k.
Appendix 2
This Appendix contains all denitions and sources of data used in the study, as well as a symbol
key. The majority of UK data are sourced from the UK O¢ ce of National Statistics (ONS);
others from International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bank of England (BoE), UK Revenue and
Customs (HMRC) and Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
Labour Market Indicators were taken from the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom Project,
which sources them from the World Economic Forums Global Competitiveness Report (GCR)
and the World Bank (WB). All data are seasonally adjusted and in constant prices unless
specied otherwise.
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 (1)  (2)  (3) SUBS
Min. -0.0695 -0.1208 -0.1701 -0.0516
Max. 0.1162 0.0677 0.0939 0.0669
Std. Dev. 0.0387 0.0437 0.0747 0.0326
Table 9.2: Descriptive Statistics of Linearly Detrended Policy Variables; Constant Removed
Notes to Table 9.1:
1 Working population is total claimant count plus total workforce jobs.
2 Nominal NFA is accumulated current account surpluses (£ m), taking the Balance
of Payments international investment position as a starting point.
3 AEI for whole economy including bonuses.
4 Weights as PF . Germany proxies EU.
5 BERD is Business Enterprise R&D.
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